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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to investigate how
undergraduate students at the University of Northern Iowa
who had taken prior coursework on non-calculus general
physics with a unit on mechanics understand the Newtonian
model of motion.

In general, the study was concerned with

reasoning strategies, the preconceptions that give rise to
these strategies, and the schema that might be inferred from
the preconceptions.

In particular, the study focused on the

three fundamental notions of the Newtonian model of motion:
{a) that uniform straight line motion is equivalent to rest,
{b) that motion is relative to an inertial frame of
reference including that of the earth if the acceleration
due to rotation of the latter is neglected, and {c) that
uniform straight line motion can exist in the absence of a
net force.

Paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were

employed throughout the study.

However, a short clinical

interview was also used in order to assess prior knowledge
of the above notions.

The tasks were designed according to

the Phenomenographic approach to investigating different
understandings of reality, and the Rule Assessment
Methodology in order for a variety of strategies, correct or
incorrect, that a student might think of, be identified.
It was found that for the great majority of students uniform
straight line motion is viewed as being fundamentally
different from the state of rest, and that uniform straight

line motion can exist only in the presence of a net force.
As for the notion of relativity, students adopt a "point of
observation," rather than an inertial frame of reference,
and motion is viewed relative to that point.

This point was

either on the ground or on the fixed stars depending upon
the context of the problem in question. Several
preconceptions and two types of schemata were also
identified.

In regard to the implications of the findings

of the study for instructional practices, the explicit
teaching of the Newtonian model as well as the provision of
advance organizers and schemata at an early age should be
given priority by physics instructors.
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CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Introduction
over the past two decades considerable international
interest has been shown by science educators in studying
children's as well as university students' ideas about
physical phenomena, particularly those of mechanics.

A

wealth of both individual and group studies have been
carried out, and there are a number of documents that review
their findings {Connor, 1990; Driver, 1991; Driver
Erickson, 1983; Gilbert

&

Osborne & Freyberg, 1985).

&

Watts 1983; McDermott, 1984;
These studies were significant

in that, for the first time, collectively they provided
overwhelming evidence that students, at all levels of
instruction, bring into the classroom a great many ideas
about how the world works.
The research findings appear to indicate that, contrary
to the behaviourist view of the mind as an "empty bottle"
awaiting to be filled by the teacher, students are
continually trying to make sense of the world by building
models or schemata.

These schemata are structures or

clusters of prior concepts that students use in order to
interpret any kind of new information {Carey, 1986; Resnick,
1983).

They (schemata) are also subject to modification so

that better predictions can be made in the future (Osborne,
1984; Pope & Keen, 1981).

But they can remain unchanged so

2

long as they make sense to the students, and provide them
with satisfactory, although not correct, explanations and
predictions {Dykstra, Boyle, & Monarch, 1992; Gilbert,
Osborne, & Fensham, 1982; Viennot, 1979).

Resnick {1983}

points out that:
All learning depends on prior knowledge.
Learners try
to link new information to what they already know in
order to interpret the new material in terms of
established schemata. This is why students interpret
science demonstrations in terms of their naive theories
and why they hold onto their naive theories for so
long. {Resnick, 1983, p. 478)
Although any consideration about the origin of
particular ideas is speculative, it seems that sensorimotor
experience plays an important role in their acquisition.
For example, through early experiences with lifting,
pushing, throwing and catching objects, children do develop
ideas about motion and forces, and the schemata "forces
produce motion" and "the direction of force is the same as
the direction of motion" are very common.

Osborne {1984)

calls these schemata "mini-theories" or "gut dynamics."

He

remarks that,
through learning about the world, from the day we
are born, we develop mini-theories which apply to
specific situations and help us make predictions and
decide on certain actions. The theories may operate at
a subconscious level of thinking, they need not be
articulated, and can be used in a spontaneous and
intuitive way . . • the active efforts made at a young
age to comprehend the world enable children to make
predictions about what will happen, for example, to an
object thrown from the high chair or kicked along the
kitchen floor • • • • Gut dynamics is about the tangible
world and influences motor skills and perception.
This perception can be quite different from the reality
staring one in the face. {Osborne, 1984, p. 505}

3

In addition, these schemata seem to be reinforced by
everyday language and even by culture (Osborne, 1984;
Solomon, 1987; Viennot, 1979).

Newspapers, science fiction

books, television, all have an influence on the way people
acquire their vocabulary.

The sport commentator quite often

uses the expression "the ball was travelling with such a
great force that"; and the popular expressions such as "the
force of the explosion could be seen or heard," "your weight
increases or decreases while you are going up or down on an
elevator" together with "weightlessness" concepts of science
fiction are widely used in everyday language.

These

expressions are what Osborne (1984) calls "lay dynamics,"
and they are expressions used to provide "entertaining
conversations," although, as he points out, they are "of
little practical use in terms of doing things" (p. 506).
Language, however, can have an effect on the
understanding of fundamental concepts in another way.

Mori,

Kitagawa, and Tadang (1974a) investigated the role of
language in understanding the concepts of time and space.
They found that Thai children showed less tendency to judge
the time duration of a moving object by the distance it
moved when compared with Japanese children.

This was

attributed to the phonological distinctions between words
showing temporal and spatial length.

In Japanese, as in

English, French, or Greek,. both temporal and spatial length
are expressed by the same word; in Thai these words are

4

different.

Similar findings regarding linguistic meaning

are reported by Mori, Koyima, and Tadang (1976} who
investigated the understanding of the concept of speed in
Japanese and Thai children.

It was found that the

performance of Thai children was better than that of
Japanese, and the researchers attributed this to the fact
that in Japanese the concepts "early" and "speed" are
expressed by the same word.

And more recently, Choi and

Bowerman (1991) studied the meaning of motion in English and
Korean students.

Through the investigation of the relative

position of concepts, that is, the position in semantic
space that one concept occupies relative to another, the
different meanings for the concept of motion were noticed.
Cross-cultural studies carried out by Mori, Kitagawa,
and Tadang (1974b) as well as by Ross and Sutton (1982) also
show the effect of culture on the understanding of concepts.
Mori et al.

(1974b) studied the fundamental concept of time

in Thai and Japanese children.

It was found that, at the

elementary level, Thai children opted for a circular concept
of time (time returns to the same point), Christian Japanese
opted for a segmental concept (time had a beginning and will
end in the distant future), while public school Japanese
children showed a rectilinear concept (no beginning or end).
The same results were obtained from high school students.
Although the segmental approach was discarded, Thai children
opted again for a circular concept.

Ross and Sutton (1982)

5

found that it was the mother tongue, rather than the
language used during school instruction, which determined
the understanding of associated concepts such as
"electricity" and "energy" among English children, Tiv
speaking children educated in English, and Tiv speaking
children educated in Tiv.
But to what extent should statements like "time returns
to the same point," "forces are pushes and pulls," "forces
produce and maintain motion," "gravity requires the presence
of air," or "a car moves in a circle because the driver
turns the wheel" be considered errors, partial
understandings, or misunderstandings?

And to what extent

should they be considered inherited or acquired, and,
therefore, culture and language determined?

These questions

are central to epistemology, but as yet no definite answers
have been found.
Certainly, a distinction needs to be made, as has been
pointed out by Driver and Easley (1978), between a
misconception that results from an incorrect assimilation of
scientific theories, and an autonomous alternative framework
resulting from personal experience in an attempt to
understand the world.

The former is more likely to be held

by secondary school and university students, whereas the
latter seems to be common among children who have not yet
experienced any, or adequate, instruction.
distinction is not very helpful.

However, this

For when asked to explain
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what happens when a coin is tossed in the air, an answer
like "we give the coin a force and it goes up until that
force is all used up and then gravity takes over and the
coin comes down" is very common among children (Driver,
1991) and university students alike (Clement, 1982).

In

fact, Clement found that 72% of engineering students at the
end of a physics course failed to give the correct response!
Peters (1982) and Osborne (1984) also reconfirm that
university physics students encounter conceptual
difficulties.

Osborne (1984) was surprised at the fact

that, although 77% of a group of first year university
students could cope with relatively complex applied
mathematics, only 60% could correctly identify the force of
gravity as the only force acting on a golf ball traveling
through the air.

The "force of the hit" that accompanies

the ball throughout its flight was as common among Osborne's
univerity students, as it was among a group of secondary
school students (Watts

&

Zylbersztajn, 1981).

The consistency in the explanations of both young
children and university students indicates that language and
semantic knowledge cannot be the sole determinants of these
mistaken ideas.

In fact, the similarities between children

who have been exposed to little or no instruction, and
university students provide strong evidence for the
existence of similar, or even identical, explanatory models,
and tend to justify Johnson's (1987) position, namely, that
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almost all of our knowledge derives from bodily experiences
through metaphorical projections into abstract domains.
Johnson {1987) remarks that behind each of our concepts
there is a non-propositional mental model that guides our
thinking process and understanding, and he provides a sound
justification for the development of such mental models as
constraints of our understanding.

Drawing on the work of

several researchers and philosophers, he argues that the
most fundamental of all concepts is that of force, which,
through bodily experiences from the day we are born,
develops into various conceptual schemata such as those of
compulsion, blockage, contact, attraction, balance,
equilibrium, in-out orientation, containment, trajectory and
so forth.

Even emotions like anger are experienced through

a conceptual schema involving a fluid within a container
that can burst open, and our experience of symmetry is not
in our perception of symmetrical objects, but, instead in
our experience of bodily balance.

In short, bodily motion

and forces provide not only "a coherent meaningful structure
to our physical experience at a preconceptual level" {p.
13), but also give meaning to all abstract concepts of our
language through the use of metaphors.

What is unfortunate

though, is that these "abstract extensions" and
"metaphorical elaborations constrain our meaning and
understanding" {p. 137-138).
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More often than not, students' models and ideas are
different from the conceptions employed by the scientists,
and have been referred to variously as schemata (Champagne,
Gunstone, & Klopher, 1985), naive theories (Caramazza,
Mccloskey, & Green, 1981), naive notions (Reif & Larkin,
1991), children's science (Osborne, 1984), alternative
conceptual frameworks (Carey, 1986), alternative conceptions
(Dykstra et al., 1992), misconceptions (Helm, 1980; Savage &
Williams, 1989), preconceptions (Clement, 1982) and so
forth.

However, it was Ausubel (1968) who first used the

term "preconception" to describe these ideas.

His claim was

that these "preconceptions" are likely to persist despite
instruction, and are therefore the most important factor in
the learning process.
Although the terms schemata, preconceptions,
misconceptions, alternative frameworks or conceptions are
used interchangeably to describe ideas which are at variance
with those of the scientists, it should be stressed that the
the term "schema" refers either to a non-propositional
mental image (Johnson, 1987) or to a structure that
facilates conceptual organization (Anderson, 1985).
A "preconception," on the other hand, is better justifiable
as a term to describe an idea or "preconcept" developed at
an early age, even before formal instruction has begun, and
which can remain unchanged unless challenged by the teacher.
In addition, it is through the preconceptions of a student
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that one can interpret his/her schematic structure, since
access to, and interpretation of, the latter becomes
possible only through the externalization of the former.
And it is for this reason that research on conceptual
understanding has concentrated upon preconceptions.
By now, a general consensus about these preconceptions
has been reached with the following general characteristics:
1.

They begin well before children encounter formal

instruction, and they cross national boundaries (Driver,
1991) •
2.

They are often missed by the teachers (Anderson &

Smith, 1985; Berg & Brower, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1982;
Terry, Jones, & Hurford, 1985; Viennot, 1979; Watts &
Zylbersztajn, 1981).
3.

They can exist without any contradiction with what

is taught by the teacher (di Sessa, 1982; Driver, 1991;
Gilbert et al., 1982; Viennot, 1979).
4.

They are change-resistant (Brown, 1989; Viennot,

1979) .
5.

They persist into adulthood despite many years of

formal instruction (Driver, 1991), and can be held by
university students (Clement, 1982; Halloun & Hestenes,
1985a, 1895b).
6.
the

They are in many ways similar to the ideas held by

scientists of the past (Boeha, 1990; Halloun &

Hestenes, 1985b; Mccloskey, 1983; Whitaker, 1983).
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7.

They form a coherent theory that can explain

phenomena of force and motion (Carey, 1986; Clement, 1982;
Mccloskey, 1983; Viennot, 1979).
8.

They have less internal coherence than both the

Aristotelian and the impetus theories of motion since they
are not used with consistency in all contexts (Halloun &
Hestenes, 1985b; McDermott, 1984; White, 1983).
9.

They pose serious implications for the learning

process (diSessa, 1983; Dykstra et al., 1992; Gilbert et
al., 1982; Halloun & Hestenes, 1985a; McDermott, 1984; Reif
&

Larkin, 1991).

The last characteristic, namely the implications of the
existence and persistence of preconceptions for the learning
process, is the most important message that has emerged from
the various studies on student conceptual undestanding.

For

unless these preconceptions are challenged by teachers,
science will continue to be taught as a vocabulary lesson
that will be nothing more than "a recipe for disaster"
(Carey, 1986, p. 1,124).

And as Viennot (1979) has put it,

preconceptions, particularly about motion and forces, will
result in juxtaposition of academic knowledge and intuitive
science, "laying one on the other without conflict between
the two" (p. 213).
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the present study was to investigate how
undergraduate students who have taken coursework on noncalculus physics with elements of Newtonian mechanics
understand the concept of uniform straight line motion, that
is motion with constant speed in a straight line, as well as
the notion that motion, in general, is relative to a frame
of reference including that of the earth.
In particular, the study was concerned with reasoning
strategies, the preconceptions that give rise to these
strategies, and the schema that might be inferred from these
preconceptions.

The ultimate purpose of the study, however,

was to contribute to an improvement of the teaching and
learning of physics in terms of efficiency and
effectiveness.
Research Questions
1.

Do students have the qualitative definition of

uniform straight line motion?
a.

Do they view uniform straight line motion as being

a relative kind of motion?
b.

Do they view uniform straight line motion as being

equivalent to rest?
2.

Do students view motion, in general, as being

relative to a frame of reference, including that of the
earth if its acceleration due to rotation is considered
negligible?
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3.

Do students have the conceptual link between

uniform straight line motion and zero net force?
4.

What strategies do students employ in their

reasoning process?
5.

What preconceptions lead students to employ those

strategies?
6.

What schema might be inferred from those

preconceptions?
7.

What interpetation might be given to the

representation of the concepts of force and motion?
Significance of the Study
Undoubtedly, any study on conceptual understanding will
uncover a number of preconceptions, and, at the same time,
help the researcher with an interpretation of the students'
conceptual schema.

As previous research in this area has

shown, these schemata and preconceptions are the single most
important factor in understanding any new piece of knowledge
(Dykstra et al., 1992; Carey, 1986; Resnick, 1983).
Conceptual schemata become manifest in reading
(Anderson, 1984), human reasoning (Johnson, 1987; JohnsonLaird, 1983), problem solving (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser,
1982; Greeno, 1978; Larkin, 1983; Larkin & Reif, 1979) and
science learning (Carey, 1986; Driver, 1991).

However, more

often than not, conceptual schemata, particularly in the
area of force and motion, give rise to preconceptions that
interfere with formal instruction.

Viennot (1979) remarks:
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We all share a common explanatory scheme of
intuitive physics which, although we were not taught it
at school, represents a common and self-consistent
stock of concepts and which, however wrong it may be,
resists attempts to change or modify it. This
intuitive physics presents, at the very least, a
considerable challenge to teaching. (Viennot, 1979, p.
205)
current views in science education (Basili & Sanford,
1991; Brown & Clement, 1989; Carey, 1986; Dykstra et al.,
1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992; Posner, Strike, Hewson, &
Gertzog, 1982; Resnick, 1983; Shuell, 1987) hold conceptual
change as the number one priority of science teachers.
This, in turn, implies that teachers first become aware of
what preconceptions and schemata the students might have,
and then challenge them in order for a conceptual change to
be produced.

Gilbert, Osborne, and Fensham (1982) did in

fact find that the teacher's explanation is not enough,
since the problem seems to be not the acquisition of the new
concept, but the reluctance on the part of the student to
give up the initial preconception.

In most cases students

adopt either two perspectives or a mixed outcome.

In the

first case students retain both the original conception and
the teacher's explanation as a memorized version, whereas in
the second case they can learn some of the taught material
but fail to integrate it into their conceptual framework.
Similar findings have been reported by Halloun and
Hestenes (1985a); instruction brought about only a 14%
improvement on student knowledge.

As they report, the same

preconceptions were entertained even after the completion of
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the instruction.

Halloun and Hestenes (1985a) also found

that physics students could successfully solve problems
without understanding the underlying conceptions, thus
confirming what both Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1982), and
Larkin (1983) reported from their own studies.
However, unlike previous studies which investigated
isolated concepts in specific contexts, this study
attempted to assess the "whole picture" of the Newtonian
concept of motion in the students' cognitive structure
through a wide variety of problem situations.

For "only by

keeping careful track of how students respond in a rich
variety of situations will we be able to better infer which
conceptions are responsible for their behavior"
(Dykstra et al., 1992, p. 621).

It was thought

that this approach would enable students to put into
relationship all their prior conceptions and thus present a
more coherent picture of how they understand.

Previous

research in the area of Newtonian mechanics has concentrated
mainly on the motion-implies-a-force preconception.

The

present study attempted to assess all related concepts that
might have been in the students' schema of motion.
But there is also another reason why this study was
important.

The concept of motion is the most fundamental of

all concepts, since it is central to all of physics.

There

is an argument, that in order to understand physics one has
to understand mechanics.

It is therefore imperative that a
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good understanding be secured before students move on to
other areas of physics.

How can students be taught even an

introductory special relativity course without a good
understanding of the concept of motion?

Even collisions of

high-energy particles are better understood through
mechanical models utilizing billiard balls!
True, the early 20th century saw the collapse of
Newtonian mechanics, since Newton's laws were shown to be
unsatisfactory over very small distances, and at very high
velocities.

Even the Newtonian theory of gravitation was

found inadequate, and was replaced by the General Principle.
And it is also true that, as important as Newtonian
mechanics is, it does not represent an accurate picture of
modern physics.

In fact it can present an extremely

distorted view of the world.

For according to Osborne

(1990), it fails "to meet one of the first aims of physics
education--to present an ontology of the physical universe
answering the child's question--what is the world like?" (p.
191) .
Yet, it should be recognized that it is the way it is
presented and not the Newtonian mechanics itself that gives
this "false" picture of the world.

For although Newton's

model is based on the determinism of the seventeenth century
natural philosophy,

it is mainly the imposition of the

correct answer to a given problem situation that
overstresses this determinism.

And apart from this
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argument, we have to accept the fact that the uniqueness of
Newton's intellectual achievement still exists.

It cannot

be discarded as an obsolete theory, since it gives accurate
solution to an immense number of problems.

And despite the

shift of the paradigms, the fundamental questions that were
posed by Newton have remained the same.

For as Einstein

himself commented:
No one must think that Newton's great creation can be
overthrown in any real sense by this or any other
theory. His clear and wide ideas will forever retain
their significance as the foundation on which our
modern conceptions of physics have been built.
(Einstein, 1950, p. 58)
Assumptions
1.

Human understanding is a complex process that is

not quantifiable.
2.

Students understand when they become emotionally

involved of their own free will.
3.

Understanding is the result of imaginative

restructuring of ideas and experiences students already have
rather than the taking in of new ideas.
4.

Students show what and how they understand by

putting into relationship all the possible factors that
might be involved in a given problem situation.
5.

Understanding is contextual and can be assessed

only through a wide variety of problem tasks referring to
the same concept.

17
Delimitations
1.

The present study was descriptive explanatory and

its findings can be generalized only to a population with
similar prior conceptions, beliefs, and expectations.
2.

The present study was qualitative and therefore no

statistical information was produced.
3.

The participants were all volunteers but received

10 course grade points.
Limitations
1.

The emotional state of the students, that is, their

degree of involvement and the desire to actively construct
meaning, could not be controlled.
2.

The interaction between the interviewer and the

students resulted in a negotiation of meanings and
understanding in the form of a conceptual change.
3.

Prior propositional knowledge might not have been

activated through the problem tasks used in the study.
Definitions of Terms
1.

Advance Organizer:

Brief statement formulated in

terms that are already familiar to the learner, and which is
presented at a higher level of abstractness, inclusiveness,
and generality.

It helps subsume other less inclusive and

more specific concepts and propositions.

They act as mental

bridges that connect prior with new concepts (Ausubel, 1965;
Ausubel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978).
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2.

Analogical Representation:

It is a

representational format of knowledge in which accurate
images of original scenes are maintained (Norman &
Rumelhart, 1976).
3.

Cognitive Structure:

Organization of concepts in

the mind that acts as a mechanism in one's interaction with
the external world {Piaget, 1970).
4.

Concept:

Regularity in naturally occuring or man-

made objects (entities) and events (happenings)

(Novak &

Gowin, 1984).
5.

Constructivism:

A perspective which holds that

knowledge, rather than passively received, is actively
constructed in one's mind.

The constructions can be either

the representations of an autonomous real world to which we
must fit or ''accomodate" (Piaget, 1970), or the viable
explanations of personal experiences (von Glasersfeld,
1989).

An important implication of the latter

constructivist perspective is the existence of a plurality
of worlds rather than a single ontological reality (Goodman,
1984; von Glasersfeld, 1987).

The constructivist

perspective also holds that what is constructed in a given
situation depends as much upon one's prior concepts and
beliefs, as upon the characteristics of the context of each
particular situation (Driver & Oldham, 1986).
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6.

Episodic Memory:

Memory that receives and stores

information about temporally dated events, and temporalspatial relations among these events (Tulving, 1972).
7.

Frame of Reference:

motion is analyzed.

A system relative to which

It is chosen in such a way that

collection and analysis of data are more easily
accomplished.

An inertial frame of reference is a frame of

reference moving with constant velocity (Alonso & Finn,
197 0) .
8.

Integrative Reconciliation:

The process whereby

two or more concepts are seen to relate to each other in a
new way.

It occurs when explicit effort is made to explore

relationships between concepts and propositions, and to
point out significant similarities and differences in order
to reconcile real or apparent inconsistencies (Ausubel,
1965) .
9.

Knowledge:

The result of the construction that

begins with propositions between the concepts one already
has and new concepts (Novak & Gowin, 1984), through an
interaction with the physical and social world (Driver &
Oldham, 1986).
(Gergen, 1982).

It is public and is shared by others
It can be declarative--that is knowing

"that"-- procedural--that is knowing "how" (Rumelhart &
Norman, 1981), or conditional--that is knowing the
conditions under which a rule or concept are applicable
(Prawat, 1989).
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10.

Meaning:

A construction taking place within the

short-term memory where organized knowledge retrieved from
the long-term memory interacts with new concepts (Wandersee,
1992), and it is personal and idiosyncratic (Johnson, 1987;
Polanyi, 1958).
11.

Newtonian Model:

A representation of phenomena of

force and motion based on four distinct components of human
experience, namely, matter, motion, absolute space, and
absolute time.

Central to the model is the relativity of

motion, and the idea that motion at constant velocity can
take place even in the absence of a net force, and therefore
rest and motion at constant velocity are fundamentally
equivalent (Hadzigeorgiou, 1987).
12.

Preconceptions:

those of the scientists.

Ideas which are at variance with
They result both from personal

experience and from an incorrect assimilation of scientific
theories.

They are often referred to as common sense

theories, common sense beliefs, misconceptions, alternative
conceptions, alternative frameworks, intuitive theories,
naive theories, and children's science (Driver, 1991;
Dykstra et al., 1992; Gilbert & watts, 1983; Halloun &
Hestenes, 1985).
13.

Progressive Differentiation:

The process whereby

concepts are being constantly modified in order to acquire
more meaning.

(Ausubel, 1965).
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14.

Propositional Representation:

we retain our knowledge about the world.

A manner by which
It is a

representational format in which concepts are expressed as
statements about the relationships among the concepts
(Norman & Rumelhart, 1976).
15.

Reality:

Whatever constructs exist in one's

Cognitive Structure, and through which one interprets and
reinterprets one's experiences (Driver & Oldham, 1986).
This definition does not differentiate between a Reality
existing "out there" and a Reality of which people become
aware.

If a differentiation is made, however, the latter

could be called Actuality (Fischer & Aufschnaiter, 1993).
16.

Schema:

Abstract propositional structure taking

the form of a mental image that is developed through
sensorimotor experiences (with motion and forces) at a very
early age (Johnson, 1987), and also reinforced by everyday
language (Osborne, 1984; Solomon, 1987; Viennot, 1979).

As

more experiences and concepts are acquired the schema
evolves and takes the form of a hierarchically organized
structure.

This structure can also represent a single

concept, object or event, according to a slot structure,
where slots specify values that the concept has on various
attributes (Anderson, 1985).
17.

Semantic Memory:

Memory about words and other

verbal symbols, their meaning, and their relations among
them (Tulving, 1972).
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18.

Strategy:

Reasoning method employing a number of

factors involved in a given problem task (Maloney, 1985).
19.

Subsumption:

The process whereby new knowledge is

incorporated into more general concepts or propositions
(Ausubel, Novak,
20.

&

Hanesian, 1978).

Understanding:

Mental activity that involves an

attempt to relate a new piece of information to an
established schema (Carey, 1986; Resnick, 1983).

However,

the following are also involved:
a.

Expectations to form meaning (Bruner, 1986; Fischer
&

Ausfchnaiter, 1993; Wheatley, 1991).

b.

Emotions (Norman, 1981, Scheffler, 1991).

c.

Freedom and responsibility to construct meaning
(Kelly, 1970).

d.

Sharing of meaning (Mead, 1932; Solomon, 1987;
Wheatley, 1991).

e.

Relationships among concepts (Bruner, 1963;
Karplus, 1981; Novak

&

Gowin, 1984; Prawat, 1989;

Resnick, 1983; Scheffler, 1991; Wandersee, 1992).
f.

Ability to use of a concept in multiple contexts
(Bowden et al., 1992; Nickerson, 1985).
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

This chapter consists of four major parts.

In the

first part there is a discussion of the fundamental problem
of human understanding as well as some of the limitations
inherent in the problem itself.

This part does not provide

an in-depth review of the related literature--this would
require an excursion into the philosophy of cognition over
the past twenty or so centuries.

Instead, it demonstrates

some of the difficulties with which any researcher on human
understanding is confronted.

Moreover, an argument about

how one might approach the problem of human understanding,
despite those difficulties, is also raised.

In the second

part there is a review of the epistemological foundations of
constructivism.

The purpose of this part is to present,

through a discussion of the fundamental ideas of Vico, Kant,
Piaget, and Kelly, the constructivist model of knowledge,
which, as it is argued, is in line with development of
scientific concepts.

The third part provides a synthesis of

ideas about how humans understand.

The purpose of this part

is to discuss findings from cognitive psychology that give
support to the constructivist model.

Finally, the fourth

part provides an in-depth review of the literature on
student conceptual understanding in the area of force and
motion.

Starting from the pioneering work of Jean Piaget,

this section discusses student preconceptions as have been
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identified by researchers worldwide.

The purpose of the

discussion of preconceptions is to draw attention to the
importance of their awareness by physics instructors.
Part 1:

The Problem and the Limits of
Human Understanding

The problem of human understanding is certainly not a
new one.

Each generation, from the time of Plato to the

present day, has reformulated the detailed epistemological
questions in its own terms.

However, the central guiding

problems have remained the same: "How do we come to know?,"
"What sort of things do we know?," "To what extent do our
senses determine what we know?," "Do our prior concepts, if
any, predetermine our ability to acquire new knowledge?,"
and "Is there any difference between knowing and
understanding?"
Nowadays most of the interest in student conceptual
understanding is, hopefully, to answer the same
epistemological questions about knowing, knowledge,
concepts, and understanding.

Yet, researchers on human

cognition are faced with a problem simply because they do
not t1really 11 know what to look for when doing research on
conceptual understanding.

For any serious attempt on their

part to define such terms is bound to leave them in the
dark.
Current views in cognitive science and science
education involve what is called conceptual change rather
than conceptual growth (Brown & Clement, 1989; Dykstra et
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al., 1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992; Posner et al., 1982).
In sharp contrast to behaviourist views, the current
constructivist perspective places emphasis on mental
reorganization rather than "mental saturation."
Understanding seems to take place not so much through the
taking in of new knowledge, as through a restructuring of
ideas we already have (Driver & Bell, 1986).
science explicitly testifies to this fact.

The history of
Kuhn (1970)

challenged the traditional view of science as a continuous
accumulation of knowledge, and suggested paradigm shifts
which overturn much of what has been taken as "true" before.
However, such mental restructuring and paradigm shifts
in the concepts of people, be they scientists working at the
frontiers of knowledge or students in a classroom, do not
take place spontaneously.

Nor is it an easy and

straightforward task to assess them.

It seems that the

search for knowledge does not involve rules, standard
hierarchies of processes, but instead factors unique to the
particular individual seeking knowledge and understanding
(Millar, 1988; Polanyi, 1958).

There are arguments that

show the immensity and complexity of the problem of human
understanding.
The Nature of Knowledge and Understanding
Russell (1948) expresses the view that knowledge is
something vague and it is a matter of degree, while Popper
(1974) argues that even scientific knowledge, that is, our
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best knowledge, is purely conjectural.

Toulmin (1972) also

points out that "the precise meaning of the terms concept
and conceptual is rarely made explicit and frequently left
quite obscure" (p. 8).

In addition, understanding and

knowledge are intimately related to beliefs, intuitions, and
expectations (Russell, 1948), and any philosophical
analysis, both metaphysical and epistemological, will
unlikely provide us with any definitions.
No doubt, there is a close link between knowledge and
understanding, since the latter presupposes the former.
Moreover, the more knowledge one has the better one's
understanding.

Yet, one need not know everything there is

to know about a specific concept in order to understand it.
our day-to-day communication is based upon such an
"understanding."

However, a thorough understanding of a

concept is impossible simply because that would require
knowledge of everything to which it relates (Nickerson,
1985) .
It becomes quite apparent that in attempting to arrive
at an acceptable definition of knowledge and understanding
many contradictions begin to emerge.

And the paradox, as

had been identified by Socrates, is that the more knowledge
one has about a certain aspect of the world, the more aware
one becomes of the extent of one's ignorance.

Understanding

in this sense is equated with confusion, which, however,
according to Nickerson,
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does not mean that one's understanding actually
decreases but simply that one's appreciation of the
complexity of that aspect of the world is likely to
increase, which may be, after all, a better
understanding of a fundamental sort.
(Nickerson, 1985, p. 230)
But although Nickerson's (1985) point is well taken, the
problem of assessing human understanding still remains a
challenge.

Does any person who is confused demonstrate an

understanding?

The only possibility available, as has been

pointed out by Trowbridge and McDermott (1980) in their
study with physics students, is to assess the "degree" of
understanding:
We may consider as an indicator of degree of
understanding the extent to which a student's
understanding corresponds to that of a physicist, i.e.,
the extent to which the student can define a particular
concept in an acceptable operational manner,
distinguish it from related, but different, concepts
and apply it successfully. (Trowbridge & McDermott,
1980, p. 1,020)
It seems that this "indicator of degree of
understanding" can take us out of our dilemma.

The problem

though is that it is the "number" of "successful
applications" of a concept that will determine its
understanding, and, therefore, an abstract mental process is
reduced to quantifiable terms.

And in such a case, a scale,

probably based upon a certain number and types of
applications, with a "minimum amount of understanding," will
determine the degree of a person's understanding.

The

question, however, is "who," and "by what standards," will
select the number and the types of applications.
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Believing and Understanding
Beliefs, according to Polanyi (1958), are "the source
of all knowledge" (p. 266), and even "truth is something
that can be thought of only by believing it" (p. 305).
Evidence, of course, for such statements can be found in the
developmemt of major scientific theories.

Metaphysical

beliefs about the universe played a major role in Einstein's
thought, and Galileo held on to his conviction about the
motion of the earth despite the fear of imminent death.
But can we say that all people who understand such
theories believe in them?

Do people believe in the Big Bang

or the the theory of evolution?

For there is a distinction

to be made between those who have the commitment and the
intellectual passion to search for a pre-existing truth, and
those who just understand theories, concepts, and symbols
without necessarily believing them.

According to Goodman

and Elgin (1988),
Whereas knowledge typically requires truth, belief, and
substantiation, understanding requires none of these.
Statements can be understood regardless of their truth
and regardless of belief in them. (Goodman & Elgin,
1988, p. 161)
Driver and Oldham (1986) speaking from a pedagogical
point of view "believe" that understanding is not the same
as believing, since "it is possible to construct a meaning
to generate a way of seeing something" like "phlogiston
theory, without accepting it" (p. 110).
a paradox.

Yet, here there is

For if it is accepted that knowledge is
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constructed by the individual in his or her attempt to
understand the world, then all knowledge can be seen as
beliefs which are tenaciously held (Dykstra et al., 1992).
There is a difference between the belief in "a force
acting on a baseball traveling through the air" and the
factual statement "nuclei are composed of protons and
neutrons."

The former is constructed by individuals

themeselves, while the latter can be retrieved from a
textbook, or imparted by a teacher during instruction.

And

regardless of whether or not the factual statement about the
composition of nuclei is taken as true, a force in the
direction of the baseball's motion is understood and taken
to be a true belief!
The Emotional Dimension
Emotions seem to be intricately related to cognition
(Bower, 1981; Norman, 1981; Scheffler, 1991; West & Foster,
1976), and matters become even more complicated.

Polanyi

(1958) provides strong arguments for a "personal knowledge"
with an emotional tacit dimension that cannot even be
assessed.
Into every act of knowing there enters a tacit and
passionate contribution of the person knowing what is
being known, and . • . this coefficient is no mere
imperfection, but a necessary component of all
knowledge. All this evidence turns into a
demonstration of the utter baselessness of all
alleged knowledge, unless we can wholeheartedly uphold
our own convictions. (Polanyi, 1958, p. 312)
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The Hierarchy of the Cognitive Domain
Certainly, Bloom's work on the "Taxonomy of Educational
Objectives" (Bloom, 1956) did throw some light in the area
of human understanding, and particularly the cognitive
domain.

But his compartmentalization of the thinking

process has its own problems too.

No doubt, "Comprehension"

requires a person to do more than memorize information.

But

do students say that "forces act in the direction of motion"
because they have memorized every piece of information, word
by word, about "forces" and "motion?"

Do students not

really "Comprehend," and therefore explain in their own
words, why "heavy bodies should fall faster than light
ones?"

Do students not understand, since it makes sense,

that once they stop applying a force on a body, the body
stops moving, and therefore "all motion implies a force in
the direction of motion?"

Although all these are common

sense beliefs, and should be considered "serious alternative
hypotheses" (Halloun & Hestenes, 1985b), they are
nonetheless at variance with what the teacher is supposed to
teach.

According to Bloom's (1956) model, students can move

on to the Application level, since they have the
prerequisites required at the Comprehension level.

However,

unless conceptual change takes place while students are at
the Comprehension level, it would be meaningless to ask them
to apply a concept or principle to other situations.

In

addition, it would be more appropriate to speak of levels of
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understanding, where "students move from one level . . • to
another more complete one" (Bowden et al., 1992, p. 263),
rather than of Comprehension, Application, and so forth.
On the other hand, is "Application" or "Analysis" so
different, or even at a higher level in the taxonomy, from
"Comprehension?"

Is it not true that sometimes we have

first to analyze in order to understand?

Is it not true

that we understand better by using a variety of
applications, and that we do make evaluation judgements even
before we become willing to understand?
In problem-solving under conditions of uncertainty
where there seems to be no right answer, or no information
available, judgements based upon assumptions about knowledge
and reality are the first, if not the only, means to
understand a situation (Kitchener, 1983).

Evaluation

judgements that make one decide about what is more relevant
to a given problem situation played the most important role
in the development of conceptual models and scientific
theories.

Ignoring friction, shape and colour of objects,

and describing motion as change in position of dimensionless
particles in 3-D space, was a judgement that was not based
upon any current knowledge about motion, forces, and the
nature of matter.
Understanding and Hemispheric Preferences
Problems, however, seem to exist even with the Learning
Style Inventory developed by Kolb (1985), and the 4MAT model
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developed by McCarthy (1990).

The latter, acknowledging

Kolb's contibution, argues that there are "those who
perceive in a sensing/feeling way" and who "project
themselves into the reality of the now," and "those who
think through experiences" by attending to the "abstract
dimensions of reality" (p. 31).
But although it can be true that people have
hemispheric preferences when perceiving and processing
information, there is a question about the validity of the
model with its four quadrants.

Can it be so simple that

people should fall within those quadrants?

Can an

individual not be both a thinker and intuitor, or both a
feeler and thinker?

Can an individual not belong to all

those four categories, depending upon the particular task
and the circumstances?

In addition, is perception quite

separate from processing?

Do "reflective observation" and

"active experimentation," as the ends of the processing
continuum, not involve some thinking, which is only one end
on the continuum of perception?
It sounds reasonable that, since the human mind invents
models that can explain the world, it can invent a model of
itself too.

But perhaps this might be the only model that

cannot be invented.

Which feature of the human mind should

be included, or excluded, so that it can best represent "the
real mind?"
decision?

And who, and by what standards, should make the
In the end it becomes evident that even this
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model of the mind represents a personal belief of his
inventor!
The Piagetian Model
It should be stressed that Piaget's biological model
(Piaget, 1972a) consisting of three separate phases, namely,
assimilation, disequilibration, and accomodation also poses
problems.

The reason for this is that it does not

necessarily explain human understanding.

It seems that the

disequilibration that results from the dissonance between
existing concepts and experiences that explicitly contradict
these concepts can help us understand.

Yet as research by

Mccloskey (1983) showed, even college students failed to
give the correct answer to problem situations that seem to
have provided rich opportunities for accomodation and
reflective abstraction.

These findings undermine the

Piagetian model, for they show that even motor activities
that are done sensori-motorically, reflectively are known
poorly.
But there is further evidence that undermines Piaget's
model.

For as research has shown (Driver et al., 1985;

Johnson-Laird, 1983), children, through early experiences,
build models or conceptual schemata in order to understand
what is going on around them.

Most of the time though these

models and schemata are at variance with those of the
scientists, despite the fact that children do seem to
understand and explain the world!

In short, autonomous

34

cognitive development, as postulated by Piaget, does not
necessarily lead to understanding since it can lead to the
construction of "false" knowledge.

This, of course, may

sound self-contradictory, but knowledge and understanding
have also a public dimension that complements, rather than
contradicts, Polanyi's personal component.

This can be also

seen in Popper's (1972) three worlds: the world of
perception, the personal world of mental constructions, and
the public world of knowledge as documented in reports,
books, and journals.

The interrelationship between the

personal and the public dimensions of knowledge and
understanding is stated by Johnson (1987):
To know is to understand in a certain manner, a manner
which can be shared by others who join with you to form
a community of understanding. (Johnson, 1987, p. 206)
The Conceptual structure of Knowledge
Bruner (1963) and Hirst (1973), although speaking from
different perspectives--the former as a cognitive scientist,
and the latter as a philosopher--see understanding as
involving the grasp of the structure of a discipline.

But

what is the structure of a scientific discipline like
Newtonian mechanics?

Accepting current views about the

nature of reality and human knowledge (Gregory, 1988;
Manicas & Secord, 1983), it becomes obvious that it is the
human mind itself that constructs the structure or the
logical organization of a discipline.

If, of course, it is

implied that "grasping the structure" is equivalent to
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helping students assimilate the structure with which a
certain subject like Newtonian mechanics is presented in a
book, two things can happen:

either the students assimilate

the structure of the book in a rote fashion, or they
construct their own meaning, and therefore structure, by
taking into account their prior conceptions.

However, in

the former case understanding will never take place, and in
the latter every student will have his or her own structure
which might be different from that of the textbook's or the
teacher's.

But the question remains:

do those students who

constructed their own conceptual organization "see the
structure", as Scheffler (1991, p. 36) suggests?

It is not

very clear whose structure the student is supposed to see,
because Scheffler himself says that the structure of a
discipline is not what the author says or means.
Hirst's (1973) arguments for understanding by having
the fundamental concepts of a discipline have their problems
too.

For it would be difficult to isolate certain concepts,

particularly of a scientific discipline, and "term" them
fundamental.

For example, which concept of the Newtonian

model is more fundamental?

Force, or motion, or both?

It

is quite apparent that motion is more fundamental if one
starts inductively, and force becomes the fundamental
concept if one starts deductively.

It might seem, of

course, that the argument could be settled if it were
accepted that both are fundamental.

Yet it could be further
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argued that space and time are more fundamental than both
force and motion since, according to Kant, these two
concepts are "a priori.''

In fact, Kant does not even call

them concepts but forms of intuition (Russell, 1948, p.
708).

The only one who could settle this kind of argument

is Newton himself, who based his model on the four distinct
components of human experience, namely, matter, space, time,
and motion (Hadzigeorgiou, 1987).

Yet, his starting point

was motion, since induction played a major role in his work.
But would motion, as a starting point, be a guarantee
for understanding?

Would induction, as was used by Newton,

result in understanding?

It seems that if one were to

follow Newton's logic of reasoning in the classroom, two
strategies

would be appropriate for understanding.

First

to instruct or train students how to observe phenomena of
motion, and second to start the teaching of the Newtonian
model by introducing the concepts of length and time, and
then move on to velocity and acceleration.

At the end, the

concept of force would be introduced and everybody could be
confident that understanding has taken place.

So far,

however, both approaches have not helped students to
understand (Ausubel et al., 1978; Shelley, 1989).

For, on

the one hand, observations are theory laden and are always
preceded by a hypothesis (Popper, 1972); and on the other,
the direction of cognition does not take place from simple
concepts to the more complex concepts and principles but
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rather in the opposite direction, from a general problem to
the specific concepts and principles involved in the problem
(Ausubel et al., 1978).
Linguistic Meaning
Toulmin (1972), in his seminal work on human
understanding, has argued that, although each of us has his
or her own thoughts, our concepts are necessarily and
inevitably shared.

And yet, this sharing of concepts within

a certain social context poses a problem, since there is the
inescapable subjectivity of linguistic meaning.

For as

Glasersfeld (1989) has pointed out,
We can no longer maintain the preconceived notion that
words convey ideas or knowledge; nor can we believe
that a listener who apparently "understands" what we
say must necessarily have conceptual structures that
are identical with ours. (Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 134)
It is quite evident that understanding through
linguistic communication, oral or written, necessitates an
active construction of meaning on the part of the listener
or reader.

However, there is no guarantee that such an

understanding will take place, unless the listener or reader
has built a conceptual framework that is compatible and
fits--not matches--with the speaker's or author's conceptual
framework.

This fit, though, "manifests itself in no other

way than that the receiver says and does nothing that
contravenes the speaker's expectations" (Glasersfeld, 1989,
p. 134).
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Ogden and Richards (1956), starting from the premise
that human communication involves thoughts (mental
processes), words (symbols), and things (referents), have
pointed out the problems, complexities, and ambiguities
associated with linguistic meaning which always requires a
personal interpretation of a sign or symbol.
noticed that:

They have also

(a) meanings can be denotative and

connotative, something any physics teacher is aware of when
acceleration is taken to mean only an increase in speed,
although in mechanics it refers to both increase and
decrease, as well as change in direction, (b) definitions
are contextual, since "they are relevant to some purpose or
situation" (p. 111), and (c) meanings can be symbolic and
emotive.

In regard to the last differentiation between

linguistic meanings, Odgen and Richards (1956) remark that,
In symbolic speech the essential considerations are the
correctness of the symbolization and the truth of the
references. In evocative speech the essential
consideration is the character aroused. Symbolic
statements may indeed be used as a means of evoking
attitudes but when this use is occurring it will be
noticed that the truth or falsity of the statements is
of no consequence provided that they are accepted by
the hearer. (Ogden & Richards, 1956, p. 239)
Intellectual Relativism
Leaving aside beliefs, emotions, and their relation to
human understanding, there are still problems if one takes
into account the effect of language, and accepts the
evidence that tends to justify linguistic relativism (Choi
Bowerman, 1991; Mori, Kitagawa, & Tadang, 1974).

The work

&
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of Talmy (1975) also shed enough light on how different
languages combine different notions to form meaning and
words.

In fact, these studies reconfirm what both Toulmin

(1972) and Bernstein (1983) have stressed:

that there is no

permanent and neutral conceptual framework that can provide
us with a rational judgement.

It is therefore crucial that

the evaluation of an individual's conceptual framework take
place by an individual who speaks the same language, and
belongs to the same culture as well.
However, the problems with relativism do not end here.
For in looking down the history of mankind, it becomes
evident that ideas about how humans understand are
inevitably shaped by ideas about the world prevalent at a
particular time.

Plato's approach was purely philosophical,

and therefore speculative.

Descartes and Locke, although

critical thinkers, were also men of their time who
approached the problem of human understanding from the
perspective of current ideas about physics, physiology, and
psychology.

Therefore they both studied epistemological

problems in the light of the prior conceptions about a fixed
order of Nature, and an inert matter that was distinct from
a rational mind (Toulmin, 1972).
Dewey's concepts about Darwin's theory of evolution
also played a major, and perhaps the most important, role in
his thought, as it can be seen in his Experience and
Education (1938) and How We Think (1933).

It is no
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coincidence that thinking and learning, as integral parts of
the knowing process, have evolved because they both have a
vital function--namely the survival of man in the struggle
of life.

It is therefore obvious that his pragmatism and

his instrumentalist theory of truth are the results of, and
at the same time rooted in, a practical view of knowledge.
And Piaget is no exception.

Although a genetic

epistemologist, his earlier training in biology did have a
profound effect upon his subsequent philosophical thinking.
Not only the terms assimilation, equilibration, and
accomodation, but also his idea of postulating the
construction of cognitive structures in a developmental way,
show the influence of biology.
At present, constructivist views about the nature of
knowledge, reality, and understanding are gaining
acceptance, and we also view the human mind as an
information processing machine.

But the question remains:

what intellectual authority does the thinking of Plato or
Descartes have over that of Dewey or Piaget or the modern
constructivists?

For if we accept the fact that "we are

brought up with certain ideas about society and morality,
about geometry and algebra, about matter and the universe"
and "we learn to regard certain methods of investigation and
types of arguments as rational or scientific, and others as
superstitious or muddle-headed" (Toulmin, 1972, pp. 50-51),
would it not be true that our modes of thought can be as
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much reflections of our particular time and place in history
as our modes of social behaviour?
Twenty years or so ago the human brain was believed to
be compartmentalized into three different and separate
domains, but at present the holistic mechanism of cognition
is gaining acceptance.

And the idea that brought about the

cognitive revolution, namely that the human brain is nothing
more than a computer is currently criticized {Scheffler,
1991) •

Following this line of reasoning, no rational authority
appears to exist, and no claims can be made on behalf of the
ideas of Plato or Dewey as compared with those of today's or
tomorrow's cognitive scientists.

Therefore the question

"who is right?" seems to be meaningless.
Approaching the Problem of Human Understanding
Having discussed the complexities associated with human
understanding, the most plausible question that might be
asked is how one might approach it.

At first glance this

appears to be a difficult, if not an impossible, task.
Given in addition the fact that an assessment of human
understanding will inevitably involve personal
interpretations, the validity of that assessment seems to be
called into question.

Yet, what is consoling is that we

have at our disposal a rich store of knowledge that has been
accumulated over the past 2000 years.

And more consoling,

as a consequence, is the fact that we know more than any of
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those past thinkers who approached the same problem.

This

knowledge though is a powerful tool provided that neither a
relativist nor an objectivist approach is adopted, and
therefore a coherent system of ideas is established.
Although we will inevitably approach the problem of
human understanding from our current perspectives about the
world and human nature, we should be careful not to fall
into the trap of relativism.

Nor should we adopt an

absolutist view of our, or any, intellectual authority.
After all, Plato seems to have been justified by modern
cognitive scientists who stress the importance of "prior,"
though not "innate," ideas.

And the early Gestalt

psychologists, who had focused on "wholes" rather than
parts, seem, at least at present, to have been in the right.
Even Locke's "sense experiences" do play a major role in the
knowing process, although we do not consider the mind as a
"tabula rasa" any more.
However, although we do not have an absolute authority
over previous thinkers, we are at a better vantage point to
make cross-contextual judgements about the various
approaches to the problem of human understanding.

The

findings of modern cognitive science as well as those of
neurophysiology cannot be ignored.

Nor should rational

cross-comparisons be dismissed as meaningless.

Certainly,

due to their different linguistic, cultural, and conceptual
frameworks, Plato and Piaget appear to have no common points
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of contact.

But would Plato not agree that infants possess

an intelligence, and, by actively exploring their
environment, do in fact learn something about the world?

It

is quite certain that Plato would not have dismissed that,
despite his insistence that "true knowledge" is only a
recollection of Ultimate Reality (Plato, Republic).

And

would modern constructivists not agree with Plato that for
an understanding of our own reality we have to "look inside"
rather than "outside ourselves?"
The attraction of intellectual relativism remains very
strong.

But it should be stressed that there are several

points of contact among all those thinkers who approached
epistemological problems.

And the fact that Plato's

epistemology has strands that appear in today's journals of
cognitive psychology do show that neither an objectivist nor
a relativist view of human understanding will prove
fruitful.

Some ideas are rejected, some are retained, and

some are modified; and in such a way knowledge grows.
Today of one thing we are almost certain: that
knowledge "was not there" one day; it has grown.

And this

growth was the result of two complementary activities:
looking inside and looking outside ourselves.
Looking outside ourselves and mastering the problems by
the world we live in, we have extended our
understanding; looking inwards and considering how it
is that we master those problems, we have deepened it.
And throughout the history of thought these twin
activities have gone continuously in parallel.
(Toulmin, 1972, p. 1)
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It is true that ever since the dawn of western
civilization the pendulum of history has been swinging back
and forth, between two extreme positions, and mankind has
been thinking in terms of extreme opposites.

At one time

there was just one ultimate reality, and at others many; at
one time knowledge was due to innate ideas and at others to
sense experiences; and at one time God seemed to play dice
with the universe and at others he did not.

However, it is

time we recognized that Either-Or philosophies are not going
to be fruitful.

Deciding between objectivism and

relativism, or between rationalism and empiricism, is not
going to help us approach, let alone "understand," the
problem of human understanding.
There seems to be no reason for us to assume that there
are no linkages between Descartes and Dewey, or between
Plato and Piaget.

For despite the effect of several

centuries of conceptual change, and therefore the different
conceptual frameworks that separate them, their fundamental
epistemological positions have remained the same, and their
theoretical positions are not totally unbridgeable.
The progress in science provides strong evidence
against both relativism and objectivism, since this progress
was the result of a continuous process of falsification and
modification rather than the acceptance of ideas, either
from a relativist or absolutist point of view.
did not remain "trapped" in their own worlds.

Scientists
For different

45

paradigms do not necessarily imply that there is no common
ground among them.

Kuhn (1970) adopts a relativist

approach, which, however, does not explain how communication
among scientists working within different paradigms, and
therefore how scientific progress, become possible (Sayers,
1982).

Although there is no "God's Eye" view, and value-

free framework of the world, although there is no
ahistorical matrix of human rationality, we cannot accept
the idea that "any" individual can have "any" idea about the
world.

Conceptual change and paradigmatic shifts have

resulted within a social and historical context, and it does
not follow that "anything goes."

For although "judgements

are not reduced to simply a matter of taste, opinion, or
emotive reaction . . . in an anything goes sense", our
concepts "must be understood as relative to a particular
conceptual scheme . . • society, or culture" (Smith, 1988,
p. 18) .

It should be recognized that without something that can
be taken as a standard, no comparisons, and therefore no
judgements can be made.

Even in the theory of relativity

the speed of light was taken to be an absolute fixed
standard, regardless the relative interpretation of space
and time.

By the same token, there is a fixed standard

against which to judge human rationality and understanding.
This standard, though, is not only shared within the context
of history, language, and culture, as Johnson (1987) argues,
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but is also personal.

This may sound self-contradictory,

but the complementarity of this personal meaning and public
understanding provides us with a fixed standard, and that is
the coherence and fit of our beliefs and knowledge.

These

beliefs and knowledge, in this sense, are not subjective,
since they represent a synthesis of ideas about human
understanding, and which themselves become accepted for
their coherence and fit.

For as Putnam (1981) has stated:

What makes a statement, or a whole system of statements
--a theory or a conceptual scheme--rationally
acceptable is, in large part, its coherence and fit;
coherence of "theoretical" or less experiential beliefs
with one another and with more experiential beliefs,
and also coherence of experiential beliefs with
theoretical beliefs. Our conceptions of
coherence • • . depend upon our biology and our
culture; they are by no means "value free".
But they
are our conceptions of something real. They define a
kind of objectivity, objectivity for us, even if it is
not the metaphysical objectivity of the God's Eye view.
(Putnam, 1981, pp. 54-55)
Accepting, therefore, "the inevitable consequence of
our hermeneutical or interpretive mode of being in the
world" (Smith, 1988, p. 18}, we can judge how people
understand according to our own rationality, that is, in
terms of the coherence and fit of our arguments, but taking,
nevertheless, into account the acceptable conceptual
framework of our culture.
Part 2:

Constructivism and Human Understanding

A current paradigm that explains how people, and
particularly students studying science, understand is
"Constructivism."

Contrary to the hidden assumption that
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knowledge can be transmitted from a textbook or the mind of
a teacher to the mind of the learner, the constructivist
model of knowledge acknowledges the active role of the
learner (Driver & Oldham, 1986; Wheatley, 1991).
Knowledge originates in the learners activity performed
on objects. But objects do not lie around ready made
in the world but are mental constructions. We reason
with scientifical objects which are our constructions.
(Wheatley, 1991, p. 10)
The Philosophical Roots of Constructivism
According to Glasersfeld (1985, 1989), it was Vico, a
Venetian philosopher, who provided the first exposition of a
thoroughly constructivist epistemology with his treatise De
Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia.

Vico's central argument is

that
God is the artificer of Nature, man the god of
artifacts • • . to know means to know how to make.
one knows a thing only when one can tell what
components it consists of. Consequently, God alone can
know the real world, because He knows how and of what
he has created it.
In contrast the human knower can
only know what the human knower has constructed.
(Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 123)
The idea that knowledge originates in the learner's head is
also evident from Vico's writings:
Man cannot know the things that are in the world
because their components lie outside man's mind, and
man, therefore has no access to them and cannot use
them to build up true knowledge. (Glasersfeld, 1985,
p. 94)
If Vico's argument is taken into consideration, the fact
that students have difficulty understanding science is
explained.

(It would be therefore unrealistic to expect

students to understand the mental constructions of Newton,
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Einstein, Maxwell, or Plank.

But it would be equally

unrealistic to expext students to construct advanced
concepts and models.

This dilemma though is resolved once

students are given the opportunity to act upon the
environment, and, in the process, consider and reconsider
ideas and thus construct knowledge.)
Kant (1934), on the other hand, was the first to argue
that our concepts are mental constructions through which we
interpret our experiences.

But unlike Kant's idealism which

postulated universal fixed concepts and categories, in
constructivist terms, our concepts are both historically and
socially determined.

This is quite apparent in Weber's

(1949) interpretive epistemology--based on the idea that
concepts are constructed and reconstructed by individuals in
their attempt to make sense of the world--as well as in the
theories of quantum physics and relativity which have
abandoned causality, permanence of matter, the classical
conception of time, and the Euclidean interpretation of
space.

Unlike also Kant's approach to reality--that is, the

things-in-themselves (noumena), and reason--that is, the
things as they appear to be (phenomena), constructivism
unites reason and reality:

our concepts and categories both

reflect and interpret reality, and there is, therefore, no
difference between the "noumena" and the "phenomema.

11

This

unification of appearence and reality is central to the
Hegelian epistemology which found Kant's metaphysical and
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unknownable thing in itself to be repugnant to an idealistic
monism.

However, unlike the Hegelian approach to reality

which is objective and "shines forth" in order to manifest
itself in appearence (Sayers, 1985, pp. 33-45), reality, as
again Kant (1934) argued, is a purely mental product.
At present, three major constructivist epistemologies
can be found in the literature; that of Weber (1949), that
of Kelly (1970), and that of Piaget (1970).

Weber's

epistemology is briefly discussed in the section of the
social dimension of knowledge, while the other two are
reviewed in some detail below.
The Biological Theory of Jean Piaget
The constructivist approach to the study of cognition,
after it was disregarded for two centuries, started with the
work of Piaget who became concerned with the way children
construct knowledge.

His thesis is elaborated in his books

Biology and Knowledge (1971a), Psychology and Epistemology
(1971b), and The Principles of Genetic Epistemology (1972a).
Although Piaget does not use the term "understanding" in his
own writings, his answer to the two fundamental questions of
genetic epistemology, namely, "what is knowledge?" and "how
are the various types of knowledge possible?" (Piaget,
1971b), provides a new approach to the problem of human
understanding.
Starting from the metaphysical premise that "all
reality--biological, physical, psychological, sociological,
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intellectual--is evolving in the direction of progress"
(Kitchener, 1986, p. 6), Piaget explains reason and
understanding in evolutionary terms.

This evolutionary

explanation also leads Piaget to adopt the biological terms
"assimilation," "accomodation," that is, two simultaneous
processes occuring while the "organism," and hence the
epistemic subject, interacts with the environment in order
to satisfy its "epistemic needs," and "equilibration," that
is, a state of equilibrium resulting from the satisfaction
of those needs.

It is obvious, according to this biological

model, that the essence of cognition lies in its adaptive
function.

And through this function, the epistemic subject

is progressing from one level of equilibrium to another,
thus attaining a better understanding.

Kitchener (1986), in

an interpretation of Piaget's writings, also speaks of
levels of understanding which are subject to an ongoing
dialectical process.

This certainly shows the Hegelian

influence on Piaget's philosophical thinking.
In rejecting traditional empiricism and the copy theory
of knowledge, as well as traditional idealism and
rationalism, Piaget proposes that knowledge is constructed
through the active interplay of experiences and the
developing cognitive structures.

These structures are not

innate but are developed because of the way the human brain
is designed to interpret the stimuli it receives.

According

to Piaget (1970, 1972a), cognitive development unfolds in
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much the same way a logical argument unfolds, step by step,
in a logical sequence, and proceeds by means of four basic
and distinct stages: the sensorimotor stage (0-2 years), the
preoperational stage (2-7 years), the concrete operational
stage (7-12 years), and the formal operational stage (12-15
years).

During and throughout these stages, the child's

cognitive structure might be regarded as a set of logical
premises, and experience provides the information that the
child uses to make deductions from his premises, resulting
in a new set of cognitive structures, from which further
deductions can be made, and so on until an adequate set of
structures is acquired that enables the child to understand
and cope with the world.

This making of deduction after

deduction from given cognitive structures leads to the
construction of knowledge, and hence, to understanding.
The idea of autonomous construction of knowledge is
different from both rationalism and empiricism, although it
seems to be a combination of both.

Something must be innate

that allows for autonomous development.

And external

experiences must also play a major role in the interaction
between people and their environment.
Piaget (1970) reports that cognitive structures exist
even in deaf and blind children, although, due to the lack
of sensory input, they develop much later.

But reality is

not eternal and unchanging, awaiting to be "recollected" by
the knower.

Nor is it "out there," awaiting to be
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discovered through the senses.

Instead, reality, including

"cognitive schemes, categories, concepts, and structures
necessary for knowledge" (Kitchener, 1986, p. 102), is
constructed through a personal interaction with the
environment, and it is therefore a personal affair.

It is

evident that this kind of constructivism departs from the
Kantian constructivism that postulated universal innate
categories.
It would be worth mentioning that Piaget (1970, 1972a)
equates intelligence and understanding with the development
of increasingly logical, complex, and numerous schemata,
which he defines as "the structures or organization of
actions as they are generated by repetition in similar or
analogous circumstances" (Piaget & Inhelder, 1969. p. 4).
His essential contribution is the description of how those
mature schemata, so numerous and complex, have evolved from
infantile reflexes such as sucking and palmar grasping.
Understanding is equivalent to incorporating an object into
an already existing schema.
In discussing Piaget's ideas, it becomes apparent that
at the heart of his model is the "action" of the "knowing"
subject upon the "objects" of the world.

This action upon

an object can take two forms:
One consists in modifying its positions, its movements,
or its characteristics in order to explore its nature:
this action is known as "physical." The other consists
in enriching the object with characteristics or new
relationships which retain its characteristics or
previous relationships, yet completing them by systems

53

of classification, numerical order, measure, and so
forth: these actions are known as "logicomathematical.11 (Piaget, 1971b, p. 67)
It becomes also apparent that "reality" and "knowledge" had
for Piaget (1970) a special meaning.

In regard to the

former he accepted that it is known only when it is acted
upon.

This obviously shows his departure from the copy

theory of reality of classical empiricism.

In regard to the

latter, he distinguished between two kinds of knowledge:
empirical knowledge, that is knowing "about" the world
through an abstraction from that world, and logicomathematical knowledge, that is knowing about the intricate
relationships of the actions upon the world.
Although it could be argued only logico-mathematical
actions and knowledge result in understanding, the notion
that the knower, or epistemic subject, is actively involved
in any kind of action, makes one infer that even in
empirical knowledge, that is, knowledge derived from
physical actions, abstraction is an active affair.

For as

Piaget (1971b) repeatedly stresses, "we only know an object
by acting on it and transforming it" (p. 67).
Kelly's Theory of Personal Constructs
An epistemology of the interpretive tradition is at the
heart of Kelly's theory of personal constructs which
stresses the fact that "whatever the world may be, man can
come to grips with it only by placing his own interpretation
upon what he sees" (Kelly, 1970, p. 2).
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It is worth mentioning that the work of Kelly (1955) on
the theory of personal constructs, initially published
almost 40 years ago, offers a constructive perspective since
it views the individual as a "scientist" who builds for him
or herself internal models in an effort to understand and
make predictions about events of the external world.

These

models are subject to modification, since construction of
reality is constantly tested out so that better predictions
can be made in the future.

For Kelly human behaviour is

anticipatory rather than reactive.
The theory is based upon the philosophical position of
constructive alternativism, the notion that there are
many workable alternative ways for one to construe his
world. The theory itself starts with the basic
assumption, or postulate, that a person's processes are
psychologically channelized by ways in which he
anticipates events. (Kelly, 1955, p. 560)
Central to the theory of personal constructs is the
notion that "the thoughtful man is neither the prisoner of
his environment nor the victim of his biography" (Kelly,
1955, p. 560), but, instead,
an inveterate inquirer, self-invented and shaped,
sometimes wonderfully and sometimes disastrously, by
the direction of his enquiries. (Bannister & Fransella,
1986, p. vii).
It is evident that, contrary to the deterministic ideas of
both Freudianism and behaviourism, namely, that we are the
victims of our infancy, and our reinforcement activities
respectively, constructive alternativism views people as
free agents able to construct their own reality, and take
also the responsibility for such constructions.
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The very idea of construct, as distinct from a concept,
is that it introduces criteria of relevance and
responsibility. Action can only be subjected to moral
judgement in the context of what a man might have done,
as a field of choice around what he did, and
perceptions, being selective, negate certain
possibilities. We are then responsible for our
construing since this is the formative structure of
our choosing. (Holland, 1970, p. 125)
It becomes quite apparent that Kelly's theory of
personal constructs shares with existentialism a number of
features, as that of action--they are both theories of
action--that of person--they both treat the individual as a
person as opposed to an object or even a biological organism
--and that of responsibility--Kelly himself equates the
philosophical position of constructive alternativism with an
"epistemological responsibility" (Kelly, 1970, p. 2).

In

fact, the notion of responsibility is an important one, for
as Kelly further remarks,
even the most valuable construction we have yet
contrived--even our particular notion of God Himself-is one for which we shall have to continue to take
personal responsibility, at least until someone turns
up with a better one. (Kelly, 1970, p. 4)
Although Kelly's ideas have immense implications for a
wide variety of fields, their consequences for conceptual,
or rather "constructive," understanding are significant and
far-reaching too.

For accepting the notions of free choice

and "epistemological responsibility," the idea that neither
the reinforcement nor the motivational methods have worked
so far becomes justified.
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Constructivism and the Notion of Truth
As far as the notion of truth is concerned, coherence
and fit, viability and usefulness are all united in a new
constructivist epistemology.
Facts are true, we may say, just so far as they work,
just so far as they contribute to the order of
experience. If by taking certain judgements of
perception as true, I can get more system into my
world, then these "facts" are so far true, and if by
taking certain facts as errors I can order my
experience better, then so far these "facts" are
errors. And there are no "facts" which possess an
absolute truth. (Bradley, 1914, p. 240)
It should be noted that while coherence and fit play a role
in accepting or rejecting certain ideas and arguments "in
accordance with how they cohere and fit with the rest of our
ideas about reality" (Sayers, 1985, p. 136), the
instrumentalist approach is taken as the main avenue to
gaining knowledge.

This approach leads to knowledge that is

viable within our experiences (Glasersfeld, 1989) and is
therefore similar, although not identical, to Dewey's
inquiry method where viability and usefulness are blended in
"the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate" (Russell, 1946, p. 824).
The idea that there are no facts that possess an
absolute truth is also central to the philosophical position
of constructive alternativism.

For

even when events are reconciled with a construction
we cannot be sure that they have proved it true. There
are always other constructions, and there is the
lurking likelihood that some of them will turn out to
be better. The best we can ever do is project our
anticipation with frank uncertainty and observe the
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outcome in terms
confidence. But
ever a matter of
which we mortals

in which we have a bit more
neither anticipation nor outcome is
absolute certainty from the dark in
crouch. (Kelly, 1970, p. 4)

Contrary to the positivist tradition and the
epistemological assumption of "accumulative fragmentalism,"
truth, according to constructive alternativism, is not to be
collected piece by piece, nor to be judged in terms of
whether a proposition can be proved true or not true, but
instead in terms of whether a proposition can lead towards a
new proposition (Kelly, 1970).

And although we cannot say

that one proposition or construction is better than any
other, any new proposition
must be regarded as a crude formulation of a
question which, at best, can serve only as an
invitation to further inquiry, and one that can be
answered only through personal experience, and . • .
the answer we get is not likely to be exactly an answer
to our question at all, but an answer to some other
question we have not yet thought to ask. (Kelly, 1970,
p. 5)
Constructivism and ontological Reality
The notion of the transformation of the epistemic
object raises metaphysical questions regarding the nature of
reality.

For as in the theory of quantum mechanics where

what is observed is the result of an interaction between the
subject and the object, in Piaget's constructivism reality
is constantly modified through the action of the epistemic
subject on the epistemic object.
The metaphysical question that could be asked concerns
the existence of the epistemic object, namely whether it
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exists independently of any constructions, or whether it can
be constructed through the mental processes of the epistemic
subject.

It is quite obvious from such considerations that

an independent existence leads to a realism, while an free
construction leads to an idealism.

However, as Kitchener

{1986) points out, the interaction between subject and
object presupposes their existence prior to interaction, and
therefore, "Piaget's constructivism only makes sense if one
is committed to some kind of metaphysical realism" (p. 114).
In short, constructions for Piaget were representations of a
real world to which children had to accomodate.
Constructivist views are held by recent philosophers
and philosophers of science who reject the notion of the
existence of objective observations against which any theory
about the world can be checked
Secord, 1983).

{Goodman, 1984; Manicas &

It is quite evident that this constructivist

approach to cognition is different from Piaget's, since the
latter seemed to cling to an epistemology of naive realism.
In defending a constructivist philosophy, Goodman
{1984) puts forward the thesis that, contrary to the commonsense view that there is a unique real world which preexists
and is independent of human mental activity, every aspect of
the world, whether a constellation, a single star, or a
chair, is the result of a conscious interaction between a
previously made world and the symbolic procedures of a mind.
In this way, man is not only the observer, but also the
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participator "in making the past, as well as the present and
the future" (p. 36).

Gregory (1988) has a similar view:

There seems to be no already-made world, waiting to
be discovered. The fabric of nature, like all fabrics,
is woven by human beings for human purposes.
(Gregory, 1988, p. 186)
Manicas and Secord (1983), share the same epistemology,
since in our attempt to represent the world, we construct
concepts which take on a reality, although
"epistemologically, there is nothing known to which our
ideas can correspond" (p. 401).

This is eloquently and

unambiguously epitomized by Einstein and Infeld (1938):
Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind,
and are not, however, it may seem, uniquely determined
by the external world. (Einstein & Infeld, 1938, p. 31)
It is quite obvious from what Einstein and Infeld say, that,
rather than viewing our observations as real, it is our
constructions of the world which are real, in the sense
that, through these constructions, we interpret and reinterpret our experience.

Einstein and Infeld (1938)

further tell us that at the heart of the knowing process is
our attempt to build models, which, however, can never be
compared with the external world, since "we cannot even
imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison"
(p. 31).

Glasersfeld (1985, 1987, 1989) also states that the
function of cognition is adaptive and serves the
organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of
ontological reality, echoing Bohr's own words:

"It is wrong
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to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature
is.

Physics concerns only what we can say about nature"

(cited in Peterson, 1985, p. 305).

Glasersfeld (1989)

stresses the fact that we cannot "check" our knowledge
against an external reality.

our only check is the extent

to which our constructions fit with our experience in a
coherent and consistent way.

Knowledge in this sense is

"conceptual constructs" that are "viable in the experiential
world of the knowing subject" (p. 122).
Glasersfeld (1985), in discussing the notion of
"adaptation," points out that adaptation is misunderstood
"as the process of a structure becoming more and more like
whatever it is adapting to" (p. 96).

on the contrary, a

radical constructivism that postulates mental constructions
that fit, rather than match, with reality
does not require building blocks that are part of
ontological reality, but . . . elements found in the
knower's experiential world.(Glasersfeld, 1985, p. 97)
The Philosophical Strands of Constructivism
In discussing the epistemological roots of
constructivism, it deserves to be noted that it has borrowed
fundamental notions from all philosophical positions.

A

personal interpretation of the contribution of these
philosophical positions with their respective notions could
be as follows:
1.

Formal Idealism:

The human mind is the primary

element in the construction of knowledge.
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2.

Absolute Idealism:

The knower and the known are

united and are in a dialectical process of becoming, reality
is experience, and the primacy of the whole over its parts.
3.

Rationalism:

Belief in an innate structure (but

not innate ideas) that develops through a rational order.
(Contrary to Descartes and Leibniz, the mind is not fully
formed at birth but is developed autonomously.)
4.

Empiricism:

Sense experience is necessary in the

construction of knowledge, but it is not the only element
present in this construction (as empiricism holds), since
the latter presupposes a prior concept, schema, into which
the sense experience will be assimilated.
5.

Realism:

An independent world exists but of which

we have no knowledge (noumena).
6.

Pragmatism:

Knowledge is tied to action, reality

is not something ouside of experience, and truth of
knowledge is judged in terms of its utility (in the sense
that it can explain and predict our experiences, and also
provide knowledge for further inquiry).
7.

Existentialism:

Freedom of choice and

responsibility for the construction of knowledge, reality
exists only in action, and the meanings are shared since in
their construction we have involved all humanity.
Part 3:

What We Know About How Humans Understand

Granted that the current constructivist perspective
places an emphasis on the reorganization of the conceptual
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structure, it is obvious that what really matters is what is
in a person's head.

Although a personal interpretation,

this reorganization could be described by the prior
conceptions and their inter-relationship, the schemata, the
direction of cognition, as well as the emotions and the
expectations of the epistemic subject.

However, the social

context in the construction of knowledge is also a factor to
be considered.
Prior Concepts
The first to stress the importance of prior ideas was
Plato who explicitly stated in one of his famous dialogues:
I know, Meno, what you mean . . . you argue that a
man cannot inquire either about that which he knows, or
about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he
has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot; for he
does not know the very subject about which he is to
inquire. (Plato, Meno, p. 36)
That our prior concepts "turn out to be the instruments
of effective thought" has been pointed out by Toulmin (1972,
p. 35), and Ausubel et al. (1978) have explicitly stated in
their epigraph that the single most important factor in
understanding any new piece of knowledge is what the
individual already knows.
Carey (1986), in discussing the implications of
cognitive science for science education, remarks that:
Students reading a science text or listening to a
science teacher must gain understanding by relating
what they are reading (hearing) to what they know, and
this requires active, constructive work.
(Carey, 1986, p. 1,123)
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Popper (1972), arguing from a philosophical point of view,
stresses the fact that knowledge never begins from nothing,
but always from some background knowledge.

"The growth of

knowledge consists in the modification of previous knowledge
that results either in its alteration or its large-scale
rejection" (p. 71).

Popper's ideas, in fact, echo what

Plato (Republic) had remarked upon almost 25 centuries
ago:
We must reject the conception of education professed by
those who say that they can put into the mind knowledge
that was not there before--rather as if they could put
sight into blind eyes. {Plato, Republic, p. 285)
The stucture of Knowledge
Putting aside metaphysical questions about the nature
of reality, as well as epistemological questions about the
nature of knowledge, it is evident that there is an
interaction between the "knower" and "what is to be known."
The latter can be the subject matter of a discipline which
has a certain structure.

Hirst {1973) speaks, not of

disciplines, but of "Forms of Knowledge" which have their
own logical structure, and equates understanding with
"having" this logical structure.

The structure of physics,

for example, is different from that of philosophy or
literature, and therefore understanding will necessarily
involve having each form's "distinctive logical structure."
Bruner (1963) expresses a similar view, for he believes that
conceptual understanding entails an understanding of the
structure of the particular discipline.

However, he sees
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structure in terms of relationships among concepts.
Grasping the structure of a subject is understanding it
in a way that permits many other things to be related
to it meaningfully. To learn structure, in short, is to
learn how things are related. (Bruner, 1963, p. 7)
Prawat (1989) and Scheffler (1991) also believe that
structure is important.

To understand a theory is "to see

its structure, its organization, its references, its various
interpretations • • • not what the author means, for an
author may intend something not in fact said, and say
something not in fact meant" (Scheffler, 1991, p. 36}.
Novak and Gowin (1984), and Heinze-Fry and Novak (1991)
assert that knowledge which is maintained in long term
memory is not a series of isolated facts, but is highly
organized and inter-related in multiple ways.

This

structure helps individuals integrate their knowledge,
clarify the relationships among the various concepts, and
spend less time in rote memorization.

They propose concept

mapping as a strategy that helps students develop this
structured knowledge (Figure 1).
The importance of structured knowledge is stressed by
Prawat (1989) who says that structure enhances knowledge
accessibility.

Resnick (1983) express the view that

isolated pieces of information are meaningless unless they
are organized into clusters of concepts.
Ausubel (1965, 1968) and Ausubel et al. (1978) are
thinking along similar lines.

They see understanding in

terms of making meaningful relationships, that is, in terms
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of how meaningfully subject matter is related to existing
general and abstract ideas that act as organizers.
According to Ausubel (1968), organizers provide "ideational
scaffolding for the stable incorporation and retention of
more detailed and differentiated material that follows" (p.
148) .

is done

by

is equal and
moves through
opposite to
increases with

Figure 1. Concept Map Showing Relationship of Concepts
Involved in Work Done when Pushing Box on Floor.
Having discussed the structure of knowledge due credit
should tie given to Vico's epistemological argument that "one
knows a thing only when one can tell what components it
consists of" (Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 123).

It seems that the
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relationships among the concepts are the most important
factor in human cognition, and their primacy had been
pointed out by Dewey (1956):

"a wagon cannot be perceived

as a wagon even when all its individual parts are put
together; it is rather the connections between its parts
that make it a wagon" (p. 143).

Phenix (1964), in his

philosophical discussion of meaning, also pointed out that
"meanings are relational" (p. 13).

Although his analysis is

concerned with the sharing of meanings in a community, the
notion of "relational" gives further support to Vice's
argument for the importance of relationships.

In fact,

Vice's idea, namely that knowledge of something implies
knowledge of its components, could be extended by adding
that the more relationships we have the better our
understanding.
Basseches (1980) challenged Piaget's "formal
operations" by suggesting that a transformation from formal
thought to dialectic operations might be characteristic of
cognitive development after early adolesence.

In defining

dialectic thought, Basseches (1980) stresses the primacy of
conceptual relationships over other features of cognition.
Dialectic is developmental transformation which occurs
via constitutive and interactive relationships . . • .
Although a relationship is often thought of as
connection between things, where the things are taken
to exist prior to the relationship, the phrase
"constitutive relationship" is meant to indicate the
opposite--that the relationship has a role in making
the parties what they are. (Basseches, 1980,
pp. 405-406)
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The Context of Knowledge
studies conducted over the last two decades have
identified two major types of knowledge.

Distinctions are

being made between declarative knowledge, that is "knowing
that," and procedural knowledge, that is "knowing how"
(Anderson, 1985; Rumelhart & Norman, 1978; Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1977; Tulving, 1972).

Rumelhart and Norman (1981)

argue that human knowledge has characteristics which are
attributed to procedural rather than to declarative systems,
since our ability to reason and use our knowledge seems to
depend strongly upon the context in which the knowledge is
required.
Most of the reasoning we do apparently does not involve
the application of general purpose reasoning skills.
Rather it seems that most of our reasoning is tied to
particular bodies of knowledge. (Rumelhart & Norman,
1981, p. 338)
Resnick (1983, p. 478) thinks along similar lines, since she
stresses that "a person's intelligent performance, is not as
a matter of disembodied processes of thinking, but dependes
intimately on kind of knowledge a person has about a
particular situation."

Halloun and Hestenes (1985b) did in

fact find that university physics students had difficulty in
applying the same principle in two different contexts.

For

example, 60% correctly predicted a parabolic path of a
projectile, but only 20% applied the same principle in the
context of a rocket that was coasting in outer space.

Brown

and Desforges (1977) also showed that individual students do
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not operate at the same level of thought in different
situations.

And while Inhelder and Piaget (1958) had

originally suggested that formal operations are independent
of the content area in which they are assessed, Piaget
himself (1972b) later acknowledged the importance of the
context in the development and use of formal operations.
Glaser (1984) stresses the fact that the ability to
retrieve the appropriate rule applicable to a particular
problem situation is dependent upon the knowledge
representation in memory.

Bransford et al.

(1986) also

state that "competencies in a domain and the ability to
think about the domain seem to develop hand in hand" (p.
1,080).

There is evidence that differences between "mature

thought" and "expert thought" can be attributed to the fact
that "expertise" is strongly dependent upon both contentspecific knowledge and task-specific strategies (Chi, 1978;
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1982).

As the study by Chi (1978)

showed, in knowledge-free tasks, performance differences
between young children and college students can be
attributed to chronological age.

But in knowledge-specific

tasks it is knowledge about the particular problem
situation, and not age, that can account for differences.
Further support is also given by the results of the study by
Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972) indicating the importance of
the context and its primacy over structural characteristics
of problem solving situations.

And Carey (1986) stresses
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the importance of context in understanding all kinds of
information, since it allows access to known schemata that
will, in turn, provide a framework for understanding.
More recently, however, a third kind of "contextual"
knowledge has been identified.

Bransford et al.

{1986),

drawing on a number of studies, report on a kind of
"conditionalized knowledge that includes information about
the conditions and constraints of its use" (p. 1,081).

This

knowledge, according to Prawat {1989) is about knowing
"when" and "why" to use a procedure, that is, under what
circumstances a certain rule is appropriate.

But it is not

only procedural, since the "if-then" pattern of thinking
goes beyond the procedural knowing "how."
Schemata
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1787/1934)
provides arguments for the existence of innate schemata that
guide our reasoning process:
In truth it is not images of objects, but schemata,
which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous
conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our
conception of triangles in general. For the
generalness of the conception it never could attain to,
as this includes under itself all triangles, whether
right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image
would always be limited to a single part of this
sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere
else than in thought. (Kant, 1787/1934, A141/Bl80)
In modern literature of cognitive science the word
"schemata" is quite ubiquitous and schemata serve as guides
or maps in the interpretation of any kind of new knowledge
(Anderson, 1985; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).

These schemata
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become manifest in reading (Anderson, 1984), human reasoning
(Johnson, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1983), problem solving
(Greeno, 1978; Larkin, 1983) and in science learning (Carey,
1986; Driver, 1973, 1991; Driver & Erickson, 1983; Resnick,
1983), and they point towards the holistic mechanism of
human understanding (Gardner, 1987).
It was Piaget who first introduced the concept of
"scheme'' (1970) as a general and goal-defined action that
can be generalized by repetition, and which helps people,
from infants to mature adults, to interact and thus make
sense of the world.
Whatever is repeatable and generalizable in an action
is what I have called a scheme, and I maintain that
there is a logic of schemes. Any given scheme in
itself does not have a logical component, but schemes
can be coordinated with one another, thus implying the
general coordination of actions . . . . For example, a
scheme can consist of subschemes of subsystems.
If I
move a stick to move an object, there is within that
scheme one subscheme of the relationship between the
hand and the stick, a second subscheme of the
relationship between the stick and the object, a third
subscheme of the relationship between the object and
its position in space, etc. (Piaget, 1970, p. 42)
Knowing, according to Piaget (1970), is the assimilation of
reality to the existing scheme, and, simultaneously, the
accomodation of the schema to reality.

According to

Kitchener (1986),
action schemes (e.g., sucking, pulling, turning) are
thus pure behavioral dispositions and also practical
concepts--or more correctly, the sensorimotor
equivalents or precursors of concepts--into which
objects are assimilated. (Kitchener, 1986, p. 17)
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But the idea of the "whole" as a schema that guides the
knowing process is better described by Anderson (1985) who
defines it as structure or cluster of knowledge representing
an object or event.

This generalized knowledge facilitates

understanding and making inferences about the world.
According to Anderson (1985), schemata are an economical way
to store propositional representations about a particular
concept, since an immense number of propositions is
condensed into a limited number of "slots."

These slots are

"filled in" by the various attributes of the concept.

For

example, an immense number of propositions about the concept
"house" can be represented through a few slots referring to
Structure, Location, Function, and so forth (Anderson,
1985).

However, a schema can take the form of network of

concepts, like a concept map.
Johnson (1987) also sees schemata as structures for
organizing our experiences in order to comprehend the world.
However, he argues that schemata "fall between abstract
propositional structures . . . and particular concrete
images" (p. 29), and are derived from bodily experiences.
For example, our bodies as three-dimensional containers give
rise to a "containment" and an "in-out" schema, while
"pushes" and "pulls" help develop "motion-is-in-thedirection-of-force" schemata.
The importance of conceptual schemata has been
documented by Gick and Holyoak (1983) who demonstrated that
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access is considerably facilitated when prior experiences
induce the relevant schema.

And Bransford and Johnson

(1973), in an influential study, showed that, without a
schema with which new information can be integrated, people
have considerable difficulty in making sense of a passage
from a text.

All subjects who participated in the study

thought that the text was incomprehensible, and they could
remember very little of it.

However, once the subjects were

allowed to look at a picture that provided the context,
comprehension became possible.

It is apparent that the

visual image of the context, as was perceived from the
picture, acted as a conceptual schema to which all
information from the text was related.
The importance of schemata has been also pointed out by
Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser (1982) who studied the
differences between experts and novices in problem solving.
Whereas the former organize their knowledge in terms of
schemata by placing together problems solvable either with
Newton's laws or the concept of energy, the latter tend to
classify problems according to surface features such as
pulleys, pendula, inclined planes and so forth.

In

addition, it was found that experts' schemata contain more
procedural knowledge, with certain conditions for
applicability (that is, conditional knowledge), while
novices' schemata contain more declarative knowledge about
the physical configurations of the problem.
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The Direction of Cognition
One of the characteristics of the cognitive perspective
is its holistic mechanism (Gardner, 1987).

This means that

the direction of cognition is from whole to parts, rather
than from part to part or from part to whole.

Piaget

(1971b) stresses the fact that when we perceive a house, we
do not see first "the color of a tile, the height of a
chimney and the rest, and finally the house," but, instead,
we "immediately see the house as gestalt and then analyze it
in detail" (p. 65).

The word superiority effect testifies

to the fact that even letters are perceived more accurately
when they are part of a word than when they do not form a
word (Kreiger, 1975; Smith & Spoehr, 1974).

Although the

word superiority effect could be interpreted as a decoding
process whereby letters are more easily and more accurately
recognized when they are in the context of a word rather
than by themselves, it nevertheless provides evidence for
the primacy of the whole over the individual parts.
The ideas of "wholes" and "patterns of organization"
had been investigated by the early Gestalt Psychologists
(Kaffka, 1935; Kohler, 1925; Wertheimer, 1945), and their
ontological priority has been emphasized by the dialectical
perspective (Basseches, 1980), and the theory of Personal
Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 1959).

Both the dialectical

perspective and the Theory of Personal Knowledge stress the
idea of perceiving the "whole."
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Polanyi (1959) equates the knowledge of a comprehensive
whole with an understanding which presupposes "an
indwelling" (p. 66).

It is evident that this notion of

"indwelling" implies a personal meaning, which, as Phenix
(1964) points out, "is not developed through formal
instruction" (p. 196).
According to the theory of Personal Knowledge, all
meaning lies in the comprehension of a set of
particulars in terms of a coherent entity--a
comprehension which is personal act that can never be
replaced by a formal operation. (Polanyi, 1959, p. 49)
The whole-to-parts direction of cognition can be also
seen in the idea that understanding begins with the
acquisition of general, rather than specific, concepts.
According to Ausubel et al.

(1978), new knowledge is always

subsumed under a given concept or proposition that already
exists in the cognitive structure (p. 124).

Unless there is

a general concept in the cognitive structure, this
subsumption will not take place, and the new knowledge will
be simply retained as meaningless information.

It is

obvious from what Ausubel and his collaborators suggest,
that the more general an existing concept in the cognitive
structure is, the better or easier the subsumption, and
therefore the better the understanding.

"Students fail to

understand because most inclusive concepts have not been
presented first"

(p. 153).

That is why they are very

critical of the idea that simple concepts should precede
more complex and general ones.
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Children first form intuitive concepts of work from
their experience with carrying toys up to their room,
recognizing in time that carrying more weight to higher
levels takes more work. As children gradually
recognize the scalar values for weight and height and
learn how to perform simple arithmetic operations on
scalar quantities their concept of work can subsume new
meanings and become differentiated to include the
mathematical characterization that forces (or
weights) and distances combine to define the physical
quantity of work . . • . Assimilation theory stresses
the importance of superordinate concepts for
facilitation of new learning through subsumption of
new, relevant information or concepts. When this does
not occur, students of physics may learn to perform
algebraic manipulation necessary for solving problems
using the algorithm W=F*d and still not recognize that
it takes more work to move a Cadillac up a mountain
than it does to move a Toyota. (Ausubel et al., 1978,
p. 362)

The Expectations of the Knower
Munz (1985), arguing from an epistemological point of
view, says that humans possess expectations which are
responsible for our growth of knowledge.

Without the

expectation to hear and see objects and events we would not
be able to recognize second objects and events since they
are different from each other in each particular (p. 27).
Although, for example, every man is clearly different and
distinguisable from another, we recognize each one of them
as a man.

The same holds true for a triangle and a sunset.

Polanyi (1969, p. 167) interprets this expectation as a
process of ''tacit knowing," and, as it becomes evident,
solves, or rather better justifies, Plato's argument for the
existence of eternal universal ideas.
A universal concept usually anticipates the occurence
of further instances of itself in the future, and if
the concept is true, it will validly subsume these
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future instances in spite of the fact that they
unpredictably differ in every particular from all the
instances subsumed in the past. (Polanyi, 1969, pp.
170-171)

Polanyi (1969) further argues that our expectations
represent not only our ability to recognize problems, but
also our innate capacity to know and differentiate between
good and bad problems, and to pursue them successfully.
A problem designates a gap within a constellation of
clues pointing towards something unknown.
If we hold a
problem to be a good one, we also imply that this
unknown can yet be discovered by our own efforts, and
that this would be worth these efforts. (Polanyi, 1969,
p. 171)
From a pedagogical point of view according to Driver
and Bell (1986), the expectation to form meaning is a
necessary condition for understanding.

It is quite

apparent, however, that this expectation is not just a kind
of motivation that will act as a prerequisite for "putting
all knowledge in the head."

It is rather a commitment on

the part of the person who wants to understand (Woods &
Barrow, 1975).

The expectations to understand is part of

what Carey (1986) calls "the cognitive rationale" since it
requires people to actively construct meaning.
also been pointed out by

This has

Wheatley (1991, p. 11) who says

that "we cannot transmit meaning but must construct it for
ourselves" since "we give meaning to what someone says by
first anticipating what they will say."
The expectation to form meaning is at the very heart of
the constructivist perspective.

Since, according to
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Glasersfeld (1989, p. 134), "a language user's meanings
cannot be anything but subjective constructs derived from
the speaker's individual experiences," human communication
becomes possible only because the "receiver says and does
nothing that contravenes the speaker's expectations."
Bruner (1986) also remarks that "looking and listening are
shaped by expectancy, stance, and intention" (p. 110).
The Emotions of the Knower
The correlation between affect and academic achievement
is well documented by a recent study (Rennie

&

Punch, 1991).

Yet it was very unfortunate that the work on the Taxonomy of
Educational Objectives (Bloom, 1956) separated, quite
inadvertently, the domains of the human brain.

Regardeless

of whether or not the initial intention was otherwise,
understanding was viewed as something separate from emotions
and feelings; the cognitive domain was different from the
affective domain.

And although the importance of motivation

and feelings had not been dismissed, they were both seen as
prerequisites or starters, rather than integral parts, of
the process of understanding:
and then understand.

one must be first motivated

This, of course, can, and very often

does happen, but the important point which, unfortunately,
was missed is that both feelings and understanding go
together.

This is the reason why accomodation and

conceptual change are difficult to occur, and students hold
on to their beliefs even after several years of instruction.
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The idea that our emotions play a major role in
governing our cognitive functioning seems to be gaining
great acceptance among cognitive scientists (Bower, 1981;
Deweck, 1986; Norman, 1981).

Their findings point towards a

cognitive component of motivation and the interrelationship
between motivation and cognition, and tend to justify
Scheffler (1991) who argues for "cognitive emotions."
Ausubel et al.

(1978), it should be stressed, had remarked

upon the idea that the causal relationship between
motivation and understanding is reciprocal rather than
unidirectional.

Bruner (1963) also saw motivation,

particularly that arising from curiosity and interest, as a
way to sustain rather than initiate the knowing process.

At

present there is a changeover, even more recent than the
cognitive revolution itself.

"Hot Cognition" is a term that

is espoused by cognitive scientists, and affect is viewed as
internal representations with structural properties, similar
to those of schemata (Ortony, Clore,

&

Lollins, 1988).

The Social Dimension of Knowledge
No doubt cross-cultural studies like those that have
been quoted previously provide adequate evidence for the
effect of language on the meaning of concepts.

However, the

construction of meaning is not limited just to semantic
factors; instead this construction is the result of the fact
that human beings in general interact with one another.
Glasersfeld (1985) argues, "the consideration of Others

As
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• is an indispensable requirement of the construction of
reality" (p. 99).

He also points out that the highest level

of reality is achieved only when the cognitive structures of
Others are taken into account.

The following quotation

makes this point quite clear.
Having attributed the power of spontaneous movement,
say, to a lizard, the child who would like to catch one
will quickly come to the conclusion that her attempts
would be more likely to succeed if, beyond the ability
to move, the lizard were also thought of as being able
to see and perhaps even to hear . . . . In other words,
the child's reality will soon be populated by
experiential items to which the child attributes
capabilities modelled after those she attributes to
herself.
Some of these perceiving creatures-especially those with whom the learning and maturing
subject frequently has occasion to interact--will
require an even more sophisticated model than the
lizard . . . . That is to say, other creatures will come
to be thought of as possessing cognitive structures and
ways of operating that are similar to, but not
identical with the subject's own. (Glasersfeld, 1985,
p. 98)
Mead (1934) had made the point that giving meaning to any
experience becomes possible only within the social process.
In fact, Mead argued that it is the social interactions
which are responsible for both the appearance of new objects
in the field of our experience and the consensus about the
existence of objects of common sense.
The social process, as involving communication, is in a
sense responsible for the appearence of new objects in
the field of experience of the individual organisms
implicated in that process. Organic processes or
responses in a sense constitute the objects to which
they are responses; that is to say, any given
biological organism is in a way responsible for the
the existence (in the sense of meanings they have for
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and
chemically responds. There would, for example, be no
food--no edible objects--if there were no organisms
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which could digest it. And similarly, the social
process in a sense constitutes the objects to which it
responds, or to which it is an adjustment. That is to
say, objects are constituted in terms of meanings
within the social process of experience. (Mead, 1934,
p. 77)
Dewey (1956), in acknowledging the social dimension of
knowledge construction, stressed the notion of "community"
and asserted that
every individual has grown up, and always must grow
up, in a social medium. His responses grow
intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because he lives
and acts in a medium of accepted meanings and values.
Through social intercourse, through sharing in the
activities embodying beliefs, he gradually acquires a
mind of his own. The conception of mind as a purely
isolated possession of the self is at the very
antipodes of the truth. (Dewey, 1956, p. 344)
Vygotsky (1978) shares the same view with Dewey since at the
heart of his theory is the idea that all learning is
embedded in a social context.

The assumption that

"processes such as deduction and understanding, evolution of
notions about the world, interpretation of physical
causality, and mastery of logical forms of thought.
occur by themselves" is criticized (p. 79).

In contrast to

the Piagetian child that is busily acting on reality and
constructing schemata, and to Kelly's man-scientist who is
making hypotheses and constructing models in isolation in
order to expain and predict events, students understand
because they share and negotiate meanings.

Understanding,

in this sense, becomes possible because communication
creates a common frame of reference.

This frame of

reference is based upon an "agreement with others about
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types of objects and experiences which are explicitly
context-dependent" (Solomon, 1987, p. 67).
over the last decade the social dimension of human
knowledge has been emphasized by both cognitive scientists
and science educators.

Norman (1981) explicitly states that

"human cognition exists within the context of the person,
the society, the culture" (p. 1), and Wheatley (1991) says
that, "knowledge is not something people possess in their
heads, but rather something people do together" (p. 11).
The idea of the "solo child" learning science has also been
reconsidered by Bruner (1986), the advocate of the inquiry
model, who acknowledges the importance of the social context
in the construction of knowledge.

Bauersfeld (1988) also

stresses the importance of negotiating meanings in a social
interaction, and Wheatley (1991), quoting Johnson (1987),
accepts that "to know is to understand in a certain manner,
a manner which can be shared by others who join with you to
form a community of understanding" (p. 10).

Solomon (1987),

in discussing the social construction of meaning, notes that
in an attempt to make sense of the world we integrate a
personal ''stock of knowledge" resulting from beliefs,
talked-over experiences, and hear-say into a socially
constructed picture; and through social exchanges, we seek
to reconfirm the fact that those people close to us see the
world as we do.

And as Solomon remarks, "this continual

reaffirmation of social notions makes them very durable and
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resistant to change" (p. 67).

At present, there is a strong

consensus about "socially situated cognition" that explains
how individuals can understand each other despite, the fact
that each one of them has constructed knowledge
independently in his/her mind (Resnick, 1991).
According to the strong constructivist assumption,
everything an individual knows is personally
constructed. But directly experienced events are only
part of the basis of that construction. People also
build their knowledge structures on the basis of what
they are told by others, orally, in writing, in
pictures, and in gestures. Our daily lives are filled
with instances in which we influence each other's
constructive processes by providing information,
pointing things out to one another, asking questions,
and arguing with and elaborating on each other's ideas.
(Resnick, 1991, p. 2)
Social interaction in classroom settings has been
investigated by a number of researchers who provide evidence
that the interaction taking place within cooperative groups
results not only in considerable gains in terms of self
esteem, social and cross-cultural relationships, but also in
terms of academic achievement (Sharan & Shachar, 1988;
Slavin 1988, 1989; Watson, 1991).

In fact, cooperative

groups that encourage shared understanding lead to higher
levels of critical thinking (Sharan & Shachar, 1988; Webb,
1982) .

There is a good reason to believe that this critical
thinking is the outcome of a dialectical process through
which opposing points of view--thesis and antithesis--are
resolved.

Johnson and Johnson (1988) propose "structured

controversy" as a means to negotiating meanings in classroom
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settings.

A controversial topic, they recommend, such as

environment and energy, should provide the start of a debate
that will in turn allow students with opposing points of
view to confront one another until the issue is resolved.
Paul (1984) also argues that the disequilibration resulting
from conflicting points of view helps develop critical
thinking.
There is also reason to believe that students who feel
isolated are provided with group support which in turn
encourages the development of an environment that allows for
opportunities for expressing ideas without the fear of being
wrong.

However, there seems to be another reason why

passive and withdrawn students begin to adopt an active role
once they become part of a group.

For it could be argued

that, although it is the interaction taking place within the
group that gives students opportunities to be both teachers
and learners at the same time and thus enhance their
thinking (Kraft, 1985), it is the relationships formed
during the interaction that both provide and sustain meaning
in classroom settings.

It is probably this meaning that

acts as an incentive for thinking and sharing, and therefore
responsible for an increase in performance.
Webb (1984) investigated how different gender groupings
can affect learning.

It was found that, when the groups

consisted of an equal number of males and females, the
performance of both genders was the same.

But when fewer
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females than males were in the groups, the males appeared to
ignore the females, and consequently the performance of the
latter decreased.

Perret-Clermont (1980) studied the

concept of conservation among children of age 5 to 7 years
and found that, if a child who did not have the concept of
conservation was put together with two conservers there was
progress, while a group consisting of two non-conservers and
one conserver showed occasional progress.

No progress was

made if three non-conservers were put in the same group,
though non-conservers from the control group made progress.
The social nature of knowledge and the notion that "all
the ideas and sentiments which motivate an individual" have
not "their origin in him alone" (Mannheim, 1936/1972, p. 2)
had been recognized much earlier by both sociologists of
knowledge and historians of science.

Weber (1949), in his

interpretive epistemology, argued that concepts are
constructed and reconstructed by individuals in their
attempt to make sense of the world.
Concept construction depends on the setting of the
problem, and the latter varies with the content of the
culture. The history of the social sciences is and
remains a continuous process passing from the attempt
to order reality analytically through the construction
of concepts . • • and the reformulation anew of
concepts on the foundations thus transformed. (Weber,
1949, pp. 105-107)
Mannheim (1936/1972) further stated that "it is incorrect to
insist that the single individual thinks" and would be more
correct to say that "he participates in thinking further
what other men have thought before him" (p. 3).

Barnes
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{1977) also discussed in detail how the social environment
influences the generation and maintenance of knowledge.
Knowledge is not produced by passively perceiving
individuals, but by interacting social groups engaged
in particular activities. And it is evaluated
communally, and not by isolated individual judgements
• . . its maintenance is not just a matter of how well
it relates to reality, but also of how it relates to
the objectives and interests of a society.
(Barnes, 1977, p. 2)
Further evidence is provided by Munz (1985) and Kuhn (1970).
The former takes the case of Leonardo Da Vinci to show how
disorder and social unrest gave him the liberty to dissect
corpses, and thus advance medical knowledge.

And the latter

argued that scientific knowledge is a social construction,
and, far from being objectively true, it is seen as what the
community of scientists have decided to accept as true.
Kuhn in actual fact, along with Toulmin (1972), argued that
science must be understood as a social activity which
develops its own rules of practice.

They made clear that

observations are theory-laden, and therefore they are not
"given" but are profoundly shaped by the scientists'
preconceptions and theoretical notions.
From a pedagogical point of view the idea that
cognitive disequilibration and accomodation imply not just
an action on reality but an experience within a social
context is epitomized by Solomon (1987) who states:
Social interaction, whether in the general culture, the
peer group, or even, in its most tenuous form, via
relationship with a television character, is not just
an additional avenue for learning. Both sociological
theory and classroom evidence suggest that in
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socially acquired knowledge exchange of meaning and
consensus take the place of logical testing, and
typification by context replaces abstraction and
conceptualization. (Solomon, 1987, p. 78)
In giving due credit to the emotional attachment resulting
from social interaction, Berger and Luckmann (1967) also
stressed that "there is good reason to believe that without
such emotional attachment to significant others the learning
process would be difficult, if not impossible" (p. 151).
In discussing the social dimension of knowledge, it
should be pointed out that an intuitive type of personal
knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, 1959) as well as schemata
constructed through sensorimotor experiences at an early age
(Johnson, 1987) do occur.

However, accepting the

inevitability of social exchanges, the interactive element
that exists in classroom and other social settings will be
responsible for the reaffirmation, modification, and even
complete abandonment of those personally generated ideas.
Even if one goes contra Mannheim, and argues that thinking
is a subjective activity, the notion of "community of
understanding," as was put by Johnson (1987, p. 206), and
the "rationale for considering Others'' (Glasersfeld, 1985,
p. 99) are at the very heart of the problem of human
understanding.
The Challenge for Constructivism
Accepting the view that reality is constructed in the
mind of each individual in his or her attempt to make sense
of the world, it is no surprise why children, and even
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mature adults, hold ideas which are at variance with those
of the scientists.

It is also no surprise why most of the

interest of science educators is in the area of science,
particularly in mechanics.
Motion and forces are an indispensable part of our
everyday life, and particularly of the life of children.
Physical experience is their primary source of knowledge
that starts with grasping a hand, pulling and pushing
chairs, keeping their balance, and continues through life
with throwing different objects with some expectation as to
the path they will take, with walking, jumping, lifting, and
running.

However, these bodily experiences give rise to the

construction of schemata that act as organizers for the
subsumption of all of our subsequent concepts and
experiences.

For as Johnson (1987) argues, all abstract

concepts and principles stem from bodily experiences through
metaphorical projections into abstract domains.

Even

psychological states, arguments, moral rights, and
mathematical operations are metaphorically structured as
physical events.

Unfortunately though these conceptual

schemata are different from those employed by the
scientists, and even more unfortunately, these schemata do
make sense.

And this is the real challenge in the area of

conceptual understanding: to identify the "wrong ideas that
sound right" to the students, as well as possible factors
that might account for their development, and then devise
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ways to change them (Brown & Clement, 1989; Dykstra et al.,
1992; Gorsky & Finegold, 1992).
Part 4:

studies On Conceptual Understanding

studies on how students understand science concepts can
be divided into two major categories.

In the first category

belong studies that identify whatever ideas students have in
their mind without any attempt to compare those ideas to the
scientific ones; these studies are called ideographic.

In

the second category belong studies that deliberately compare
students' ideas with the scientific ones; these studies are
called nomothetic (Driver & Easley, 1978).
Studies conducted by Piaget and his collaborators could
be described as ideographic, although, as Driver and Easley
{1978) point out, it is difficult to make a sharp
distinction between the two.

Phenomenographic studies

(Bowden et al., 1992; Marton, 1986} that identify categories
or patterns of student's thinking could be also called
ideographic.

The majority of the studies, however,

particularly with high school and university students,
should be considered nomothetic, since their primary goal is
to identify alternative (other than scientific) conceptions,
and then devise ways to change them.
The Contribution of Jean Piaget
The study of conceptual understanding has its origins
in Piaget's work in Geneva in the 1930s, where he studied
the concepts of time, space, speed, movement, and causality
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{Piaget, 1971b, 1971c, 1971d).

His work was promoted by a

number of questions suggested by Einstein whom he had met at
an international symposium on philosophy and psychology at
Davos, Switzerland, as Piaget himself reports (Piaget,
1970}.

The most important findings of his study of the

concept of time (Piaget, 1971d} are:

{a) Children confuse

the concept of time with speed and distance,

(b) the concept

of speed is more fundamental than the concept of time, and
(c) time is the co-ordination of motions at different
speeds.

Particular attention, however, deserve his

investigations of the intuitive concept of speed.

Piaget

{1971e, p. 136) grouped his tasks of two moving objects into
three major categories:
1.

The starting and stopping points alone are visible;

the paths are unequal in length, run parallel and in the
same direction, and the objects start together and also stop
together at the end.
2.

Both paths are altogether visible; the paths are

unequal in length, and the starting and stopping points are
the same.
3.

The objects are traveling side by side on two

concentric tracks of unequal sizes, and visible throughout.
The findings of Piaget's research were very interesting
and can be summarized as follows:
1.

Movement is assigned a cause.

2.

All movement has a goal (finalism).
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3.

All movement implies an inherent power (dynamism).

4.

The speed of movement is judged by the points of

arrival rather than by the time it takes and the distance.
5.

Overtaking is equated with "going faster."

However, the most significant result of Piaget's study was
the parallel which was identified between the children's
intuitive ideas and the ideas of Aristotle's physics.

The

significance of Piaget's studies could be summarized in one
short paragraph:
All movement tends towards a goal and implies an
inherent vital or creative power. Hence a number of
analogies with Aristotle's physics, in particular the
hypothetical need for two motive forces, one internal
and the other external, to explain movement like that
of clouds or river water. (Piaget, 1971e, p. ix)
New International Interest in Conceptual Understanding
In addition to Piaget's work in Geneva, other
researchers came to recognize the value of what became known
as clinical interview as a diagnostic device for evaluating
students' understanding.

In the early studies on conceptual

understanding Piaget's work was replicated.

In England King

(1961) asked children of ages four to early adolescence to
give their explanation of natural phenomena, ranging from
the origin of night and the movement of the clouds to
objects they were able to manipulate such as bicycles or
different things that float or sink in water.
just confirmed what Piaget had found.

The findings

That in passing from

an initial state of egocentricism as very young children to
objectivity as young adults, children's explanations pass

91

through a pre-causal phase:

a phase were explanations are

teleological and animistic.
Results of similar studies indicated that animism and
precausal forms of thinking can persist into adolescence
(Laurendau & Pinard, 1962).

Nussbaum and Novak (1976), in

a pioneering study at Cornell University, questioned 7- to
14-year-old students using drawings and models.

They

studied how the children's concept of the earth develops,
and several conceptual frameworks were identified.
Children's notions about the earth evolve from a flat-earth
notion, through a notion of the earth as a hollow sphere
with life existing on a platform at the bottom, to a
spherical earth with gravity.

The value of this study was

not so much that it could establish norms of conceptual
development in learning science, but that it raised the
awareness of the possible alternative perspectives that
students may bring to the classrooom with them and influence
effective communication.

The study also gave evidence to

what Ausubel (1968) was claiming at the time:

that

preconceptions are the most important factor of the learning
process, and they are likely to persist despite instruction.
It was in the light of these studies that a new
international interest in conceptual understanding was shown
worldwide.

The area of Newtonian mechanics received special

attention.

However, these new studies began to investigate,

not only children's intuitive ideas, but also alternative
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conceptions of high school and university students.

What

follows are studies on preconceptions in the area of force
and motion.
Preconceptions and Conceptual Understanding in Mechanics
In an influential study on dynamics, Viennot (1979) was
the first to raise the awareness that university students
entertain the same ideas as young children, and also remark
that these ideas can exist in the minds of students without
any conflict with what they are actually taught.

Her

central claim was that the student's concept of force has
two distinct versions or models, each called upon in
different contexts.

The first model she called "force of

interaction" representing a force that satisfies the
equation F

=

ma.

The force of interaction is a function of

position and is used in contexts in which a local analysis
of the problem situation is required, usually problems
involving static situations,

or when the the force acts in

the same direction as the motion.

In this context students

speak of "the force acting on the body."

The other model

she called "supply of force" and it is used whem motion is
made obvious in the statement of the problem, and
particularly when the motion is in the opposite direction to
the resultant forces.

In this particular context, students

speak of "the force of the body" in order to account for the
motion of the body.
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Viennot (1979) stressed the fact that major teaching
effort is needed if we want to replace the students'
preconceptions.

She remarked that "teaching of the

Newtonian scheme will only be effective when students are
led to look at the discrepancies between it and their
spontaneous ideas" (p. 213).
However, Viennot's study was very significant because
she found that the preconceptions held by high school and
university students are "closer to the impetus theory than
to Aristotle.''

Piaget (1971d), in studying young

children's ideas about the motion of clouds and river water,
had found that children adopt the Aristotelian schema, thus
employing one inherent and one external force.

This shift

in the paradigms generated an interest in mechanics on both
sides of the Atlantic, and studies undertaken by Watts and
Zylbersztajn (1981), Clement (1982), Mccloskey (1983),
Halloun and Hestenes (1985b), and Lie (1985) provided
evidence for an impetus theory of motion in the thinking of
many students.
Clement (1982) argued that the students' intuitive
ideas represent an integrated and coherent theory which has
parallels with the pre-Galilean impetus theory of motion.
He suggested that it is the coherence of this impetus theory
which contributes to its stability.

Central to the impetus

theory that was first propounded by the Greek scholar Yannis
Philoponous in the 6th century, and was fully developed by
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the French philosopher Jean Buridan in the 14th century, is
the notion that a moving object must have an inherent motive
power or force.

This internal power or force is dissipated

as the object moves, and when it is all used up the object
will either come to a stop, or start moving downwards due to
gravity (Butterfield, 1957; Cohen, 1985; Crombie, 1963).
This theory was a correction to the Aristotelian paradigm
because it could better explain the motion of a projectile.
Aristotle had been obliged to accept that the air must be
continually pushing the arrow after the latter leaves the
bow.

The impetus theory circumvented this difficulty by

assuming something inherent in the body (Butterfield, 1957).
However, it shared with Aristotle's theory the idea that
every motion must have a cause, and, therefore, the idea
that motion in the absence of forces is impossible.

The

impetus theory differs substantially from the Newtonian
paradigm in the sense that it makes a distinction between
motion and rest; moving objects have impetus while objects
at rest do not.
In Newtonian mechanics moving bodies have momentum,
which, however, is not inherent in the bodies themselves.
Furthermore, this momentum is not the cause of motion or an
agent that sustains it, but simply "a quantity employed to
describe motion" (Mccloskey, 1983, p. 125), and it can in
fact be in a direction opposite to, or generally different
from, that of the force.

For example in the case of a ball
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moving straight up in the air the acting force, that is the
weight, is downward, while the momentum is in the upward
direction.

In addition, the impetus of a body is viewed in

an absolute sense, in sharp contrast to the momentum, which,
like velocity, is always defined relative to frame of
reference.
Also, according to the impetus theory there is no
fundamental distinction between linear and circular motion;
both forms of motion require a certain amount of impetus.
In Newtonian mechanics though, it is only circular motion
that always requires the action of force.

Motion in

straight line though can exist even in the absence of forces
if the speed is constant (Mccloskey, 1983).

It is probably

this conceptual difficulty, namely, the association of
uniform motion with zero force that makes students develop
the conceptual schema "Motion implies a Force," and be,
according to (Cohen, 1985), in the same position as the
scientists of the past.

However, not all students use the

impetus theory in their thinking.

Halloun and Hestenes

(1985b) found that 18% of a sample of 478 university physics
students were predominantly Aristotelian.

In addition, they

noticed that the conceptual systems employed by the students
"have much less internal coherence than the Aristotelian and
Impetus systems" and could be described "as bundles of
loosely related and sometimes inconsistent concepts" (p.
1,058}.

In regard to Newton's first and second laws, for
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example, although 84% of the sample held the Newtonian
conception that a free particle moves in straight line, only
30% believed that the speed of such a particle remains
constant, and only 15% thought that under a constant force a
particle has a constant acceleration.
In the 1980s several studies on how students understand
concepts of force and motion were undertaken, and several
preconceptions were identified.

Although these

preconceptions are misinterpretations of Newton's Laws of
Motion, and, therefore, they are interrelated, a detailed
breakdown by reference to the particular investigators would
better show the patterns that students employ in their
reasoning.
The direction of the resultant force is the same as the
direction of motion.

This preconception is probably a

subsumption of the more general schema namely "Motion
implies a Force," and is reminiscent of the Aristotelian
belief of an inherent internal force as well of the preGalilean impetus theory (Mccloskey, 1983).

Several studies

undertaken with secondary school as well as with university
students have shown that the idea of a force acting in the
direction of motion is very common.
In a survey carried out by Watts and Zylbersztajn
(1981), junior-high school students were given a
questionnaire with coded answers associated with the forces
acting on a cannon ball at different points of the
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trajectory.

As watts and Zylbersztajn report, 85% of the

students identified a force in the direction of the ball's
motion (Figure 2).
It is quite interesting to note that the researchers
conducted interviews with the physics teachers, in which the
latter were asked to predict the percentage of students who
would respond correctly to the questionnaire tasks.

The

predictions, however, were not good enough, since the
percentage of the correct answers was considerably lower
than what the teachers had expected.

For this reason, the

researchers recommended that any teaching strategy, in order
to be effective, should include:
1.

Awareness on the part of the teacher of the

existence of children's prior conceptions.
2.

Knowledge of some of the forms that these

conceptual fram~works can take.
3.

Utilization of these conceptual frameworks as the

starting point of the teaching-learning process.
Boeha (1990) replicated the study with 12th-grade high
school students in Nigeria.

He used semi-structured

interviews that probed the understanding of the concept of
force in the context of a moving softball after it was hit.
Boeha (1990) reports identical results with those of Watts
and Zylbersztajn (1981), since the majority of students
thought that when the softball is hit a force is imparted
that accompanies it during its flight, and which gets used
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up.

However, Boeha (1990) calls that kind of thinking

Aristotelian, although it resembles more to the impetus
theory as has been noted by McCloskey (1983) and Viennot
(1979).
Clement (1982) reports how university students in their
laboratory write-ups about the motion of a simple pendulum
identified a force in the direction of the motion of the
bob, suggesting that if there were no such a force the
pendulum could never move up to the top of its swing (Figure
3).

Most students who participated in the study, as Clement

(1982} reports, identified a force in the direction of
motion regardless of whether or not the pendulum was
swinging up or down.
Similar results with the motion of the pendulum were
obtained by·sjoberg and Lie (1981) as reported by McDermott
(1984).

Sjoberg and Lie (1981) conducted a study with

Norwegian high school and first year university students.
They were among the first to stress the importance of
preconceptions for the teaching process.
In another study, as reported by Roper (1985), 31% of a
sample of university science and engineering students at the
University of Leeds, England, opted for a force in the
direction of motion of a ball thrown vertically upwards.
When asked, in a paper-and-pencil test, to insert the
force(s) on the ball, students identified an upward force
when the ball was going up, a downward force when it was
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coming down, and no force when the ball had reached the
maximum height on its trajectory.

Clement (1982) also

illustrates the same point, since 72% of a sample of 150
university engineering students at the end of their
physics course, predicted an upward force from the hand that
must be greater than the downward force of gravity in the
case of a tossed coin.

The students explained their answer

by suggesting that the upward force must be greater,
otherwise the coin would be moving down.

It is apparent

students associated the resultant of the two forces with the
motion of the coin.
Clement (1982) also reports on a task that asked
students to predict the path of a spaceship, before, during,
and after the firing of its engine.

The results reveal that

the initial sideways motion of the spaceship in a straight
line implied a force, which was combined with the force
produced by the engine to give a resultant straight line
motion in the direction of the resultant force.

As soon as

the engine is off, the original straight line motion is
followed once again (Figure 4).

It is quite interesting to

note that only 9% of a sample of 150 first year engineering
students correctly combined the accelerated motion due to
the firing of the engine with the initial straight line
motion to produce a parabolic motion, and then a straight
line motion at constant velocity according to Newton's first
law.
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If there is no force there will be no motion.
exactly the opposite of the above preconception.

This is
Mccloskey

(1983) carried out a study that probed college students'
"knowledge-in-action".

He asked them to release a ball from

their hand as they were moving across the floor in order to
hit a target.

As he reports, only 45% of the students knew

that the ball would travel forward as it fell, while 49%
thought that the ball would fall straight down.

These

students released the ball when they were directly over the
target, thus suggesting that they were either neglecting the
horizontal component of the velocity of the ball, or
assuming that this component was zero as soon as it leaves
their hand (Figure 5).
would move backwards.

The rest 6% thought that the ball
These students released the ball

after they reached the target.
Motion takes place in the direction of the applied
force.

In another study, Di Sessa (1982) presented

elementary school students with an object on a screen.

The

object obeyed Newton's laws of motion (it remained at rest
or moved in a straight line if no force acted on it), and
could be given a force in the form of a kick.

Most students

ignored the initial velocity of the object, when they were
asked to hit the target; they applied the force in the
direction of the target.
Motion in the direction of the applied force can be
also seen in the case of a spaceship traveling in outer
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space and propelled by impulse rockets.

White (1983) gave

series of pencil and paper tasks in an interview mode to a
sample of 40 sixteen year old secondary school students.

As

she reports, when the students were asked to find how they
could get the spaceship to fly in a circular and then a
square path, they opted for a force in the direction of
motion, 70% in the case of the circular path, and 22.5% in
the case of the square path (Figure 6).

Equally interesting

was the fact that 80% of the sample correctly applied
the first law of motion and predicted constant eternal
motion if the impulse engine of the spaceship were fired
once.

White noted that students were not consistent in

their responses, thus contradicting the argument about an
integrated and coherent theory of motion, as reported by
Clement (1982).
Force varies with velocity.

This is a very widespread

preconception since everyday experience suggests that the
greater the force the greater the speed.

Thus one must

apply greater force if one's bicycle is to move with greater
speed, and the harder one pushes an object the higher its
speed.

Viennot (1979), in a study with French, Belgian, and

British last year secondary school and university students,
confirmed just that.
Viennot presented the students with a number of paper
and pencil questions including a question about six
juggler's ball, all at the same height above the ground, but
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at different points on their trajectories, and a question
about a system of three identical masses oscillating on the
ends of vertical strings (Figures 7 and 8).

The students

were asked to predict whether the forces on all the balls
and the springs were identical.

The results indicated that,

even at the university level more than half of the students
tend to associate force with velocity, assuming that, since
the velocities are different, the forces must be different
too.
In the problem with the springs, although it was
explicitly stated in the test that the force (tension) in a
spring is proportional to the elognation, students
encountered tremendous conceptual difficulty in reasoning
that a mass with non-zero velocity passing through its
equilibrium position is not acted upon by a force.
Roper's study (1985) also indicated a similar
preconception since students thought that at the highest
point of the vertical trajectory of a ball the force must be
zero.

Although in this particular problem the preconception

"force-acts-in-the-direction-of-motion" can give a plausible
explanation, as with Clement's (1982) tossed coin problem,
the idea that the ball will finally reach a point at which
its velocity will become zero makes one suspect that the
Aristotelian theory that views force as being proportional
to velocity is also employed in students' thinking (Figure
9) •
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Additional evidence for this preconception is provided
by Halloun and Hestenes {1985a, 1985b).

In an attempt to

survey naive concepts about motion in a group of 478
university physics students, they administered a diagnostic
pre-test and a post-test at the beginning and end of the
semester respectively.

They found that many students

believed {66% on the pre-test and 44% on the post-test) that
under a constant force a body moves with constant velocity,
although only 2% maintained this belief consistently.
Continuous force is required to maintain motion.

This

preconception is another manifestion of the more general
scheme "Motion implies a Force", and derives from personal
experience with pushing and pulling objects.

According to

McDermott {1984), when university physics students were
asked to make a puck on an air table move in a straight line
with a constant speed by using blasts from an air blower,
their first attempt was to apply continuous blasts.

This

clearly shows how the students' experience of a body that
stops moving once they stop pushing or pulling it influences
their reasoning process.

A similar preconception among

university students has been also found by Jira, Mccloskey,
and Green (1981).

Halloun and Hestenes {1985a) also report

that 47% of the students on the pre-test and 20% of them on
the post-test expressed the idea that under no net force a
body must slow down.
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Once a body leaves its frame of reference its motion
becomes absolute.

This preconception is not surprising if

one takes into account the fact that in daily life there is
always an absolute frame of reference (i.e., the ground),
and that we all share the common sense Aristotelian belief
that rest is different from motion.
Lie (1985) reports.

This is what a study by

The idea of "meeting the movement" was

very common in two cases.

In the first one, students

predicted that a broad jump inside a train and in the
direction of the train's motion would be longer than a jump
in the opposite direction (Figure 10).
case, their prediction was identical:

And in the second
two airplanes that

take off from the same place on the equator and fly in
opposite directions will complete their trip around the
earth in different time intervals.

The plane traveling due

west will arrive first because it is moving towards the
place from which it took off.
Use of absolute frames of reference.

It is evident

that, in the examples that were discussed above, absolute
frames of reference were used.

In the case of the train,

motion becomes relative in relation to the ground, and in
the case of the earth, motion becomes absolute in relation
to space.

This preference for absolute frames of reference

has been documented by Aguirre and Erickson (1983) and
Aguirre (1988) who studied high school students' conceptions
of the vector characteristics of velocity and displacement.
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The tasks that they used were simulated situations in which
the subjects were standing on a bridge watching a river boat
crossing the river, and on the shores of a lake trying to
locate fishing spots.

From the clinical interviews it

became evident that the students always tried to locate a
fixed position on the ground.

However, several fixed

positions were selected at the same time, thus suggesting
that they (students) had difficulty in selecting a standard
frame of reference.

In addition, it was found that the

speed and the path of an object were absolute in the the
sense that they were viewed as intrinsic properties of the
objects themselves and independent of any frame of
reference.

These "intrinsic speed" and "intrinsic path"

properties of moving objects reconfirm the findings of
Saltiel and Malgrange (1980).
Stationary objects cannot exert forces.

Driver (1973)

spent several months observing junior-high school students
in the laboratory as they were conducting experiments.

The

idea that a table or a chair cannot exert an upward force
when there was no motion was very common.

Minstrel! (1982)

also reports that 50% of his high school students did not
believe that an upward force can be exerted on a book by a
table.

As Minstrel! (1982) reports, 50% of his students did

believe that the only force acting the book is its own
weight (Figure 11).

Identical findings have also been

reported more recently by Brown and Clements (1987).
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Terry, Jones and Hurford (1985) studied the conceptual
understanding of forces and equilibrium with children who
were at the mid-point of years three, four, and five in
their study of physics.

Each pupil was presented with a

drawing of a box resting on a table and was then asked to
explain what kept the box at rest.

The researchers report

that 95% of the pupils in the year three group asserted that
it was not necessary for the table to exert a force on the
box.

When this response was discussed further, it was found

that pupils had considerable difficulty in accepting that
inanimate objects like a table can exert a force.

However,

only 25% and 54% of the other two groups could correctly
explain the equilibrium of the box.
Motion is different from rest.

Whitaker (1983)

replicated one of Galileo's famous thought experiments.

In

this particular thought experiment, Salviati, the voice of
Galileo, is trying to change the belief of Simplicio, an
Aristotelian advocate, that a bolt dropped from the top of
the mast of a moving ship will not land at a point that is
behind, but instead, at the foot of the mast as if the ship
were at rest.
As Whitaker reports, many university physics students
believed that a bolt hanging loose from the ceiling of a
uniformly moving train will not pass through a hole that is
on the floor and directly under the bolt.

For the students,

motion and rest were fundamentally inequivalent (Figure 12).
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Velocity is the same as position.

Trowbridge and

McDermott (1980), in a replication of Piaget's tasks, found
that university students confused velocity with position.
In observing the motion of two balls moving on different but
parallel tracks (one ball with constant velocity on a
horizontal track, and the other with an initial velocity
greater than the first's ball velocity), they tried to
identify the instant of passing in order to judge whether
the velocities were equal.

They thought that the velocities

are the same when the positions are the same.

And they also

associated the idea of being ahead with having greater
speed.

As the researchers report, the students employed

perception in their thinking, without any attempt to think
of velocity as rate of change of displacement.

The same

results were obtained in a follow-up study with
acceleration.

Again students confused position and

acceleration (Trowbridge & McDermott, 1981).
Curvilinear motion in the absence of forces.

As Lie

(1985), McCloskey, caramazza and Green (1980), and Mccloskey
(1983) report, impetus ideas that make students believe that
moving objects "remember" their previous motion are
widespread among secondary school and university students.
For example, a stone tied to the end of a rope and circling
around will not follow a straight line path in the direction
of the tangent once the rope breaks, but a curvilinear path
or a path along the same circle as before (Figure 13).

What
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is very interesting, however, is that in the task of an
object moving inside a tube (Figure 14), the longer the
object is in the curved tube the more curved its motion will
be after it leaves the tube (Mccloskey, 1980).

In addition,

there were differences in the percentage of students who
predicted a straight line path.

These differences can be

attributed either to the time spent inside the curved tube
or to the degree of curvature.

Lie (1985) reports similar

findings, but not as frequent, with the case of a ball that
leaves a spiral track.

Students with "impetus" beliefs"

thought that the path will continue to be spiral.
Preconceptions about Action-Reaction.

The

preconceptions about Action and Reaction are held both in
static and dynamic situations.

Roper (1985) and Watts and

Zylberstajn (1981) investigated static situations, while
Maloney (1984) and Brown (1989) focused on dynamic
ones.
Roper (1985) reports how university students confuse
the normal reaction from a surface with the reaction to the
weight.

Students tend to see the weight as Action, and the

normal reaction from the table as the Reaction (Figure 15).
Watts and Zylberztajn (1981) also report that junior-high
school students failed to identify action-reaction correctly
in the tug-of-war game.

They thought that the winning team

must exert a greater force on the rope (Figure 16).

It is

rather apparent that the movement of the losing team involved
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the "Motion-implies-a-force" preconception, which in turn
made students think that there has to be un unbalanced force
in the direction of motion.
The above preconception about Action and Reaction has
been also pointed out by Viennot {1979), who studied
Newton's third law in problem situations involving springs.
Students thought that in equilibrium positions Action and
Reaction are equal, but when there is motion the Action
exceeds the Reaction.
Maloney (1984) studied high school students' ideas
about Action and Reaction in the context of two boxes that
are in in contact {Figure 17).

He identified several rules

that students employ in their thinking when solving problems
in this particular context.
1.

These are:

Mass is the only determiner for all states of

motion. That is, the object with the greater mass exerts
greater force.
2.

At rest the forces are equal, but for moving

systems the object with the greater mass exerts greater
force.
3.

At rest the forces are equal, but for moving

systems the "cause" exerts greater force.
4.

For rest and constant velocity the forces are

equal, but for accelerating systems the greater mass exerts
greater force.
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5.

For rest and constant velocity the forces are

equal, but for accelerating systems the "cause" exerts a
greater force.
As it can be seen, two general rules-preconceptions that
seem to be applied in situations in which there is an
interaction between two bodies are the following:

a} The

greater mass exerts the greater force, and b} the body that
causes the motion of the other exerts the greater force,
because it overcomes the other's opposition.
In a more recent study with pre-physics high school
students Brown (1989}, found similar preconceptions about
Newton's third law.

He reports that 99% of the students

(sample size of 78} thought that a moving ball exerts a
greater force on the pin than the pin does on the ball
(Figure 18}.

And 60% believed that in the case of two boxes

which are in contact with each other, the bigger box exerts
(or rather "has"} a greater force.
The responses to the rest of the tasks in the
questionnaire indicate that the rules identified by Maloney
(1984} are applied with some consistency.

In addition,

Brown (1989} stressed the fact that forces are viewed as
properties of single bodies rather than as relations or
interactions between two bodies.
Preconceptions about the path of projectiles.
Mccloskey (1983} found that only 28% of college students
predicted a parabolic path for a projectile that is launched
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horizontally.

The rest of the sample thought very

differently, since 5% predicted that the projectile will
move straight out and then straight down, and 35% believed
that it first moves straight out but then curves downwards
(Figure 19).
However, it is not clear from McCloskey's (1983)
findings that even those students who correctly predicted a
parabolic path actually understood that it involved a
combination of a horizontal motion with constant velocity
and an accelerating vertical motion.

Halloun and Hestenes

(1985b) found in their study that many students had the
notion of parabolic motion, as this became evident from the
responses to the multiple-choice diagnostic questionnaire.
But when they conducted interviews with a small sample of 22
students to probe further the extent of students'
understanding, they found that very few of them were able to
recognize a parabola as a motion resulting from the
composition of two different motions.
Most of the students maintained impetus ideas about
projectile motion, and some of them believed that a
projectile's motion is not only determined by its initial
velocity, but also by how this velocity is imparted.

It

makes, for example, a difference whether the projectile is
an object thrown by hand, or an object projected off a
table, or a bomb dropped from an airplane.
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In a more recent and more structured study, Aguirre and
Rankin (1989) report on the conceptual understanding of the
independence of vector components in kinematics.

They

presented their first-year college students who had
completed a course in mechanics with an experimental
situation consisting of a frictionless inclined plane (airtable).

On it there was a projectile that was provided with

a constant linear velocity across the incline by means of a
spring-loaded plunger.
velocity.

This was the x-component of the

They-component was due to the the component of

the force of gravity that acted because of the incline.
It was found that, only 52% (sample of 73 students) had
grasped the formal vectorial treatment of composition of
orthogonal component velocities.

One third of the students

{33%) predicted a combination of two velocities but
resulting in a straight line.

And 15% predicted a two-step

path consisting of two straight lines, thus suggesting that
the "velocity imparted to the projectile by the spring has
to be dissipated before the velocity due to gravity takes
over."

In addition, 40% of the students entertained the

preconception that the resultant motion would require more
time than either of the separate orthogonal components, and
7% thought that the time for the resultant motion would be
less than either of the components.
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Force is the same as energy.

One of the models of

force identified by Viennot (1979) is what she called
"supply of force."

This model is used when a body is in

motion, and students refer to it by saying "the force of the
body."

This idea is compatible with the pre-Galilean

impetus theory of motion, and allows one to suggest that
students might think of a force as something close to
kinetic energy.

However, Viennot has some reservations, for

she says that it is not very clear whether students actually
think of energy when they use the concept of force.
In a recent study, Boeha (1990) provides some evidence
that some students do confuse force and energy, as they are
employing both concepts at the same time.

For example, in

the context of a softball traveling in the air, some
students thought that the ball has a force and this force
increases as the height increases.

As Boeha (1990) reports,

there was a link between potential energy and force.
Osborne and Gilbert (1980) have also noted that young
children hold an anthropocentric conception of force, which,
in many cases is related to the concept of energy.

As they

noted, "the everyday use of the word force as it relates to
human action tends to reinforce anthropocentric views" (p.
377), since many students could not identify a force on a
bike when the biker is not pedalling.
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The centripetal force is an additional force and not
the resultant of all other forces.

Savage and Williams

{1989) studied the conceptual understanding of force in the
context of circular motion.

Their sample was first year

science and engineering students who were to begin a course
in Newtonian mechanics.

They used a questionnaire in which

the problem of the conical pendulum asked for the
identification of all forces acting on the mass
20).

{Figure

The majority of students inserted a force in addition

to the weight and the tension of the string.
Viennot {1979) also noticed that in the problem of a
stone turning at the end of a string, students identified
the tension of the string on the stone, which, however,
balances the centrifugal {outward) force.
Limitations of Previous Research
Although previous research identified preconceptions
about force and motion, the main focus was upon Newton's
third law, as well as upon the "Motion Implies a Force"
schema, as identified from the study of the trajectory of
objects.

No extensive study has been conducted on how

students think about the motion of objects in moving frames
of reference, and the factors-strategies that they consider
when approaching problem tasks in this context.

In

addition, the conceptual link between zero resultant force
and uniform motion has not been studied across a variety of
contexts.

These two inadequacies have not allowed
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researchers to assess the complete picture of physics
students' Newtonian schema of motion.

This study attempts,

through Phenomenography and Rule Assessment Methodology, to
explore the variety of concepts, relevant or irrelevant,
that might exist in the students' schemata, and therefore
provide a more coherent picture of how students understand.
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CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Participants
A group of 20 students consisting of 15 males and 5
females who were enrolled in a non-calculus physics course
with elements of Newtonian mechanics at the University of
Northern Iowa were selected for the study.

The participants

were all volunteers who received 10 course grade points for
their participation.

Only 5 students had previously taken a

physics course while in high school.

For the rest of the

group, the introductory physics course at the University of
Northern Iowa provided the first exposure to the Newtonian
concepts of force, motion, and frame of reference.
Methods and Procedures
Paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were
employed throughout the study.

The advantage of using this

kind of protocol instead of an unstructured clinical
interview was that, while the latter has been used "to probe
a student's cognitive structure in a narrowly circumscribed
area of science" (Stewart, 1980), the former would be more
appropriate for assessing understanding in multiple contexts
which had to be designed in advance and checked for content
validity.
Each student was interviewed for approximately one
hour.

All 20 interviews were audio-tape recorded so that

validity checks could be made on certain responses after
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transcription.

The place as well as the days on which the

interviews took place, were selected by the students
themselves.

This approach to scheduling was employed to

help them feel more comfortable without undue constraints of
time.
Before each interview started I explained that the
purpose of the study was to identify whatever ideas and
beliefs the students employ in their understanding, and not
right or wrong answers to the various problem tasks.

I

thought that this would encourage students to give whatever
ideas they might have had without the fear of being wrong,
something that could bias, and at the same time limit, the
reliability of the instrument.
During the interview I also tried to be as unobtrusive
as possible by asking questions such as "how do you think
about that?" why is this so?" "can you explain this
further?" and so forth without showing any signs that the
response to a given problem task might have been nonacceptable.

Even the "why" type of questions were avoided

in order for students not to feel that they were being
questioned about a wrong response.

Only when it was thought

necessary a "why" type of question was asked.

However, that

question was not a mere inquiring "why," but rather in the
form "why is this so?" and in a tone of voice that suggested
encouragement and reassurance.

Before the presentation of

the problem tasks, however, a short clinical interview
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helped me with assessing whether students had any prior
knowledge, both declarative and procedural, related to the
concept of motion, as well as specific contexts in which
that knowledge is used (Appendix C).

During the clinical

interview, the students were asked to support their
knowledge with as many examples as they could give.

This

gave me the opportunity to speculate, and probably make
inferences, about why students had conceptual problems in
the problem tasks that were used during the course of the
interview.
Although concept mapping is a way to probe a student's
cognitive structure, and specifically its organization
(Heinze-Fry & Novak, 1990; Novak & Gowin, 1984; Stewart,
1980), concept mapping was not considered as an assessment
instrument due to the fact that students would need time to
become familiar with it and practice.

In addition, concept

mapping could only assess declarative knowledge through the
identification of links among the various concepts, without
any reference to procedural knowledge.
After the identification of prior knowledge, the
students were presented with several tasks out of a wide
variety of contexts.

The sequence of the presentation of

the problem tasks during the interview was entirely fixed
but the follow-up questions varied according to each
interviewee's mode of reasoning.

In order to facilitate

students' demonstration of the extent of the coherence of
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their conceptual framework, the tasks were grouped into
three major categories.

These categories are discussed in

detail in the section on instrumentation.
Before the presentation of the problem tasks of each
category, I explained the general problem situation.

I

assumed that this explanation would provide a framework, or
organizer, which could help subsume the specific problem
tasks, and also help students relate whatever factors they
might have had in their schema to the general problem
situation.

In addition, this technique would also minimize

the effect of random responses, probably influenced by an
isolated problem situation, a certain linguistic, or a
visual representation. The problem tasks were presented
orally, while simultaneously the students were shown
drawings representing the tasks in question.
During the interviews and while solving problem tasks,
the students were requested to think aloud and explain their
predictions.

Special attention was given to the students'

explanations and general reasoning process, so that possible
ambiguities were eliminated.

For this reason, the students

were requested to compare and contrast specific problem
tasks, in order to identify similarities and differences, if
any, that might have led them (students) to respond the way
they had.

This, of course, might also have resulted in

conceptual change, since the disequilibration that
accompanied apparent contradictions might have very well led
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students to reconsider previous ideas, and influence their
responses to the rest of the tasks as well.

This, however,

is a limitation of any study involving an interaction
between a student and a researcher.

But since the purpose

of the study was to identify the preconceptions that the
students had, only the initial conception, after it was
clarified, was used for the analysis.
Special attention was also given to the identification
of the frame of reference relative to which the motion of
the body in question takes place, as well as to the
identification of the forces acting on that body.

The above

clarifications helped me with providing a more valid
interpretation of preconceptions, and hence, a more valid
inference about the students' schematic structure.
The model shown in Figure 21 was used to guide the
analysis and interpretation of the data.

similar responses

to a particular problem task were grouped in different
categories, and then for each category patterns of reasoning
strategies were identified.

For the same response was

arrived at through a different strategy (see section on
strategies in Chapter V).

These strategies were then

compared with the accepted Newtonian conception in order for
the preconception(s) to be identified.

After the

identification of both strategies and preconceptions, an
attempt to give an interpretation of the representation of
the students' schema was made.
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As can be seen in Figure 21 the student's schema leads
to a certain response through a preconception and reasoning
strategy.

For the interpretation of the responses the

researcher moves in the opposite direction.

Although it

appears that the relationship between preconceptions and
schematic structure is a dialectical one, in the sense that
they both evolve and develop through a two-way interaction-a preconception contributes to the development of the
schema, while the latter reinforces, or modifies that
preconception, or helps develop a new one--the linear model
that was proposed facilitated the analysis and
interpretation of the data.
Instrumentation
Starting from the premises that human cognition
proceeds from the general to the more specific, rather than
in the reverse direction {Ausubel et al., 1978; Gardner,
1987), and that understanding involves the restructuring of
ideas and experiences one already has rather than the taking
in of new ideas and experiences (Driver & Bell, 1986), it is
imperative that an assessment of understanding start from a
familiar problem situation in which students are asked to
identify the concept or principle involved.

For this reason

the tasks of the interview did not address specific laws,
for example, "what would happen, or how would you explain or
predict this according to the First Law of Motion?"
Instead, the tasks were designed in such a way as to
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identify reasoning patterns out of a wide variety of
everyday contexts.

All contexts were carefully designed so

that they could facilitate access to students' relevant
schemata, and at the same time help me with identifying the
strategies and preconceptions derived from those conceptual
schemata.
In designing problem tasks I took into account the
Phenomenographic Approach to investigating different
understandings of reality (Bowden et al., 1992; Marton,
1986), and the Rule Assessment Methodology (Siegler, 1978),
as has been used by Maloney (1984, 1985).

The

Phenomenographic Approach is based on the notion that people
perceive, conceptualize, and understand each phenomenon in
the world in a limited number of qualitatively different
ways.

Therefore, understanding is contextual, and a given

concept could be understood differently by different
students.

The different types of understandings are

categorized without reference to the scientific conception.
However, unlike Phenomenography, I further attempted, as has
already been pointed out in the Methods section, to identify
preconceptions for those categories--which I call reasoning
strategies.
The Rule Assessment Methodology is based on empirical
research conducted by Siegler (1978), who, in replicating
Piaget's balance beam problem, found that children employ
with consistency a number of rules or strategies.

Maloney
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{1984, 1985) in two follow up studies applied Siegler's
findings in order to identify the strategies, or rules,
students use in solving problem tasks involving Newton's
third law and conservation of mechanical energy.

Maloney,

in order to identify those strategies, generated a complete
list of possible factors that a student might think of while
approaching a particular problem task.

The problem task

used by Maloney {1984) for the identification of strategies
in regard to Newton's third law can be seen in the section
of the literature review in the fourth part of
preconceptions about Action and Reaction.
Although it appears that Phenomenography and Rule
Assessment Methodology share such notions as "categories of
understanding," "rules," or "strategies," the latter could
be seen as an extension of the former.

The reason for this

is that Rule Assessment Methodology enables the researcher
to identify in advance the categories that might exist in a
student's schema.

These categories could be seen as the

research hypothesis, which will be either confirmed or
rejected.
For the present study, I grouped the tasks into three
categories.

The first category assessed the understanding

of the notion that uniform straight line motion is relative,
as well as the idea that uniform straight line motion and
rest are fundamentally equivalent.

It also assessed the

notion that motion in general is defined relative to an
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inertial frame of reference.

The second category assessed

whether students view the earth as a frame of reference,
and, therefore, whether its state motion is seen as
different from its state of rest.

Finally, the third

category evaluated the conceptual link between zero force
and uniform motion.
The content validity of the problem tasks was
established in two different ways (Halloun
1985a).

&

Hestenes,

First, the tasks were examined by a number of

physics and mechanics experts, such as Dr. Mike Savage and
his team from the Mechanics in Action Project, University of
Leeds, England, and Dr. Roy Unruh from the University of
Northern Iowa.

Second, the same tasks were administered in

the form of a test to ten physics graduates from the
University of Leeds, and the consistency in their
explanation using the accepted conceptions was noticed.
The categories, the questions and the lists of possible
factors-strategies that guided the construction of tasks in
each one of them were as follows:
CATEGORY 1:

Motion of Bodies in Frames of Reference

General problem task questions.
1.

Will two bodies that start moving with the same

speed from either "end" of an inertial frame of reference in
opposite directions (towards each other), and parallel to
the direction of motion of the frame of reference, reach the
opposite "end" simultaneously?
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2.

Will a body projected vertically upwards from an

inertial frame of reference return to the same point?
List of factors-strategies and specific contexts.
1.

The motion of a body depends upon the "openness" or

the "closedness" of the frame of reference, as in the case
of the motion of a ball moving on the roof of a train
{Figures 22a

&

e), the case of the motion of a ball thrown

straight up by a running person {Fig. 22f), and the case of
the motion of a ball inside the car compartment of a train
{Figures 22b & d).

Probable strategy:

Motion relative to

the train when motion takes place inside the train, and
relative to the ground when motion takes place outside the
compartment of the train, or the human body.
2.

The motion of a body depends upon the direction of

its motion, that is, parallel or perpendicular to the
direction of the motion of the frame of reference as in the
case of the motion of a ball in the direction of the train's
motion (Figures 22a & b), and in the vertical direction
{Figures 22d & e).

Probable strategies:

Motion relative to

the ground for motion parallel to the direction of motion of
the frame of reference, and motion relative to the frame of
reference for motion perpendicular to its (frame of
reference) direction of motion.
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Figure 22. Problem Tasks for Assessing Understanding of
Motion of Object in Frame of Reference. (Explained in Text)
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3.

The motion of a body depends upon whether it is in

contact with the frame of reference, as in the
case of a ball rolling on the floor of a train (Figure 22c).
Probable strategies:

Motion either relative to the ground

or relative to the frame of reference.
CATEGORY 2: Motion of Bodies on the Inertial Frame of
Reference of the Earth
General problem task questions.
1.

Will a body projected vertically upwards from the

earth, modeled both as "flat motionless surface" and as
"flat surface moving with constant velocity," return to the
same point?
2.

Where will a body dropped from a point high above

the ground, modeled as "flat surface moving with constant
velocity," land?
3.

Will two bodies moving with equal speeds around the

earth along the equator, but in opposite directions, arrive
at the starting place simultaneously?
List of factors-strategies and specific contexts.
1.

The motion of a body projected straight up in the

air is viewed as motion from "flat motionless ground" as in
the case of the motion of a stone (Figure 23a), the motion
of a cannon ball (Figure 23b).

Probable strategy:

Motion

relative to the ground.
2.

The motion of a body projected straight up in the

air from the ground, modeled as "a flat surface moving with
constant velocity," is viewed from space as in the case of
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the motion of a rocket (Figure 23c).

Probable strategy:

Motion relative to the space (fixed stars).
3.

The motion of a body moving vertically from the

earth, modeled as "a flat surface moving with constant
velocity" depends upon the earth's atmosphere, as in the
case of a hot-air balloon (Figure 23d).

Probable strategy:

Motion relative to the earth.
4.

The motion of a body dropped from a large height to

the ground, modeled as "a flat surface moving with constant
velocity," is dependent upon the existence of a reference
point on the surface, as in the case of an iron ball dropped
from an imaginary hand that remains fixed in space (relative
to the stars)

(Figure 23e), from an imaginary hand remaining

fixed in space near the top of the building (Figure 23f),
and from the top of a building (Figure 23g).
strategies:

Probable

Motion relative to space when no building is

present, relative to the ground when a building is present.
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Figure 23. Problem Tasks for Assessing Understanding of
Motion of Object in Frame of Reference of Earth. (Explained
in text)
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5.

The motion of a body on the frame of reference of

the earth depends upon whether the body is in contact with
the earth's surface, as in the case of two boats (Figure
23h), and two airplanes (Figure 23i) sailing and flying
respectively around the earth.

Probable strategies:

Motion

relative to the space for case of the airplanes, and motion
relative to the space or earth for the motion of the boats.
CATEGORY 3:

Motion of Bodies with Constant Velocity

General problem task questions.
1.

Is a net force acting on a body moving with

constant speed in straight line?
List of factors and specific contexts.
1.

The conceptual link between zero net force and

uniform straight line motion depends upon the kind of the
moving object (e.g., a spaceship, car, box).
2.

The conceptual link between zero net force and

uniform straight line motion depends upon episodic knowledge
(e.g., a car on a "windy'' day, a box being pushed along the
floor by a person, objects hanging from strings inside cars,
boxes being lifted from the floor).
3.

The conceptual link between zero net force and

uniform straight line motion depends upon the mass of the
moving body (e.g., a bicycle, car, truck).
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES

This chapter groups the responses, as given by the 20
students to each task of all three categories, without any
attempt to interpret them.

(The responses to the clinical

interview appear in quotations in the chapter of
Interpetation and Discussion.)

For each task there is the

accepted response (in accordance with the Newtonian
conception) and the alternative response(s).

The number of

students for each response is also given.
Category 1:

Motion of Bodies in Frames of Reference

This category deals with two general problem situations
addressed through different contexts.

The first situation

and the responses (collectively and individually) can be
seen in Tables 1 and 2, while the second situation is
presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.

Below are the specific

tasks and the respective responses to those two problem
situations.
Task 1:

Two friends are standing on either end of the

roof (outside) of a train moving with constant speed in
straight line.

Suddenly they each throw the balls they are

holding to each other.

What can you say about the time the

balls take to reach the other person?

The velocities and

the masses of the balls are the same, and the effect of air
resistance is negligible.
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Accepted responses:

Neglecting air resistance, both

friends will catch the balls simultaneously as if the train
were at rest because it does not make a difference whether
the train is at rest or in motion (n = 0).
Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to
the frame of reference of the train, which is an inertial
frame of reference and therefore both friends will catch the
balls simultaneously (n

= 0).

Alternative response 1:

The person in the rear will

catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball

(n = 17).
Alternative response 2:

The person in the front will

catch the ball first because the ball is approaching him
with higher velocity

The ball has, in addition to its own

velocity, the velocity of the moving train (n
Task 2:

=

2).

Two friends are standing on either end

(inside) the car compartment of a train moving with constant
speed in straight line.
hands.

Each is holding a ball in his

Suddenly they both throw their balls simultaneously

to each other.

What can you say about the time the balls

will take to reach the person on the opposite end?

The

velocities and the masses of the balls are the same.
Accepted responses:

Taking into account the conception

that uniform straight line motion and rest are equivalent,
both friends will catch the ball simultaneously (n

= 0).
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Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to
the frame of reference of the train, and therefore both
friends will catch the balls simultaneously (n = 3).
Alternative response 1:

Both friends will catch the

ball simultaneously because the balls are moving along with
the train because the train is a closed system (n

=

4), but

if the air were pumped out of the train the friend in the
rear would catch the ball first

because this situation

would be the same as being outside on the roof of the train
(n

=

2) •

Alternative response 2:

The friend in the rear will

catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball

en=

11).
Alternative response 3:

The friend in the front will

catch the ball first because the ball is approaching him
with greater velocity.

The ball has, in addition to its own

velocity, the velocity of the train (n
Task 3:

=

2).

Two friends are standing on either end

(inside) of the car compartment of a train moving with
constant speed in straight line.
ball to each other.

Suddenly they both roll a

What can you say about the time it will

take the balls to roll to the other person?
Accepted responses:

Taking into account the conception

that uniform straight line motion and rest are equivalent,
both friends will catch the ball simultaneously (n

= O).
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Or, the motion of the balls is considered relative to
the frame of reference of the train, which is an inertial
frame of reference, and therefore both friends will catch
the balls simultaneously (n

=

3).

Or, both friends will catch the balls at the same time
because the balls are in contact with the train and they
therefore participate, in the motion of the train (n
Alternative response:

=

5).

The friend in the rear will

catch the ball first because he is moving towards the ball

(n = 12).
Task 4:

A person is sitting in the car compartment of

a train traveling with constant speed in straight line.
Suddenly he throws a softball a small way straight up in the
air.

Where will the softball land?

The force the person is

applying is in the vertical direction.
Accepted responses:

The softball will fall straight

back down into the person's hands because its motion is not
affected by the uniform motion of the train (n = O).
or, the motion of the softball is relative to the frame
of reference of the train and therefore it will fall
straight back down (n = 3).
Or, the softball will fall straight back down because
it will continue to move in the direction of the train's
motion (n

=

5).

Alternative response 1:

The softball will land behind

the person because he is moving forward along with the train
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while the ball is moving upwards (n

=

5).

(Three of those

five students believed that a person on the train sees a
straight line path of the softball, and a person on the
ground sees a curved path, while two students believed the
opposite.)
Alternative response 2:

The softball will fall

straight back down because it will continue to move in the
direction of the train's motion due to a force that carries
the softball forward (n
Task 5:

=

7).

A person is standing on the roof of a train

moving with constant speed in straight line.
throws a softball straight up in the air.

Suddenly he

Where will the

softball land if the effect of wind and air resistance are
negligible?
Accepted responses:

Neglecting the effect of wind and

air resistance, the softball will fall straight back in the
person's hands because the motion of the softball is not
affected by the uniform motion of the train (n

=

0).

or, the motion of the softball is considered relative
to the frame of reference of the train, and therefore it
will move straight up and then fall straight down and will
land in the person's hand (n

=

0).

Table 1
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Two Persons standing on Either End of Car
Compartment of Train and Throwing or Rolling to Each Other the Ball They are Each
Holding

RESI'_ONSE
A: Accepted

_li'_RA.ME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE A

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE B

B: Alternative

Both persons
catch the balls
at the same time

Either person
catches the
ball first

Train

Ground

Train

Ground

TASK
1

1

19

1

2

5

15

4

3

8

12

7

3

16

1

3

12

1

2

10

,_.
.i=-

°'
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Table 2
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of Two
Persons Standing on Either End of Car Compartment of Train
and Throwing or Rolling to Each Other a Ball They are Each
Holding

RESPONSES
Either person
catches the
ball first

Both persons
catch the balls
at the same time
TASK

1

A, B, c, D, E, F,
G, H, J, K, L, M,
N, o, P, Q, R, s,
T

I

2

I, J, K
L, M, Q, R

3

I, J, K
L, M, N,

o,

A, B, c, D, E, F,
G, H, N, o, P, s
T
A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H, Q, R, s, T

p

Or, the softball will land in the person's hand because
the softball continues to move in the forward (horizontal)
direction while it is going up and down in the air (n = 5).
(Three of these five students believed that there is a force
that carries the softball forward.)
Alternative response 1:

The softball will land behind

the person because he is moving forward, while the softball
is moving up and down in the air (n

=

10).
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Alternative response 2:

The softball will land behind

the person because the softball is moving outside the frame
of reference (n
Task 6:

=

5).

A person is holding a baseball in his hand

while running with constant speed in a straight line.
Suddenly (and while he is in uniform straight line motion)
he applies a vertical force to the baseball and the ball
starts moving vertically upwards in relation to the person's
body.

Where will the baseball land?
Accepted responses:

The baseball will fall straight

back in the person's hands because the motion of the ball is
not affected by the uniform motion of the person's body

<n = o) .
Or, the baseball will fall straight back in the
person's hand the because the ball continues to move in the
forward direction while it is going up and down in the air.
This situation is similar to that of the train (n
Alternative response 1:

=

1).

The baseball will land behind

the person because he is moving forward, while the baseball
is moving up and down in the air (n = 14).
Alternative response 2:

The baseball will land behind

the person because the earth is the frame of reference

(n = 5).

(All five students believed that the human body is

not a frame of reference.)

Table 3
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Person Throwing Softball Straight Up in
Air from Frame of Reference

RESPONSE

A: Accepted
The ball falls
straight back
to the person's
hand

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE A

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE B

B: Alternative
The ball lands
behind the
person

Train

Ground

Train

Ground

TASK
4

15

5

7

8

2

3

5

5

15

1

4

4

11

6

1

19

1

19

I-'
,:,,.
\0
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Table 4
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of
Person Throwing Softball Straight Up in Air from Frame of
Reference

RESPONSE
The ball falls
straight back
to the person's
hand

The ball lands
behind the
person

TASK

4

I, J, K,
L, M, N, 0, P, Q
A, B, C, D, E, F

G, H, R, S, T

5

I' J'
A, B, N

C, D, E, F, G, H,
K, L, M, O, P, Q,

R, S, T

6

J

A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H, I, K, L, M,
N, O, P, Q, R, S,
T
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Table 5
Responses to Sarne Problem Situation of Person Throwing Ball
Straight Up From Inertial Frame of Reference in Different
Contexts Show Pattern of Consistency in Thinking of Students

CONTEXT
ball thrown
inside the
compartment
of a train

Response:
person

ball thrown
from the roof
of the train

ball thrown
from a person
running on the
ground

n

The ball always lands behind the

Response: The ball lands in the person's
hand when the person is inside the train,
but behind the person if he/she is on the
roof (outside) of the train or running
Response: The ball lands in the person's
hands if he/she is on the train (inside or
outside), but behind the person if he/she
running on the ground
Response: The ball always lands in the
person's hands

Total Number of Students

5

10

4

1

20
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Category 2:

Motion of Bodies on the Frame of Reference
of the Earth

This category deals with three general problem
situations.

The first problem situation and the responses

(collectivelly and individually} in different contexts are
presented in Tables 6 and 7.

The second problem situation

and the responses to this situation can be seen in Table 8,
while the responses to the third problem situation are shown
in Tables 9 and 10.

Below are the specific problem tasks

responses to these tasks.
Task 7:
rock.

A person is standing in his backyard holding a

He suddenly throws it straight up in the air.

Where

will the rock land?
Accepted response:

The rock will land in the person's

hands because the rock has only a vertical (component of}
velocity (n

=

Task 8:
in the air.

20}.
A cannon is firing a cannon ball straight up

Will the cannon ball return to the same point

on the ground?

The earth is considered a non-rotating frame

of reference moving with constant speed in straight line.
Accepted responses:

Assuming that there are no

external forces except for the weight acting on the cannon
ball as it is traveling through the air, the cannon ball
will return to the same point on the ground because its
motion is considered relative to the frame of reference of
the earth (n

=

0}.
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Or, the cannon ball returns to the same point because,
the cannon ball has, apart from a vertical velocity, a
horizontal component equal to the velocity of the earth's
surface that remains constant during its flight (n

= O).

Or, the cannon ball will return to the same point
because this situation is similar to that of the softball
thrown straight up in the air from the roof of the train.
The cannon ball is moving up and down in the air but it also
has the horizontal velocity of the earth.
parabolic (n

=

Its path is

2).

Alternative response 1:

The cannon ball will not

return to the same point because as it is going up and down
in the air, the earth has moved considerably (n = 17).
Alternative response 2:

The cannon ball will land at a

point on the ground that is far ahead of the point of
projection because the cannon ball has also the velocity of
the moving earth (n
Task 9:

=

l}.

A rocket is fired vertically from the ground.

The rocket travels straight up until all its fuel is used up
and then starts falling straight down.

Will the rocket

return to the same point on the ground, that is, to the
point from which it originally took off?

The effect of wind

and air resistance are considered negligible.

The only

force acting on the rocket on its way back to the ground is
its weight.
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Accepted responses:

Assuming that there are no

external forces except for the weight acting on the rocket
as it is traveling in the air, it will return to the same
point on the ground because its motion is considered
relative to the frame of reference of the earth.

The path

of the rocket is a straight line (n = 0).
Or, the rocket will return to the same point because,
at the moment it leaves the ground, the rocket has, apart
from a vertical velocity, a horizontal component equal to
the velocity of the earth's surface which remains constant
throughout its flight.

The path of the rocket is a parabola

<n = o).
Or,

the rocket will return to the same point because

this situation is similar to that of the softball thrown
straight up in the air from the roof of the train.

The

rocket is moving up and down but it also has the velocity of
the earth.

The path of the rocket is a parabola due to the

composition of two components of velocity, the vertical
component and the horizontal one (n
Alternative response:

=

2).

The rocket will not return to

the same point because as it is going up and down in the
air, the earth has moved considerably (n

=

18).

(Three

students believed that the rocket is not in the frame of
reference of the earth because the rocket is moving away
from the surface of the earth.)

155

Task 10:
ground.

An air-balloon is rising vertically above the

After it goes up high, it stays there for some

time, and then comes back down again.

Will it land on the

point from which it took off?
Accepted responses:

Assuming that the only forces

acting on the balloon are its weight and the force of
buoyancy, both acting in the vertical direction (the weight
in the downward direction and the buoyancy in the upward
direction), the balloon will land to the same place. Its
motion--straight up and down--is relative to the frame of
reference of the earth (n = 0).
or, the balloon returns to the point from which it took
off because it is moving along with the earth's atmosphere
(n

=

3) •

Alternative response 1:

The balloon will never land at

the same point because the earth has moved while the balloon
was going up and down.

The path of the balloon is a

straight line (n = 16).
Alternative response 2:

The balloon will not land at

the same point because it stays motionless for some time

en

=

1) •

Table 6
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Vertical Projection of Object from Ground

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE A

RESPONSE

A: Accepted
The object
returns to
same point
on the ground

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE B

B: Alternative
The object
cannot return
to the same
point on the
ground

Earth

Space

Earth

Space

1

2

16

2

2

16

2

15

TASK
7

20

8

2

18

9

2

18

10

3

17

20

1

3

I-'
U1
O'I
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Table 7
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of
Vertical Projection of Object From Ground

RESPONSE
The object returns
to the same point
on the ground

The object cannot
return to the same
point on the ground

TASK

8

9

10

Task 11:

I, J

I, J

A, B, I

A, B, c, D, E, F,
G, H, K, L, M, N,
o. P, Q, R, s, T
A, B, c, D, E, F,
G, H, K, L, M, N,
o, P, Q, R, s, T

C, D, E, F, G, H,
H, J, K, L, M, N,
o, P, Q, R, s, T

An iron ball is dropped from a point high

above the ground by an imaginary hand fixed in space.

Where

will it land?
Accepted responses:

The motion of the iron ball can be

considered relative to space (fixed stars), and therefore
the iron ball will fall straight down and will land at a
point that was not directly under the point of release

en

= o> •
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Or, the iron ball will land at

a point that was not

directly under the point of release because the earth has
moved (n

=

20).

Task 12:

An iron ball is dropped by an imaginary hand

that is near the top of a very high building.

Where will it

land?
Accepted responses:

The iron ball will land at point

that is far away from the foot of the building because the
motion of the ball is relative to space (fixed stars)

en

=

o) •

Or, the iron ball will land at a point that is far away
from the foot of the building because while the ball is
falling the earth has moved (n = 17).
Alternative response:

The iron ball will land directly

under the point of release, that is, at the foot of the
building because the iron ball, being near the building, is
falling parallel to it (n
Task 13:

=

3).

An iron ball is dropped from the top of a

high building.

Where will it land?

on it is its weight.

The only force acting

The effects due to the rotation of the

earth is negligible.
Accepted responses:

The motion of the iron ball can be

considered relative to the earth (or building), and
therefore it will fall straight down and will land at the
foot of the building, that is, at a point directly under the
point of release

(n = 5).
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Or, the iron ball will land at the foot of the building
because the ball is also moving with the velocity of the
building (n = 8).
Alternative response:

The iron ball will land away

from the foot of the building (to the left) because as the
iron ball is falling through the air the earth has moved (to
the right)

(n = 7).

Task 14:

Two boats set sail from the same place on the

equator and they are going to sail around the earth and
along the equator.

The boats will sail in opposite

directions with the same speeds.

Will the boats arrive at

the place from which they set sail simultaneously?

The

Coriolis effect is not taken into account.
Accepted responses:

The motion of the boats is

relative to the earth, and therefore they will both arrive
at the place from which they set sail at the same time

(n = 2).
Or, both boats will arrive at the same time because
they belong in the frame of reference of the earth since
they are in contact with the earth (n
Alternative response:

=

2).

The boat sailing west will

arrive first because the earth is moving towards it

(n = 16).

Table 8
Number of Responses to Problem Situation of Dropping of Iron Ball from Height Above
Ground by Considering Only Weight of Iron Ball

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE A

RESPONSE

A: Accepted
The iron ball
hits the ground
at a point that
is under the
point of release

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE B

B: Alternative
The iron ball
will hit the
ground at a
different point

Earth

Space

Earth

Space

TASK
12

3

17

3

13

13

7

5

8

4

13

2

5

I-'

°'

0
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Task 15:

Two airplanes are taking off from the same

place on the equator, and are flying around the earth
parallel to the equator but in opposite directions and with
equal speeds.

Will the planes arrive at the take-off place

simultaneously?

The Coriolis effect and forces due to wind

are not taken into account.
Accepted response:

Neglecting air resistance and the

effect of wind, both planes will arrive simultaneously
because their motion is relative to the frame of reference
of the earth (n

=

0).

Alternative response:

The plane flying due west will

arrive first because it is flying towards the place from
which it took off (n
Category 3:

=

20).

Motion of Bodies with Constant Velocity

This category deals with the motion of an object with
constant speed in straight line.

The responses and the

different contexts in which students were requested to
assess whether there is a net force acting on the object in
question are summarized in Table 11.

Following are the

responses to the specific tasks.
Task 16:

A spaceship is traveling in outer space with

constant velocity.
planetary forces.
is also negligible.

The spaceship is not acted upon by any
The force exerted by interplanetary dust
Do you think there is a net force

acting on the spaceship as it is moving in outer space with
constant velocity?

Table 9
Number of Responses to Problem situation of Motion of Two Objects Traveling Around
Earth

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE A

RESPONSE
A: Accepted
The objects will
arrive at the
point from which
set off at the
same time

FRAME OF REFERENCE
FOR RESPONSE B

B: Alternative
The object that
is moving due
west will arrive
first

Earth

4

Space

Earth

Space

TASK
14

4

16

15

0

20

1

15

1

19

....O'I
I\)
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Table 10
Responses of Individual students to Problem Situation of
Motion of Two Objects Traveling Around Earth

RESPONSE
The objects will
arrive at the
point from which
the set off
at the same time

The object moving
due west will
arrive first

TASK

I, J
M, N

14

A, B, c, D, E, F,
G, H, K, L, o, P,
Q, R, s, T

15

ALL

Task 16:

A spaceship is traveling in outer space with

constant velocity.
planetary forces.
is also negligible.

The spaceship is not acted upon by any
The force exerted by interplanetary dust
Do you think there is a net force

acting on the spaceship as it is moving in outer space with
constant velocity?
Accepted response:

There is no net force acting on the

spaceship because it is moving with constant velocity
(n

=

12) .

(Six of those 12 students believed that the

spaceship is not acted upon by a net force because, once set
in motion, there are no forces to slow it down.)
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Alternative response 1:
direction of motion.

There is a net force in the

It is the reaction to the action of

the engine which is exerted on the ejected fuel (n

=

4).

{All four students believed that the force acting on the
spaceship is constant, otherwise the spaceship would
accelerate, and also that the constant velocity of the
spaceship is due to the fact that the force on it is applied
discontinually, since action and reaction are not continuous
forces.)
Alternative response 2:

There is a net force acting on

the spaceship because it is moving (n = 4).

{Three students

believed that the force that set the spaceship in motion
must be applied continuously otherwise the spaceship would
travel a certain distance and stop, and two of them also
believed that the force acting on the spaceship has a
constant magnitude, because constant magnitude forces
produce and maintain constant velocity and forces of
increasing magnitude produce acceleration.)
Task 17:

A car is traveling against a strong wind but

the driver manages to keep the car in a straight line with
constant speed.

Do you think there is a net force acting on

the car?
Accepted response:

There are two forces in the

horizontal direction, one exerted by the ground and the
other by the air, but the net force is zero because the car
is moving with constant velocity (n

=

4).
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Alternative response:

There are two forces but the

force exerted by the engine of the car is greater because
the driver is pressing the accelerator harder in order to
overcome the force exerted by the wind (n = 16).
Task 18:

Three identical airplanes are traveling with

constant speed in a straight line on three different
occasions.

The first airplane is traveling up an incline,

the second is traveling along a horizontal line parallel to
the ground, and the third plane is traveling down an
incline.
planes?

Do you think there is a net force acting on the
If yes, which airplane is acted upon by greater net

force?
Accepted response:

On all three occasions the net

force is zero because the plane is always moving with
constant velocity (n

=

3).

Alternative response 1:

The net force is zero only

when the plane flies horizontally.

There is force in the

direction of motion when the plane flies on a slope

en

=

6>•

Alternative response 2:

There is a net force in the

direction of motion on all three occasions, but the force on
the plane moving downwards is smaller because there is a
component of the weight in this direction, and the force is
greater when the plane is moving upwards because it has to
overcome the component of the weight that is now applied in
the opposite direction (n

=

11).
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Task 19:

There are three different vehicles:

motorbike, a racing car, and a truck.

A

They are all

traveling with constant speed in straight line.

Do you

think there is a net force acting on these vehicles?

If

yes, which one is acted upon by greater net force?
Accepted response:

The net force is zero on all

occasions because all vehicles are moving with constant
velocity (n

=

1).

Alternative response:

The net force on the truck is

greater because it has the greatest mass (n
Task 20:

=

19}.

A person is pushing a heavy box along the

floor with constant speed in straight line.

Do you think

there is a net force acting on the box?
Accepted response:

The net force is zero because the

box is moving with constant velocity (F
Alternative response:

= T} (n = 3}.

The force applied by the person,

F, is greater than the frictional force, T, and therefore
there is a net force in the direction of the motion of the
box (n

=

17}.

Task 21:

There are three identical vans.

A piece of

string is hanging from the roof of each van, while a bob is
attached to the other end of the string.

In the first van

the string is tilted backward, in the second van the string
is hanging straight down, and in the third van the string is
tilted forward.

Do you think that any of these vans is

moving with constant speed in straight line?
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Accepted response:

The van with the string hanging

straight down is moving in straight line with constant speed
because there are is no force acting on the bob in the
direction of motion (n = 4).
Or, since the state of rest is equivalent to the state
of uniform straight line motion the van with the string
hanging straight down is moving with constant speed in
straight line (n

= O).

Alternative response 1:

The van with the string

hanging straight down is moving with constant velocity
because from our experience we know that objects tied to
strings hanging from rear view mirrors remain vertical

en=

13).

Alternative response 2:

The van with the string tilted

forward is moving with constant velocity because the string
is tilted in the direction of the motion of the van (n
Alternative response 3:

=

The van in which the string is

tilted backward is moving forward with constant velocity
because the string is acted upon by a force that is the
reaction to the force of the car.
Action and Reaction

(n = 2).

1).

It is about the law of
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Table 11
Responses to Problem Situation of Motion of Object with
Constant Velocity (Tasks 16, 17, 18, and 20)

RESPONSE
Accepted
The net force acting
on the object is
zero

Alternative
There is a net force
in the direction of
the object's motion

CONTEXT

Spaceship
in outer
space away
from forces
Car on a
windy day
Airplane
flying up
and down
an incline
A box being
pushed
along the
floor

12

8

4

16

3

17

3

17
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CHAPTER

V

INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES
This chapter provides an interpretation of students'
thinking during the clinical interview and their responses
to the 21 problem tasks that followed.

The chapter is

divided into six major sections according to the original
research questions:
1.

On the understanding of the qualitative definition

of uniform straight line motion:

Is uniform straight line

motion understood as being equivalent to rest?
2.

On the understanding of the notions of relativity

and frame of reference:
frame of reference?

Is motion defined relative to a

What is the the preferred frame of

reference across the various problem tasks?

Do students use

consistently the same frame of reference, or do they change
the frame of reference according to the context of the task
in question?
3.

On the understanding of the relationship between

zero net force and uniform straight line motion:

Do

students understand that uniform straight line motion can
exist in the absence of a net force?
4.

On reasoning strategies and preconceptions:

What

reasoning strategies do students employ in their thinking,
and what preconceptions lead students to adopt these
strategies?
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5.

On schematic representation:

What schema(ta) might

be inferred from the identified preconceptions?
6.

On knowledge representation:

What kind of

knowledge representations--propositional and analogical-exist in the cognitive structure of these particular
students?
The interpretation given in the first three sections is
based mainly upon the students' thinking employed during the
clinical interview, while the strategies and preconceptions,
along with the schematic and knoweledge representation are
inferred from the responses to the problem tasks of the
three categories (see Chapter IV).

However, the most common

responses to one or two particular problem tasks, as were
given by the great majority of students, are also
incorporated in the discussion.
The Qualitative Definition of Uniform Straight Line Motion
The most fundamental idea of the Newtonian model of
motion is the equivalence between uniform straight line
motion and rest.

From

a

Newtonian point of view no

differentiation is made between an object at rest and an
object moving with constant speed in straight line.

The

tasks of the first two categories were used to assess this
equivalence.

In both categories the problem tasks were

about predicting the motion of an object in a frame of
reference, that is, a train, the human body, and the earth,
all moving with constant speed in straight line.

According
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to the Newtonian conception, the object would move as if the
train, the human body, and the earth were at rest.

However,

there was a difference in the thinking of students between
the case of the motion of an object in the frame of
reference, when the latter is at rest, and the case of the
motion of the same object in the same frame of reference
when the latter is in uniform straight line motion.
During the preliminary clinical interview all students
were unable to find a way to determine whether they are
moving with constant speed in straight line or whether they
are at rest.

{Students were asked to imagine themselves

inside a windowless vehicle, and then find a way to tell
whether they are in uniform straight line motion.)

However,

the difficulty that most students had in determining whether
or not they are in uniform straight line motion was not
related to the identification of force(s), or the
performance of an experiment that could provide some
evidence as to the different behaviour of an object in the
vehicle, but rather to the lack of visual contact with the
external world that would act as a reference point.

This

reference point becomes quite apparent from what three
students said:
If we cannot look outside we can't tell whether we
are moving . . • we must have a reference point.
How can we tell if we cannot look outside? If we are
traveling in a car we must look outside and see other
cars, and other objects like trees and houses . . . .
It's always the trees and the houses going in the
opposite direction that make us perceive motion.
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Without looking outside • • . I think it would be hard
to tell if something is moving with constant speed.
It should be mentioned, though, that six other students did
make a reference to "feeling," that is, whether or not they
would feel anything inside the vehicle, but they
nevertheless reasoned that, since there is no acceleration,
they would not feel anything.

The following are the actual

words of four students who made explicit reference to
"feeling:"
I don't know . . . I suppose it's very difficult to
tell if we are moving with constant speed . . . we
don't feel anything.
If the vehicle does not accelerate . . . I don't think
we can say whether we are moving with constant
velocity.
If I don't feel any forces when I'm inside the vehicle
. . . I cannot tell whether I am at rest or in motion
with constant velocity.
No . . . we cannot feel anything if the road is smooth
and the vehicle is traveling in a perfect straight
line.
Yet, this type of reasoning was strongly tied to that
particular context, namely, "the feeling of something" when
inside a non-accelerating vehicle, and was not used in other
contexts, like those used in the present study.
It should be also mentioned that three students thought
of performing an experiment (dropping a coin, or performing
a standing vertical jump) in order to ascertain the
vehicle's uniform straight line motion.

But all three

employed perception and concluded that whatever is in the
air, whether a coin or their own body, will land at point
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that is different from what it would be if the vehicle were
at rest, thus giving in advance the response to the problem
tasks that were to follow the clinical interview.
If we dropped a coin
. we could see where it would
land.
• If it landed behind me then I could say
that I am in motion.
I could jump and watch where I would land.
If the
vehicle is in motion . . . I will land either to the
left or to the right . . . because while I'm in the air
the vehicle has moved.
In short, students relied heavily on perception, which in
turn provides strong evidence that they did not have the
conception of the equivalence between rest and uniform
straight line motion.
Further evidence was also provided by the students'
responses to the problem tasks, particularly the first task
of the first category.

Only one student could think that

both people standing on either end of the car compartment of
a train could catch the ball simultaneously, as they would
if the train were at rest.

This finding reconfirms the

results of Lie's (1985) and Whitaker's (1983) studies.

As

has been cited in the review of the literature, the former
found that the length of a standing broad-jump performed by
a person in the compartment of a train is thought to be
dependent on the direction of the jump--being longer if the
person jumps in the same direction as that of the motion of
the train.

The latter reports that students thought that a

bolt falling from the ceiling of the car compartment of a
train that is moving with constant velocity will not move in
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straight line but rather in a parabola due to the motion of
the train.
The Concept of Relativity of Motion
Another fundamental concept of the Newtonian model of
motion is that of relativity; motion as well as the laws
that describe it are defined relative to an inertial frame
of reference.

An inertial frame of reference is a frame of

reference moving with constant speed in straight line;
therefore it should be considered as any system on which the
laws of motion are applicable, in the same way as if the
system were at rest.

It is quite apparent that the notion

of relativity and that of the equivalence between rest and
uniform straight line motion are inter-related.

Yet, an

assessment of whether or not students have an understanding
of the concept of relativity of motion allows for an
evaluation of the preferred frame of reference in the
students' thinking.
From the clinical interview it became evident that all
students had the conception that motion is defined relative
to an "observation point"--not frame of reference--such as a
point on the ground or another object which we consider to
be at rest.

(Students were asked to imagine themselves

onboard an aircraft, and determine whether they are in
motion.

They could also see another airplane that appeared

to be at rest relative to them.)

Moreover, several students

used expressions such as "that's how I perceive it," "that's
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how I see it," and "that's how it appears to me," thus
providing evidence that motion is observed from a reference
point.

The following excerpts represent the thinking of

five students:
You mean I can see an airplane in the sky? . • . Well
it appears to be at rest but it's not . . . we know it
is moving.
. The only thing we can do is find
something that is at rest . . . the ground . . . a
star.
I see the aiplane in the sky . . . to me it appears to
be at rest . . . it's like an illusion, because the
airplane is moving relative to the ground.
If I see another plane in the sky that appears to be at
rest . . . then to me that airplane is at rest, but it
is moving relative to someone on the ground . • . . We
are both right • . . only the guy on the ground sees
the real motion of the airplane.
You mean how I see it? Well, when I'm inside the
airplane and I don't feel anything . • . I have to look
down and see the ground . . . so motion is relative to
the ground • • • . It could be relative to the airplane
but it's more, I would say, convenient to take the
ground as our reference point.
Motion is not relative to the airplane that I'm
seeing in the sky because to me that airplane appears
to be at rest . . . . Always we have to find something
that is not moving.
Although the above responses provide a commonsense way of
approaching motion, they nonetheless provide evidence that
the preferred frame of reference is "terra firma.

11

A few

students, of course, when asked, gave the train as a
reference frame; but their reasoning strategy, namely, that
the ball and the train "move towards each other" (Task 1),
or that the ball and the train "move away from each other,"
the former going up, while the latter moving forward (Task
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4), made it apparent that motion was observed from the
ground.

Additional evidence for this preference is provided

by the fact that, although two persons (one onboard a moving
train and one standing on the platform, as well as one
running and another one standing still in the rain) can
describe motion according to their own point of view (both
persons are right in describing paths and velocities of
moving objects), a realist perspective was predominant in
all students.

For they all responded that the real

direction of the raindrops or of a coin flipped inside the
car compartment of a train is that perceived by the person
who is standing still on the ground.

However, in the

situation of a person standing still and another one running
in the rain, several students (ten) appeared to adopt a
point of view from the fixed stars thus giving a
metaphysical realist belief.

Two of those 10 students

said:
The real direction of the rain is vertical . . . this
is what the person standing still sees but . . . it is
also the direction of the raindrops if we look from
outside the earth.
We have to look at the earth from space if we want to
see real direction of the rain.
Their responses to the particular problem tasks further
verified the fact that motion is approached from an absolute
point of view, that is, from a point of view from the ground
or the fixed stars.
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Only three students talked explicitly about frame of
reference.

Yet, for all students, the notions that motion

is defined relative to a reference--or rather observation-point and/or relative to a frame of reference appeared to be
strongly dependent upon the context of the problem
situation.

Even those three students who seemed to have an

understanding of the concept of relativity thought that
motion is relative to the frame of reference (train) only
when motion takes place inside the compartment as in the
case of Tasks 2 and 4 (see Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Chapter
IV and Table 12 in the section of Strategies and
Preconceptions in this Chapter).

Some other students

approached motion relative to the train (although this was
not made explicit but was rather inferred from their
thinking strategy) but only when the motion of the object
was in the vertical direction (Task 4), when the object was
moving "inside" the frame of reference (Task 2), and when it
was in contact with the frame of reference (Task 4).

For

those particular students, the notion of relativity was
intuitive, as this is discussed in the section of
preconceptions.

On the other hand most of the students who

used the train or the ground as a frame of reference,
explicitly or implicitly, reasoned that motion should be
viewed relative to the stars when the motion of an object
projected vertically from the ground was instead considered.
This suggests that always something that is considered to be
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at rest must be established and then motion will be viewed
relative to it.
It deserves to be mentioned that the responses to the
problem task of a cannon ball fired straight up in the air
make it quite evident that the supposedly simple notion of
an earth moving with a constant velocity poses tremendous
conceptual problems that are similar to those experienced by
scholars and philosophers in the 16th and 17th century
Europe.

Even the two students who thought that the cannon

ball will fall straight back down, since "this situation is
similar to that of a person throwing a softball from the
roof of a train," adopted an observation point on the fixed
stars from which they could describe the parabolic path of
the cannon ball.

Yet, this reasoning strategy, although not

incorrect, does show that the idea that motion is relative
to an inertial frame of reference is difficult for students
to grasp unless it is taught to them explicitly.
In summary, the majority of students showed a
preference for defining motion relative to a point either on
the ground or on the fixed stars.

Although a point of

reference is not the same thing as a frame of reference, the
preference for the ground or the fixed stars as an implicit
point of observation suggests that the concept of frame of
reference was not understood.

This preference for an

absolute frame of reference is in agreement with findings of
previous studies which have been discussed in the review of
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the literature (Aguirre, 1988; Aguirre & Erickson, 1983;
Saltiel & Malgrange, 1980, Whitaker, 1983).
The Conceptual Link between Zero Net Force and Uniform
Straight Line Motion
The fundamental idea that motion with constant velocity
takes place in the absence of a net force was understood by
three students as this appears from the consistency with
which they thought about the various problem tasks.

But

only one student had a higher level of understanding since
he used the same reasoning strategy, namely, that the net
force on any body moving in straight line with constant
speed is zero, across all contexts (see Table 11 and
responses to tasks of category 3 in Chapter IV).
From the preliminary interview it became evident that
most students could correctly predict eternal uniform
straight line motion in the absence of external forces.
These students could reason that a spaceship, once set in
motion, can move even with its engine off since it is
carried by its initial momentum that remains constant,
provided that there are no forces to slow the spaceship
down.

And they also thought that a spaceship already

traveling with constant velocity is not acted upon by a
force.

However, as the context began to change so did the

thinking of the students.

As was already mentioned, it was

only three students who had the conceptual link between zero
force and motion at constant velocity.

For the great

majority of students uniform straight line motion and force
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in the direction of motion were two concepts that could
exist in their minds without any contradiction.

The co-

existence of a net force and constant velocity in the minds
of students is in line with previous findings (Halloun &
Hestenes, 1985a, 1985b).
Strategies and Preconceptions
The purpose of any study on how students think is first
to identify and describe the strategies that students
employ.

These strategies are rather explicit, and are

directly revealed through the responses.

The second step is

to identify and describe the preconceptions that lead
students to adopt their strategies.

The preconceptions are

rather implicit, and an inference based upon further
questioning about other related concepts, such as frame of
reference, acting forces, and path of the moving object is
made.

Sometimes it might be necessary that students become

aware of their change in reasoning strategy through a
comparison between their responses to similar or different
problem tasks.

In such cases the students make their

preconceptions explicit.

For example, the comparison

between the problem situation of a ball thrown upwards from
the roof of the train (Task 5) and that of a ball thrown up
from the floor of the train (Task 4) made some students
state explicitly that "objects moving outside the train are
not in the frame of reference."
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But it is also possible that a preconception could be
directly inferred from the reasoning strategy.

For example,

the "meeting of two objects" moving in the horizontal
direction (such as the ball and the train in Task 1) implies
a preference for a reference point on the ground.

This

preference, in turn, suggests the preconception that motion
is observed from the ground.
Although strategies and preconceptions are intricately
related, and it therefore remains a mere speculation which
gives rise to which, a linear model (see Figure 24 in
Chapter III) that postulates a distinction between these two
is a convenient way to both identify and descibe them.

From

the analysis of the individual responses the strategies that
students employed while thinking about the problem tasks
could be identified.

Although students used with some

consistency the same strategy while thinking about
particular problem tasks (for example, most students
employed perception and approached motion relative to the
ground in Tasks 1 and 2, while two students used vector
composition of velocities in the same tasks and one of them
also used it in Task 8), the responses, when considered
across all contexts, did reveal that the same problem
situation results from different strategies that are
dependent upon the context in which the problem is set.

In

short, the same students changed their strategies according
to the context (see Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15).
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Table 12
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem
Situation of Two Persons Standing On Either End of Car
Compartment of Train and Throwing or Rolling To Each Other
the Ball They are Each Holding

TASK

1

STRATEGY

(a) Motion relative
to the frame of
reference (n = 1)
(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
train) relative
to the ground
and meeting each
other (n = 17)

Motion is observed
from the ground
en= 11)

(c) Vector composition
of velocities (ball,
train) without
reference to
distances traveled

Motion is observed
from the ground

en=

2

PRECONCEPTION

en=

2)

2)

(a) Motion relative
to the frame of
reference (n = 3)
(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
train) relative
to the ground
and meeting
each other (n = 11)

Motion is observed
from the ground

(c) Vector composition
of velocities without
reference to distances
traveled (n = 2)

Motion is observed
from the ground

en

=

en=

11)

2)

(table continues)
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TASK

STRATEGY

(d) Motion inside the
atmosphere of the
train that "carries"
the ball (n = 2)

Frames of reference
have an atmosphere

(e) Motion relative to
the train due to
its "closedness"

Frames of reference
are closed vehicles

<n =

3

PRECONCEPTION

(n =

2)

(n = 2)

2)

( a) Motion relative
to the frame of
reference <n = 3)
(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
train) relative
to the ground
without reference
to speeds and
distances traveled

<n =

Motion is observed
from the ground
(n

=

12)

12)

(c) Motion relative
to the train
that "carries" the
ball (n = 5)

Objects belong in
the frame of
reference only
when they are in
contact with it

<n =

5)

184
Table 13
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem
situation of Person Throwing a Ball Straight Up From car
Compartment of Train, and when Running on Flat Ground

TASK

4

STRATEGY

PRECONCEPTION

(a) Motion relative
to the frame of
reference (n = 3)
(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
train) relative
to the ground
that move in
different
directions and
away from each
other (n = 5)

Motion is observed
from the ground

<n

=

5)

The observer on the
train sees a
straight line path
of an object thrown
straight up while
the observer on the
ground sees a
curved path (n = 3)
The observer
on the train sees
a curved path of an
object thrown
straight up while
the observer on the
ground sees a
straight line path

(n =
(c) Forward motion of
ball relative to
the ground as the
ball is going up
and down in the
air (n = 12)

2)

Objects continue to
move in the forward
direction once they
are thrown up in the
air because there is
a force supplied by
the motion of the
train (n = 7)
(table continues)
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TASK

5

STRATEGY

(a) Forward motion of
ball relative to
the ground as the
ball is going up
and down in the air
(n

=

5)

(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
train) relative
to the ground
that move in
different directions
and away from each
other (n = 15)

6

PRECONCEPTION

Motion is observed
from the ground
(n

=

5)

Objects continue to
move in the forward
direction once they
are thrown up in the
air because there is
a force supplied by
the motion of the
train (n = 3)
Motion is observed
from the ground

<n

=

10)

Frames of reference
are closed vehicles

(n =

5)

(a) Motion relative to
the frame of
reference (n = 1)
(b) Motion of two
bodies (ball,
human body)
moving in
different
directions away
from each other
(n = 19)

Motion is observed
from the ground
(n

=

14)

The human body is
not a frame of
reference (n = 5)
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Table 14
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem
Situation of Motion of Body Thrown or Projected Straight Up
in the Air From Ground

TASK

STRATEGY

7

(a) Motion due to
the vertical
component of
velocity (n = 20)

8

(a) Motion of cannon
ball relative to
space by considering
the ball's forward
velocity as it is
going up and down in
the air due to the
earth's forward motion

<n

=

PRECONCEPTION

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n = 2)

2)

Motion is observed
(b) Motion of two bodies
from the fixed
(cannon ball, earth)
relative to space
stars (n = 17)
that move in different
directions and away
from each other (n = 17)
(c) Vector composition
of velocities (cannon
ball, earth) without
reference to
distances traveled
(n

=

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n = 1)

1)

(table continues)

187

TASK

9

STRATEGY

(a) Motion of two
bodies (rocket,
earth) relative
to space that move
in different
directions and away
from each other
18)

en=

PRECONCEPTION

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n = 18)
An object thrown
up from the frame
of reference does
not belong in the
frame of reference
because it is
"moving away" from
it
= 3)

en

(b) Motion of rocket
relative to space
by considering the
rocket's forward
velocity as the
rocket is going up
and down (n = 2)

10

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n = 2)

Motion is observed
from the fixed
(air-balloon, earth)
relative to space
stars (n = 17)
that move in different
directions and away
from each other (n = 17)

(a) Motion of two bodies

(b) Motion of air-balloon
inside the earth's
atmosphere that
"carries" it along

en=

3)

An object rising
straight up from
the ground belongs
in the frame of
reference of the
earth because the
object is moving
inside the earth's
atmosphere (n = 3)
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Table 15
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem
Situation of Motion of Two Bodies Moving Along the Equator
in Opposite Directions Around the Earth

TASK

14

STRATEGY

(a) Motion of boats
relative to the
frame of reference
of the earth (n = 4)

PRECONCEPTION

An object in
contact with the
frame of reference
belongs in the
frame of reference

en=

15

2)

(b) Motion of boats
relative to space
without reference
to distances
traveled (n = 16)

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n = 16)

(a) Motion of airplanes
relative to space
without reference
to distances
traveled (n = 20)

Motion is observed
from the fixed
stars (n =20)

Evidence that context plays a major role in the
students' reasoning process can be seen in the thinking of
three students who consistently used the concept of "frame
of reference" and approached motion relative to the train in
contexts involving the motion of a ball "inside" a train,
regardless of the direction of the motion of the ball, and
regardless of whether the ball is moving in the air or
rolling on the floor (see Tasks 2, 3, and 4, and Tables 12
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and 13).

Yet those same students did consider the motion of

the ball when thrown from the roof of a train or by a
running person relative to the ground (see Tasks 5 and 6,
and Table 13).

It is worth mentioning that, although those

three students did not see any difference between the
situation of a ball thrown upwards by a person standing
inside the car compartment of a moving train and that of a
ball thrown upwards by a person standing on the roof of a
train, they nonetheless ''felt," or had the intuition, that
something is different.
In the context of the running person the students
explicitly said that ''things are different."

Even that

student who correctly thought about the problem tasks
involving the motion of the ball inside and outside the
train (Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) approached motion relative
to the ground in the context of the running person (see Task
6 and Table 13).

And the only student who responded that

the ball should come straight down to the person's hand, did
so because he did not want to contradict himself.

For if

that were the case, he should have reconsidered everything
that he had said about the rest of the problem tasks.
Another good illustration of the effect of context can
be seen in the problem situation involving the motion of an
object that is thrown up or projected from the ground (see
Tasks 7, 8, and 9, and Table 14).

A

unanimous response to

the problem situation involving a person throwing a rock
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straight up in the air was that the rock always comes back
straight down.

And the accepted explanation that the person

imparts only an upward velocity and not a horizontal one was
given almost intuitively.
The same unanimous response was given to the problem
situation of a cannon ball fired straight up in the air.
Yet, a disequilibration began to take place when the
students were reminded that the earth is also moving.

Many

of them began to reconsider their previous ideas:
Oh, yes, the rock doesn't go very high.
the
cannon ball shouldn't return to the same point, because
the earth has moved.
The rock I'm throwing up in the air will not fall
straight back to my hands because the earth is always
in motion. But we cannot feel this motion, and
that's why the rock will always fall in my hands.
The stone comes straight down because it doesn't go
high up, but the rocket goes very high, and in the
meantime the earth has moved.
All of the students began to have second thoughts about
whether a cannon ball or rocket will return to the same
point on the ground on their way back down to the earth.

It

is very interesting to note how the 100% certainty in the
context of a rock thrown up in the air changes into 100%
uncertainty in the case of a rocket.
Although all tasks in the first two categories were
essentially concerned with the same problem situation, that
is, the motion of an object in an inertial frame of
reference (train and earth), and the tasks of the third
category with the identification of a net force on a body
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traveling with constant velocity, all students did respond
by considering other irrelevant (from a Newtonian point of
view) to the problem concepts.

This also reconfirmed the

fact that students construct knowledge by putting into
relationship all the possible factors that might be involved
in a given problem situation.
The evidence provided by the thinking patterns of
students strongly supports the premise of Phenomenography
(Bowden et al., 1992; Marton, 1986), namely, that people
understand each phenomenon in a number of ways.

In looking

at Tables 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 one can see how strategies
changed from task to task.
strategy are also shown.

The preconceptions for each
The most common preconceptions are

now discussed.
Preconception 1: Motion Is Observed From A Point Considered
At Rest Relative To The Surroundings
For all students, including those who explicitly used
the notion of frame of reference in some contexts, motion
was also viewed from a point either on the ground or on the
fixed stars in other contexts.

It is quite interesting to

note that even those students who had consistently used the
ground as their frame of reference both in the context of
the motion of the ball inside and outside the train (see
Tasks 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 in
Chapter IV, and Tables 12 and 13 in this Chapter) and in the
context of the firing of the cannon ball and the projection
of the rocket (see Tasks 8 and 9, and Tables 6 and 7 in
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Chapter IV, and Table 14 in this Chapter) "observed" motion
from a point on the fixed stars in the context of the
sailing of the boats and flying of the airplanes around the
earth (see Tasks 14 and 15, and Tables 8 and 9 in Chapter
IV, and Table 15 in this Chapter).

When asked about what

was the frame of reference in the latter case all those
students thought that it should be "the space" or "something
outside."

And when they were requested to compare the

situations of the firing of the cannon ball and the
projection of the rocket with those of the sailing of the
boats and the flying of the airplanes around the earth, most
students reasoned that "the frame of reference changes" or
that ''it is easier or more convenient to see it from space,"
while two students characteristically said:
When I'm on the ground I can see where the cannon ball
or rocket falls • . . I can stay near the cannon and
watch the cannon ball land farther to the left . . . But
I must be outside the earth if I want to see the boats
or the planes go around it.
We must move outside the frame of reference (earth] if
we want to see the whole thing.
Another point worth mentioning and which is consistent
with the view that motion is observed from a point is that
many students used the notion of the "person" on the frame
of reference as the frame of reference.

Evidence for this

anthropomorphic conception of the frame of reference is also
provided by the "me" as a frame of reference in several
contexts.
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Preconception 2: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame
of Reference When Motion Takes Place Inside The Frame of
Reference
It made a difference in the thinking of most students
whether the body is moving inside or outside a moving
vehicle.

"Moving inside" was associated with motion

relative to the vehicle, while "moving outside" was
associated with motion relative to the ground or the stars.
Lie (1985) found the same preconception.
It is quite interesting to note the difference in the
responses, and, of course, the reasoning patterns of the
same students.

For although only one student thought that

simultaneity is possible in the situation of the two balls
moving outside along the roof of the compartment of the
train (see Task 1 and Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter IV, and
Table 12 in this Chapter), the idea that the balls can be
caught simultaneously when the two people are inside a
moving train was much more frequent (see Task 2 and Tables 1
and 2 in Chapter IV).

Four students thought as follows:

One guy will catch the ball first because he is
moving towards the ball. But inside the train, I
don't know, I think I'm confused now.
When you are outside, the frame of reference is the
earth, therefore the guy in the back of the train will
catch the ball first because the ball travels a
shorter distance. But inside the train, the frame of
reference is the train, so both guys should catch it at
the same time. Well, I think • . . yes, I'm sure both
guys will catch it at the same time.
Well, when you are inside the train things should be
different; because the air is moving.
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There is a difference when you are inside because
everything is moving with the train.
Everything is
part of the frame of reference.
Preconception 3: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame
Of Reference Due To The Atmosphere Inside The Frame Of
Reference
It made a difference in the thinking of two
students whether the object in motion is inside the
"air" or "atmosphere" of the train (see Task 2 and Table 1
and 2 in Chapter IV).

For "if the air where pumped out of

the car compartment of the train" things would be different
"because the frame of reference would change."

Or, as the

other student thought, "when there is air inside the train
we can define a frame of reference; but with no air, the
frame of reference becomes the earth."

Although both

students reasoned that if there were no air inside the
compartment of the train the person in the back would catch
the ball first because "he is moving towards the ball" (thus
adopting the ground as their reference point and using
perception like the majority of the students), the idea that
the existence of an atmosphere implies the establishment of
a frame of reference cannot be dismissed.
However, the notion of atmosphere was invoked by
another three students in the context of the rising of an
air balloon (see Task 10 and Tables 6 and 7 in Chapter IV).
When those three students were asked to compare the motion
of a cannon-ball with that of an air balloon they explicitly
spoke of the velocity of the balloon

(it is not as great as
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that of the cannon ball) as well as of the fact that "an air
balloon is rising" while "a cannon ball is fired."

And one

student (of those three) who had previously thought that a
cannon ball or rocket should return to the same point
because the situation is similar to the one involving a ball
thrown straight up from a moving train, did not think in a
similar manner in the context of the air balloon.

For as he

stated, "the air balloon returns to the same point because
as it's going up in the air, the atmosphere pushes it
along."

This provides additional confirmation of the

pri~acy of the context over the universality of the laws of
motion!
Another interesting point is that those three students
who used the notion of atmosphere to predict the motion of
the air balloon adopted the earth as a frame of reference.
Although this adoption does not provide evidence for an
understanding of the concept "frame of reference," it does
show that the students' "observation point" was on the
earth.

All three students did believe and explain that "we

can stay above the same place if there are no strong winds,"
and that by going very high in a hot-air balloon, they could
not land in a different place, as the rest of the students
thought, despite the fact that one of them had his
reservations:
But this way of travelling would be very tiring and
dangerous too . . . . The crossing of the Atlantic would
require many hours • . . and we never know where we
will land because there are strong air currents over
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the Atlantic. And the earth moves from west to east,
so we could only go west. But still, it can be very
dangerous . • • • Oh, you said we neglect wind. Then I
suppose it would take many hours . . . oh, yes, it takes
only 24 hours for a complete rotation ... so it wouldn't
take that long . • . but . . . I think we don't do this
kind of travelling because we cannot neglect the wind.
But as the earth spins it creates a wind . . . air
currents.
However, what is interesting is the fact that all three
students agreed that "if there were no atmosphere the
balloon would never return to the same point."

And two of

them also changed the frame of reference, or rather the
observation point, since perception became their thinking
strategy thus viewing the motion of two objects--the earth
and the balloon--relative to the fixed stars.
Preconception 4: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame
Of Reference When The Moving Body Is In Contact With The
Frame Of Reference
It made a difference whether the balls are moving in
the air or whether they are rolling on the floor of the
compartment of the train {see Table 12 in this Chapter).
For five students the rolling of the balls {see Task 3 and
Tables 1 and 2 in Chapter IV, and Table 12 in this Chapter)
implied that motion should be considered relative to the
train because "the balls are part of the motion of the
train'', or "the balls are traveling the same distances."
And two of those five students used the same strategy in the
context of two boats sailing around the earth {see Task 14
and Tables 9 and 10 in Chapter IV, and Table 15).

And in

the case of the two planes flying around the earth all
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students thought that one plane should arrive first at

the point from which the planes took off (see Task 15 and
the same Tables as above).
It is quite interesting to be mentioned in passing that
even those two students who appeared to have the concepts of
relativity and frame of reference, since they used those
concepts with consistency both in the context of the ball
moving inside the train (Tasks 2, 3, 4, and 5) and the boats
sailing around the earth (Task 14), did not used the earth
as a frame of reference.

For they thought that "the

airplanes are not on the earth any more."
phenomenographic study, Bowden et al.

In their

(1992) have also

identified a category of this type of student reasoning.
Preconception 5: Motion Is Considered Relative To The Frame
Of Reference When The Body Is Moving Towards The Frame Of
Reference
It made a considerable difference in the thinking of
students whether an object is projected upwards from the
ground or whether it is dropped from a height to the ground.
For although 18 students approached motion from an
absolute point of view and thought that a rocket cannot
return to the same point on the ground (see Task 9 and Table
6 in Chapter IV, and Table 14), 13 students did think, by
viewing motion as being relative to the ground or the stars,
that an iron ball will hit the ground at a point that is
directly under the point of release (see responses to Task
13 in Chapter IV).

Another interpretation of the responses

198

to Tasks 9 and 13 is also given in the section of Knowledge
Representation.
Preconception 6:

Two Observers See Different Events

For some students a person on the train and a person on
the ground see, not only different paths and velocities of
the ball thrown straight up in the air (see Table 13), but
also different events taking place since the former sees the
ball coming straight down to his/her hands, while the latter
sees the ball landing behind him/herself.
is also true.

And the opposite

One student, in fact, gave a very rational

explanation, which, however, shows the effect, and at the
same time the limitation, of analogies on understanding
abstract concepts.
It's like the two people, one standing and the other
running in the rain. The one standing still sees the
raindrops falling straight down • . . if he holds the
umbrella straight up. But to the other guy who's
running the raindrops appear to be coming at an angle
. . • they see different things . . . they are both
right, but this is how they perceive it . . . and one
will be soaked to the skin even if he's running with an
umbrella in his hand, unless he changes the direction
of the umbrella . . . . So they see different paths, one
straight, vertical, and one at an angle . • • and the
guy standing still will be dry . . . and the other
one will be wet in the front, unless like I said he
turns his umbrella like that.
Preconception 7: Uniform Straight Line Motion Is The Result
Of The Interaction Between Two Opposing Forces Of Different
Magnitude
It makes a difference whether an object is moving away
from any interactions, as in the case of a spaceship
traveling in outer space (see responses to Task 16 in
Chapter IV and Table 16 below), or whether it is moving
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under the influence of two forces of which one is opposing
the object's motion, as in the case of car traveling on a
windy day or a box being pushed along the floor (see
responses to Tasks 17 and 20 in Chapter IV).

One student

said:
When I'm pushing the box the force I'm applying must be
greater than the force of friction.
On the spaceship
there are no forces . • . it (the spaceship) is moving
because it has a momentum that was given by the
engine • • . it will move forever unless there are
forces to slow it down • • . . If there is a force in
the opposite direction, the force from the engine must
overcome this force • . . a force must be supplied
continuously, otherwise the spaceship would slow down.
Is is very interesting to be mentioned that, although the
preconception that motion with constant velocity implies a
net force began to surface in the context of a moving car,
the preconception that an object can move with constant
speed only in the absence of resistive forces were
identified when students were questioned about the initial
problem task with the spaceship, to which they had
apparently given the accepted Newtonian response.
I don't see any difference between the spaceship,
the car, and the box, if the spaceship is moving inside
an atmosphere.
There is no net force on the spaceship . . . it just
moves . • . it is carried . . . because there was a
force that set it in motion . . . (this) force acted
for a very short time . . . . we are in outer space, but
if there are forces in the opposite direction • • .
then there must be a force in the forward direction.
You asked me about the force on the spaceship . . . . If
you told me that the spaceship has to overcome friction
. I think the net force on the spaceship is the
force applied by the engine and the force of friction .
. • yes like the car moving on the road.
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This type of reasoning provides evidence that motion is
viewed as the result of two competing forces even when the
problem situation explicitly states that the object in
question is moving with constant velocity.

Halloun and

Hestenes (1985a) reported identical findings.
Preconception 8: Motion Of Objects In The Forward Direction
Once They Are Thrown Up In The Air From A Frame Of Reference
Is Due To A Force Supplied By The Motion Of The Frame Of
Reference
Seven students believed that a softball, once thrown up
in the air by a person standing on the floor of moving train
(see Table 13), will continue to move forward while it is
also moving up and down in the air (inside the car
compartment), because there is a force supplied by the
train.
It is the force of the train . . . because the train is
moving.
We know that whatever we throw up . . . falls back down
to our hand . . . . If there is no force on the ball
while it's going up in the air it will land behind.
Motion without a force? I mean, there has to be a
force, otherwise everything would hit the back of the
train . . • this doesn't happen.
Three of those seven students also entertain the same
preconception in the context of the motion of the softball
thrown up in the air from the roof (outside) of the train.
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Table 16
Reasoning Strategies and Preconceptions for Problem
Situation of Object Moving with Constant Velocity

TASK

16

STRATEGY

(a) Linking net force to
constant velocity

en

=

a)

PRECONCEPTION

There is a force
in the direction
of the spaceship's
motion because
the spaceship is
in motion (n = 4)
Objects in motion
are acted upon by
a continuous force
because the force
that sets objects
in motion has a
limited range of
action (n = 3)
Forces producing
acceleration have
an increasing
magnitude (n = 6)
A spaceship can
move with constant
velocity because
the force supplied
by the propulsion
engine is applied
in short bursts

en=

4)

There are forces
producing
acceleration and
those maintaining
constant velocity

en

=

4>

(table continues)

202

TASK

STRATEGY

(b) Linking zero net force
to constant velocity

An object can
move in the
absence of a net
force only if it
is set in motion
and there are no
forces to slow it
down (n = 6)

(a) Linking the resultant
of the forces exerted
by the engine and the
wind to constant
velocity (n = 16)

The force exerted
from the engine
is greater than
the force exerted
by the wind
(n = 16)

(n = 12)

17

PRECONCEPTION

There is a force
in the direction
of the object's
motion resulting
from one
accelerating
force and one
decelerating
force (n = 4)
(b) Linking zero net force
to constant velocity

<n

18

=

4)

(a) Linking net force
to motion along
an incline (n = 17)

Motion along an
an incline is
due to two forces
of different
magnitude (n = 17)

(b) Linking zero net
force to constant
velocity (n = 3)
(table continues)
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TASK

19

STRATEGY

(a) Linking greater net
force to the motion
of an object with
greater mass (n = 19)
(b) Linking zero net
force to constant
velocity (n = 1)
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(a) Linking the resultant
of the force exerted
by the person and the
force of friction to
constant velocity
= 11)

<n

PRECONCEPTION

Objects with
greater mass are
acted upon by
greater force
= 19)

<n

The force by the
person is greater
than the force
of friction
= 11)

<n

(b) Linking zero net
force to constant
velocity (n = 3)

Some Comments On Preconceptions
Explanations about why a particular student has thought
about a particular problem task the way he or she has are
usually taken to be mere speculations.

Why, for example,

did the two students who used vector composition of
velocities in Tasks 1 and 2--incorrectly though since they
did not take into account the different distances covered by
the two balls--not use this same strategy in the context of
the two balls rolling on the floor of the compartment of the
train (Task 3)?

Why did only one of these two students use
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vector composition of velocities to predict the motion of a
cannon-ball (Task 8)?

Why did the two students who invoked

the notion of atmosphere to predict the motion of the balls
inside the train (Task 2) not use the same notion in the
context of the rising balloon (Task 15) given the fact that
the notion was invoked by three other students?

And why did

that same student who had supposedly used with consistency
the same strategy across three contexts not use vector
composition in the context of the rocket (Task 9)?

From a

pedagogical point of view, however, it would be more
appropriate to make a number of general points regarding
preconceptions than concentrate on providing explanations
about why or how these preconceptions have been developed.
The Contextual nature of preconceptions.

Like

reasoning strategies, preconceptions are contextual since,
for example, only two, of those five students who used
"contact" as a criterion for judging whether or not an
object belongs to the frame of reference (Task 3), thought
that the boats (Task 14) move relative to the earth.

The

notion of "atmosphere" was invoked by two students in the
context of the motion of a ball inside the car compartment
of a train (Task 2), but not in the context of the rising
air balloon (Task 10).

Instead, three other students made

reference to "atmosphere" in the latter context.
The inter-relationship of preconceptions.
Preconceptions are inter-related and a certain response
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could very well result from more than one preconception.
Five students, for example, thought that once a ball is
thrown straight up in the air by a person standing on the
roof of the moving train the ball will land behind the
person because "the ball is outside the frame of reference''
while two had also the preconception that "there is no force
acting in the forward direction because the ball is not
moving inside the train."

However, it should be stressed

that for each problem task there was a primary preconception
that led students to reason the way they did, and secondary
preconceptions were identified upon further questioning.
The latent nature of preconceptions.
not become evident from the responses.

Preconceptions do

Preconceptions are

inferred either from reasoning strategies or through further
questioning about those strategies.

Most of the time

students were requested to compare and contrast their
responses to certain problem tasks.

It was after they

became aware of their strategies in thinking about problem
tasks that preconceptions were identified.
For example, in the case of a rocket fired vertically
from the ground (Task 9), the great majority of students
used perception as their reasoning strategy, and the
preconception that ''motion is observed from the fixed stars"
was inferred from that strategy and from their response to
the question about what was the frame of reference.

Yet it

was upon further questioning that the preconception "an
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object moving away from the frame of reference does not
belong in the frame of reference" was identified for three
students.

It was also through further questioning that a

preconception about force and motion was identified.

For

although 12 students thought that a ball, thrown straight up
by a person standing in the car compartment of a train, will
land in the person's hand because, while the ball is moving
up and down in the air, it is also moving forward {Task 4),
seven students thought so because they had the preconception
that "there is a force acting in the forward direction that
carries the ball forward."

Similarly, it took students some

time beyond the accepted response and the correct strategy,
that is, a spaceship is not acted upon by a net force
because it is moving with constant velocity {Task 16), to
give the preconception that "an object can move with uniform
straight line motion only when there are no resistive forces
to oppose the object's motion."
Three students who had approached motion relative to
the train in contexts involving the motion of a ball inside
the train {Tasks 2, 3, and 4),

gave the accepted response

through an accepted strategy by observing motion from the
ground in another context {Task 5).

It is obvious that for

those three students the preconception of viewing motion
from the ground was totally undetected in the context of
Tasks 2, 3, and 4.
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The implicit and explicit nature of preconceptions.

It

should be recognized that preconceptions can be implicit or
explicit.

The idea that motion is observed from the ground

or the fixed stars was tacit for some students, while other
students explicitly stated their preference for that
selection.

For example, the three students who changed

their point of observation expressed awareness of it.

Yet,

they could not find an explanation as to why they changed
their point of observation when the ball was thrown up from
the roof of the train (Task 5).

They thought that the path

of the ball, once in the air, "should be a curve (parabola)
because that's how we see it."

They also had a conceptual

difficulty with the path of the ball as viewed by a person
standing on the roof of the moving train.

The same

preconception was also had by the two students who employed
vector composition in Tasks 1 and 2, and by one of those two
students who used in Task 8.
With regard to the nature of preconceptions it should
be mentioned that several preconceptions about force were
explicit.

For when asked about the magnitude of the force

acting on a spaceship moving with constant velocity, six
students stated that the force is constant because if it
were not the spaceship would accelerate.

And they went on

to identify forces of increasing magnitude as forces
producing acceleration, and forces of constant magnitude as
forces maintaining constant speed.
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Preconceptions vs misconceptions.

Preconceptions are

not necessarily misconceptions, but instead ideas that are
at variance with the scientific ones.

For example the

preconception that "contact implies that motion is relative
to the frame of reference" is not a misconception.

Yet it

is an idea that is different from the one used by physicists
since the latter do not make such a distinction.

And the

fact that the visual perception of motion is a strategy of
the human perceptive system does not make even a perceptual
type of thinking a wrong thinking if the strategy is
acceptable.

Yet "perceptual thinking" is not scientific

thinking since a differentiation between a moving vehicle,
the ground and the fixed stars is implicitly or explicitly
made by the students.
Similarly the preconception "frames of reference are
closed vehicles" is not a misconception but rather an
incomplete idea, since physicists do not distinguish between
"closed" or "open" vehicles.

Nor do they differentiate

between vehicles and frames of reference, or between
vehicles that are "full with air" and vehicles from which
air has been pumped out.

On the other hand, the idea that

there is a net force on a body traveling with constant speed
is a misconception since this is an idea that is not only
different from the scientific one but is also a wrong one.
For there is no net force acting on a body moving with
constant velocity.

Empirical evidence, either through
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direct experience or computer simulation, that contradicts
the belief in the existence of a net force in the direction
of motion can show that this belief is in fact a
misconception.
Schematic Representation
From the identification of the strategies and
preconceptions an inference about what concepts exist and
how they are organized in the students' cognitive structure
in regard to their model of motion can be given.

This

content and its organization is certainly based upon the
number of problem tasks used in the present study, and there
is the possibility that other concepts might also exist.
The conceptual organization of the student's model of
motion is represented by two major types of schemata as
shown in Figures 24 and 25.

It should be mentioned though

that despite the similarities some students' schemata
contained more concepts than other students' schemata.

In

general, however, these two types of schemata provide a
comprehensive representation that is particularly useful
from a pedagogical point of view when a comparison with the
accepted scientific schema (Figure 26) is made.
As can be seen, Figure 24 represents an intuitive
schema based upon perception and everyday experiences with
motion and forces.

This type of schema was employed in the

thinking of those students who did not have any
understanding of the Newtonian conceptions.

On the other
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hand, Figure 25 represents a schema combining intuitive and
scientific concepts.

This type of schema contains both the

concept of frame of reference and the preconception of
motion as observed from a reference point.

This inference

is based upon the fact that students who used explicitly the
term frame of reference and viewed motion relative to that
frame of reference--train--also approached motion relative
to the ground or the fixed stars in subsequent contexts.

In

addition, it contains other concepts related to the frame of
reference such as "vehicle," "closed," and "atmosphere,"
since for some students, the concept of frame of reference
was linked to a closed vehicle, while for some other
students the notion of "atmosphere" was further employed.
The notion of being in contact with a vehicle, was also used
by some students who intuitively approached motion relative
to the frame of reference.

Moreover, an intuitive

differentiation between two directions of motion, that is
horizontal and vertical, was also made.

For some students

vertical motion, such as that of a ball thrown up by a
person standing on the floor of the car compartment of a
train, was related to motion relative to the frame of
reference, while horizontal motion, as in the case of a ball
moving along the length of the train, was approached
relative to the ground.
In regard to the causal link between zero net force and
motion, there are additional concepts related to that link.
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As shown in Figure 25, several students differentiated
between "moving" and "resistive" forces, while the magnitude
of a force was viewed as being either "constant" or
"increasing."

Constant magnitude forces were linked to

velocity or deceleration, while increasing magnitude forces
were associated with acceleration.

However, as can be seen

in Figure 25, the Newtonian link between constant magnitude
forces and acceleration was also present in the schema of
some students.

Figure 24.
Motion.

Network Representation of Intuitive Schema of
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Figure 25.
Network Representation of Schema Combining
Intuitive and Scientific Concepts.
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Figure 26.
of Motion.

Network Representation of Newtonian Schema
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Knowledge Representation
With regard to the representational format of the
students' knowledge, both propositional and analogical
representations seem to exist.

Although an interpretation,

the reasoning strategies and preconceptions do provide some
evidence that the concepts of motion and force are stored
not only in a propositional form, and hence in a schematic
structure representd by a networks of concepts (Figure 28),
but also in an analogical form.

And although propositional

representations of the concepts of force and motion appeared
to exist in all students, the fact that students employed
perception suggests that visual images do play an important
role in their reasoning process.

Moreover, for some

students analogical representations were predominant as this
became evident from their responses to the task of the
motion of a ball thrown upwards from the roof of the train
and from the hands of a running person (Tasks 5 and 6) as
well as from the responses to the problem situation of
string hanging from the roof of a van (Task 21).
In regard to Tasks 5 and 6, students employed visual
perception of two separate objects (ball-train, ball-human
body) moving in two different directions--the ball moving
upwards and the train or human body in the forward
direction.

However, it was in the case of the ball thrown

up in the air by a running person (Task 6) in particular
that students provided evidence for the existence of
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analogical representations.

In thinking aloud three

students said:
I'm moving under the ball • . . I have done this . . .
I know it.
We are running under the ball . . . it's like the train
. • . but I'm not 100% sure. But I'm sure that If I
throw a ball while I'm running the ball will land
behind me. •
Look my head is moving under the ball.
I don't know how to explain it, but as you throw the
ball up you are moving away from the ball . . • • It's
similar to the situation with the guy on the roof of
the train, but here you are also involved . . . I mean
when you are on the train, you are just moving with the
train • • • when you are actually running . . . I think
this is a different kind of motion • . . problem.
now you confuse me.
Even the only student who had the notion that motion is
defined relative to a frame of reference (as this became
evident from his responses to all five tasks of the first
category) thought that
this case is different because the person is moving
under the ball . . . . Here [in the train] the person is
also moving under the ball . . . but this is
different.
I don't know why . . . . But I know • . .
and I cannot explain it.
In discussing these responses, it should be pointed out
that there is a difference between the visual image of a
string hanging straight down from the roof of a van moving
in straight line with constant speed (this image has been
acquired and retained from personal experiences while inside
moving vehicles), and mental images like those of "moving
under a ball."

For mental images have been acquired not

only through visual perception but also through personal
experiences with the world.

However, as Johnson {1987)
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argues, these mental images fall in between visual images
and abstract propositional structures, and they are
therefore partly analogical and are stored in the episodic
memory.
Two further points, however, in regard to analogical
representations need to be made.

The first point is that

the present study provides some evidence that visual
representations might give rise to propositional
representations.

For as the majority of the responses to

two similar problem tasks demonstrated, an iron ball dropped
from the top of a high building would land at the foot of
the building, that is, at a point on the ground that was
directly under the iron ball at the moment the latter was
released {Task 13), while a rocket launched vertically from
the ground would not return to the same point on its way
back {Task 9).

Although for some students the

preconceptions of "moving away or towards the ground or
frame of reference" was responsible for their response to
those two tasks, for other students the visual
representation of a building on the ground might have made
them established in their mind a local frame of reference
and hence treat motion relative to the earth, while in the
problem situation with the rocket motion was approached
relative to space.

This interpretation becomes evident from

the responses of some students:
The iron ball dropped from the building moves in
straight line and falls parallel to the building
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• . . it (iron ball) will strike the ground at the
foot of the building . . . • The rocket is moving in
space • • . away from the earth . . . I may be wrong,
but that's how I understand it.
The building is attached to the earth . • • the
building moves with the earth . . . . The rocket is
moving alone.
The earth is moving but the building is also moving
with the earth
• the building is fixed on the
earth • . . so the iron ball will land at the foot of
the building.
The earth and the building are moving together . . •
they are on the same frame of reference . . . the guy
who dropped the ball was on the frame of reference.
But the rocket is moving away from the frame of
reference.
The second point is that analogical representations are
not contextual.

This means that, unlike propositional

representations, analogical representations are not tied to
the context in which the concepts of force and motion are
required.

For as the thinking of many students about the

situation of a spaceship traveling in outer space showed
(Task 16), the mental image of "two competing forces" (a
moving one and a resistive one), acquired through
sensorimotor activities and certainly in contexts that did
not involve airplanes (Task 18) and spaceships (Task 16) did
in fact guide the reasoning process.
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CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
The present study investigated how undergraduate
university students who have completed one semester of
coursework in non-calculus general physics with elements in
Newtonian mechanics understand the Newtonian model of
motion.

For the evaluation of conceptual understanding

paper and pencil tasks in an interview mode were employed
throughout the study, while a short clinical interview in
the beginning was used to assess prior knowledge such as the
concept of relativity, frame of reference, equivalence
between motion and rest and Newton's First Law, and contexts
in which this knowledge is utilized.
For the construction of the problem tasks two research
approaches to assessing conceptual understanding were
employed:

Phenomenography and Rule Assessment Methodology.

The former is based on the philosophical notion that people
perceive, conceptualize and understand each phenomenon and
concept in a number of qualitatively different ways; the
latter is a research methodology based on the idea that
people use with consistency a number of reasoning strategies
depending upon the context in question, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the researcher to identify all possible
strategies by constructing contexts in which the same
concept is embedded.
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The problem tasks were grouped into the following three
categories:
1.

Motion of an object in a frame of reference.

2.

Motion of an object in the frame of reference of

the earth.
3.

Motion of an object with constant velocity.

The problem tasks assessed the following three
fundamental notions of the Newtonian model of motion:
1.

Uniform straight line motion is equivalent to rest.

2.

Motion in general is relative to an inertial frame

of reference.
3.

Uniform straight line motion can exist in the

absence of a net force.
The responses were analyzed by considering the accepted
and the alternative conception(s), and then for each
alternative conception reasoning strategies and
preconceptions were identified.

However, preconceptions

were found, even in the accepted conceptions.

Finally an

inferrence about the schematic representation and about
knowledge representation in general was made.
It was confirmed that conceptual understanding is a
complex process involving many interrelated factors that
depend upon personal experiences and beliefs.

There is

evidence that the context has primacy over the content since
the same concept was understood differently depending upon
the context in which the concept was required.

There is
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also strong evidence that in all students' thinking
perception played a major role.

For in approaching problems

involving the motion of an object in a moving frame of
reference, all students thought in terms of two separate
bodies (the object and the frame of reference) moving
relative to each other, but nevertheless viewed motion from
their own absolute point of view without reference to the
velocities of the objects and the distances they traveled.
This "absolute point of observation" was either on the
ground or on the fixed stars.
With regard to the schematic representation, two major
types of schemata were identified.

The first type is an

intuitive schema derived from the perception of motion as
well as from bodily experiences that suggest a causal link
between motion and forces (the moving ones and the resistive
ones).

This type of schema is a crude one, simplistic, yet

convenient and explanatory.

The second type of schema is a

mixture of the intuitive one and a scientific one.

This

schema is more complicated with many contradictory concepts
which, however, exist in the students' cognitive structure
without any contradiction.

These findings about the

existence of two superimposed schemata without apparent
contradiction reconfirm the conclusion of previous studies
(di Sessa, 1982; Gilbert et al., 1982; Halloun & Hestenes,
1985a; Reif & Larkin, 1991; Viennot, 1979).
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The responses to the various tasks also suggest that
the concepts of force and motion are stored not only in the
form of propositions, but also in the form of visual images,
and mental-image schemata resulting from personal bodily
experiences.

In short, the concept of force and motion are

represented both propositionally and analogically.

The

first type of schema refers to analogical representations,
while the second type is a combination of both analogical
and propositional representations.

And it deserves to be

pointed out that in some students those analogical
representations seemed to be much "stronger" than, and
remained quite separate from, the propositional ones in
certain contexts.
The implications of the existence of those two types of
schemata for instructional practices are that the following
preconceptions should be the starting point of the learning
process if understanding is the goal:
1.

Frames of reference are observation points.

2.

Frames of reference are closed vehicles.

3.

Objects move relative to (move along with) the

frame of reference because the objects are moving inside the
frame of reference.
4.

Objects belong in the frame of reference only when

they are in contact with it.
5.

Two observers, one on the ground and the other on a

frame of reference see not only different paths and
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velocities for a moving object, but also different events
involving the object.
6.

An object dropped from a point high on the frame of

reference belongs in the frame of reference because the
object is moving towards the frame of reference.
7.

An object projected straight up from a frame of

reference does not belong in the frame of reference because
the object is moving away from it.
8.

An object rising straight up from the ground

returns to the same point on the ground on its way back down
because the object moves along with the atmosphere of the
earth.
9.

An object continues to move in the forward

direction once it is thrown straight up in the air from a
frame of reference because there is a forward force supplied
by the motion of the frame of reference.
10.

An object in motion, including straight line

motion, is acted upon by a net force in the direction of
motion.
11.

A constant force produces constant velocity while

an increasing force produces acceleration.
12.

The effect of a constant force depends upon its

magnitude.
13.

An object can move in the absence of a net force

only if there are no resistive forces.
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14.

The net force responsible for the uniform motion

of an object results from the interaction of two opposing
forces, the accelerating force and the resistive force.
15.

An object of greater mass is acted upon by greater

net force even when the object is moving with constant
velocity.
Conclusion
Students demonstrated an everyday--common sense-understanding based on perception and past experiences with
the world.

However, they did not have a conceptual

understanding of the Newtonian model because they had
difficulty in:
1. Treating motion always relative to a frame of
reference.
2. Identifying zero net force on an object moving with
constant velocity across all contexts.
3. Identifying the equivalence between motion and rest.
4. Using the same concept with consistency in a variety
of contexts.
Recommendations
If we, as science educators, take seriously and espouse
the shift from behaviourism to cognitive science, then it
goes without saying that understanding should be the goal of
any science lesson.

More than a decade ago, Resnick {1983)

made it quite clear that new findings in the area of
cognitive science necessitate new approaches to teaching and
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learning.

More than a decade, however, has passed; and,

despite the energy, effort, and talent on the part of
excellent instructors, "understanding" is seen as a farfetched dream, let alone a reality in classrooms at both the
high school and college level.
True, it took mankind 2000 years to model
successfully phenomena of force and motion.

It would be

therefore paradoxical to expect students to acquire an
understanding of the Newtonian model in one or two years,
let alone in one semester!

It is also true that visual

images and the problem of language will always exist-perception is a form of understanding, and motion in
everyday language is fundamentally different from rest--and
that bodily experiences will inevitably help develop
intuitive schemata, and hence "mini theories" and
preconceptions about force and motion.

However, this type

of reasoning does not absolve science educators and
instructors from their purpose, that is helping students, at
all levels of education, to "truly" understand.

But how

could they achieve this purpose, given the existence of both
intuitive and scientifico-intuitive explanatory schemata, as
well as the inevitability of the development and
strengthening of those schemata?
Thus far science educators and cognitive scientists
have been stressing a number of strategies for helping
students understand, and for treating their preconceptions,
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such as clarification of student ideas at all levels of
instruction, challenging these ideas through counter
examples, using precise and unambiguous language,
differentiating between Newtonian and everyday language, and
finally applying a concept in a variety of contexts {Gorsky
&

Finegold, 1992; Hadzigeorgiou, 1987; Posner et al., 1982,

Driver & Oldham, 1986).

However, the inevitability of the

development of intuitive schemata as well as their
persistence into adulthood, point to another alternative
avenue.

This avenue is the development of a strong

scientific schema that can be called upon whenever the
situation arises without the constraints imposed on thinking
by the intuitive schema.
The development of a strong schema is an idea
conceived while conducting the interviews.

I noticed quite

often that, for the students who had a partial understanding
of the Newtonian conceptions, a kind of "intellectual
struggle" between the Newtonian conceptions and the
intuitive schema was taking place.

I therefore postulated

that it is the "stronger schema" that determines the final
retrieval of concepts, and hence the reasoning strategy
employed in a certain problem task.

And for almost all

students the retrieval took place from the intuitive and not
from the scientific, which, as was interpreted, are
intermingled.

The following specific recommendations could

very well show that in the long run (although this will be a
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matter of another longitudinal study to determine) the only
remedy to developing ''scientific" understanding is to help
students develop the scientific Newtonian schema through a
conscious effort on the part of teachers.

This approach may

very well prove to be more effective and more efficient than
the conceptual change approach.

These specific

recommendations should be seen as steps, taken both jointly
and independently, to developing and strengthening the
Newtonian schema of motion.
1. Provision of Advance Organizers and Schemata at a Very
Early Age
It is my belief that students should be helped to
develop the scientific Newtonian schema from early on.

It

is therefore imperative that a conceptual framework be
developed at a very early age, and also strengthened in
later years.

But not just by teaching the scientific ideas,

but rather by providing abstract ideas in a way that could
become understood.
Taking into account the shift from the concrete to the
abstract, the notion that all knowledge is abstract, and
therefore general concepts and ideas that in some way can
become understood should be introduced even to young
children, appears to be making more sense now than it did
ten or twenty years ago.

However, it would be totally

unrealistic to expect students at the elementary level to
understand abstact concepts in a propositional form.

For

this reason the fundamental ideas should be introduced to
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students through learning episodes that deliberately contain
general ideas.

These episodes will serve as advance

organizers that will help subsume other less inclusive
concepts through progressive differentiation.

In addition,

the episodes will be remembered due to the "contextual set
up."

Given the by now famous idea that the most important

factor influencing learning is the prior conceptions and
experiences of the learner (Ausubel et al., 1978), the
utilization of sensorimotor activities becomes justified.
In order for the first law to be introduced through an
advance organizer, "action of forces" should be the starting
point.

An object, like a stone or ball, tied to a piece of

string that is twirled around in a circle means action of a
force; this is what students, at all levels, feel because it
is real.

Following this line of reasoning, the advance

organizer "circular motion means the action of a force" that
can be "felt" by all students can initiate the instructional
process.

Once this general idea is assimilated, "straight

line motion in the absence of a net force" can be subsumed
under it.

For it would be easier and much more meaningful

for students to "see" and "feel" that once they release the
string from their hand "the force they were applying becomes
zero and the object moves in a straight line."

(In

addition, this particular advance organizer can help develop
at a later stage a meaningful link between circular motion
and acceleration.)

Given the fact that Newton's First Law,
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that is motion in the absence of net force, goes contrary to
common experiences, then it would make more sense to start
from those experiences.
It is not news that the Newton's First Law poses the
greatest conceptual problems, since motion in the absence of
forces is a utopia and goes contrary to common sense.

Yet,

activities carefully designed and interpreted could help
towards alleviating these problems.

Walking, for example,

over a trolley-car with constant speed could be used as an
organizer that states that "uniform motion in straight line
does not involve a net force," since students could "see"
and "feel" that, by walking over it, the final displacement
of the trolley-car is zero.

But as was said, the

sensorimotor experiences and their interpretation should be
used simultaneously.

If these two complementary activities

are used at the same time, even the fundamental, but so
difficult to grasp, notion that "rest and uniform straight
line motion are equivalent," could be understood.

For once

students are encouraged to imagine themselves inside the car
compartment of a train and predict in which direction their
standing broad jump would be longer, while, at the same
time, performing "live" the same jump inside the classroom,
in all possible directions, and becoming aware that the
earth is in fact a moving vehicle, conceptul problems
associated with the Newtonian model would be alleviated.
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Another advance organizer would be "forces are applied
over time or distance."

This particular organizer will

subsume the concept of acceleration.

Students can perform

any kind of activity in which the concepts of impulse (F*t}
and work (F*S} are embedded.

For example, jumping,

throwing, coming to a stop by use of an elastic or rope, and
twirling an object tied to a piece of string are good
experiences that will form a ''roof" under which new concepts
and experiences will be subsumed.
Certainly the second law is a quantitative definition
of force, and does not pose those immense conceptual
difficulties as does the first law.

However, without a

sound grasp of the concept of acceleration, students should
not be expected to relate force to acceleration and
therefore understand what the second law is all about.

And

there is also another problem that seems to complicate
things further, namely, that the second law

does not become

manifest in daily experiences though its simple formula
F=ma, as much as it does through its consequences, that is
the concepts of impulse and work respectively.

What all

people experience in their daily life is "forces acting over
a distance or over a time interval."
pull, kick, slap and throw objects.

People squeeze, push,
And it is through these

experiences that teachers should introduce the second law.
But sensorimotor activities can also be used for the
provision of schemata.

The schema of Force, for example,

230

could be developed through an activity involving two
students on skate-boards who are holding an extended piece
of rope, and who are pulling the rope; first only one
student pulls, then both pull.

It is obvious that this

activity does provide the Newtonian schema of force, namely,
that forces act in pairs, and that these forces act in
opposite directions.

For regardless of whether only one

student or both of them pull, motion will always take place
in opposite directions.
It should be recognized that learning episodes in the
form of activities involving the child's own body, and which
are designed in such a way that they contain unambiguously
general ideas, seem to be a potential educational tool in
the hands of science teachers.

In actual fact, these

episodes may well prove to be both an answer and a
complement to current theories of learning since all three
domains of the brain are involved simultaneously.

In

addition, they are the only way to introduce students to
general and abstract ideas at an age in which propositions
among concepts do not make sense at all, and at the same
time help them with the unification of semantic and episodic
knowledge, which, as the present study showed, can remain
separate and quite isolated from each other.
2. Reinterpretation of student Ideas about Sensorimotor
Experiences
Because intuitive schemata are embedded in, and stem
from, bodily experiences with motion and forces, and because
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these schemata have an explanatory power, students should be
helped to reinterpret their experiences.

For it is true

that, although what students experience and feel is real, it
is the interpretations of these experiences and feelings
that develop, and subsequently reinforce through additional
agents, the intuitive schemata.

It is therefore imperative

that several misinterpretations stemming from daily
experiences be corrected at an early age before students
move on to a higher level.

A good example is the

misinterpretation of the reverse thrust which gives rise to
the preconception that the direction of the acceleration is
opposite to that of the applied force.

And yet this

preconception can be changed once students are led to accept
that there is no force pushing them backwards or forwards,
but instead there are only contact forces that must be
provided by the objects with which the human body is in
contact.

Another common misinterpretation is the idea that

motion is the result of two competing forces, such as the
force one applies to push a box, and the opposing force of
friction.

It is obvious that the reintepretation of the

idea that the "pushing force is greater than the frictional
force" should be the first priority of physics instructors
when it comes to the introduction of the First Law.
3.

Reintroduction of a Concept at Different Grade Levels
It should be emphasized that the progressive

development of the concepts of the Newtonian model over a
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period of six or eight years is much more realistic than
their mastery in one year or a couple of semesters.

Physics

instructors should design activities that could demonstrate
the coherence of the laws of motion as students move from
the elementary grades throught high school and even
university.

It is quite certain that if the Laws of motion

are introduced in this spiral fashion at all levels, by the
time students leave senior-high school they will have a
conceptual understanding comparable to that of a physicist.
4.

Explicit Teaching of the Newtonian Model
Given that the Newtonian schema of motion is at

variance with the intuitive schemata possessed by students,
it would be unreasonable to expect students to understand
the Newtonian concepts unless these concepts are defined and
used in a way that explicitly shows the difference between
the Newtonian and the common sense way of looking at
phenomena of force and motion.

It would be also unrealistic

to expect students to "rediscover" the concepts of the
Newtonian model if we take into account the fact that even
Galileo himself had not completely abandoned the
Aristotelian belief that the perfect and perpetual motion
was circular.

Moreover, the constraints of time imposed

upon any curriculum and any instructional model do not allow
for such "rediscoveries."
Another reason why the explicit teaching of the
Newtonian model is recommended is that it can facilitate
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access.

For as was discussed in the review of the

literature, access is affected by the nature of the problem
situations considered during the learning process, and
therefore, not only the concepts but also the context and
the conditions under which those concepts are applicable are
of importance.

If different contexts as well as the

conditions that "trigger" the applicability of a concept are
provided to students, access to relevant information is more
likely to occur.

In such a way students could abandon the

perceptual type of thinking and instead use, for example,
the notion that rest and uniform straight line motion are
fundamentally equivalent whenever the appropriate context
and conditions arise.
The power of modeling is not my own idea since the
explicit teaching of the particulate model of matter, the
modeling of real-life objects as dimensionless particles,
the Bohr model for the atom, to mention but a few, has been
utilized by science educators with considerable success
(Shelley, 1989).

In the same fashion, students should be

taught explicity the notion of frame of reference

(and at

the same time become aware that a frame of reference is
different from "a point from which we just perceive
motion"), the notion that motion in straight line with
constant speed does not involve a net force, and, of course,
the idea that rest and motion with constant speed in
straight line are the same thing.

The idea that students
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should be taught explicitly the rules and techniques of
modeling in general is remarked upon by Hestenes (1992),
while Reif and Larkin (1991) have recommended the explicit
teaching of scientific knowledge--its goals and structure.
5.

Use of Concept Mapping
Taking into account the idea that our concepts in

memory are not held as separate or scattered units but are
highly organized into schematic sctructures (Anderson,
1985), then a conscious effort on the part of physics
instructors should be to develop and promote knowledge
structure.

Concept mapping of the concepts of the Newtonian

model at every level of instruction would very much help
towards this development and promotion.

There is evidence

that concept mapping can promote knowledge structure and
hence enhance understanding (Heinze-Fry & Novak, 1990; Novak
&

Gowin, 1984).

Also a recent study by Willerman and McHarg

(1991) found evidence that concept mapping at the beginning
of instruction resulted in better understanding.
6. Careful Selection of Problem Tasks
No doubt the selection of the problems that will be
worked out under both guided and independent practice plays
an important role.

Yet that selection should be carefully

done so that students become aware that a contradiction
exists.

This awareness of a contadiction, however, goes

well beyond the Piagetian idea of disequilibration, since
the latter implies a confusion between existing conceptions
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and new knowledge, while the former is an awareness of the
contradictions of one's own thoughts.

For this reason,

problems should be selected in such a way that the thinking
strategy employed in one of the problems contradicts the
thinking strategy employed in another.
It is therefore crucial that a general problem
situation is selected, and then specific contexts are
devised, all of which address the same concept.

However,

these specific contexts do not imply just a multiplicity of
contexts, but rather contexts that closely resemble one
another.

For only then will students become aware of their

"implicit" or "tacit" reasoning strategies.

And the

advantage ensuing from this awareness will certainly result
in a conceptual change as the interviews conducted during
the present study showed.
7. Reconsidering the Traditional Approach to Teaching
Newtonian Mechanics
The recommendation that the development and subsequent
reinforcement of the Newtonian model of motion start at an
early age through sensorimotor activities necessitates a
reconsideration of our ideas about instructional design.

So

far students have been taught by starting from straight line
motion, supposedly because it "looks" simpler, and then move
on to circular motion.

Or starting from bodies at rest and

then move on to the study of bodies in motion, and teach
first about acceleration and then move on to the concepts of
impulse and work.

"This procedure," as Ausubel et al.
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remind us, "is effective with infrahumans and rote

learning of nonsense materials" and not ''for meaningful
learning" (p. 362).

And the problems that continue to

plague the teaching-learning process also tell us that this
approach does not work.
Perhaps it is time we started from circular motion and
the action of forces; that is what is real and what students
are aware of, not only during the lesson, but also when they
are out of school.

And after they get a grasp that

"circular motion involves the action of forces" teachers can
confidently introduce them to the first law.
Although teaching strategies such as computer
simulations through games where an object on the screen
obeys the Newtonian laws of motion is a motivating way to
introduce students to the Newtonian model, the effectiveness
of such an approach for developing acceptable conceptions
could be called into question.

For understanding is

contextual, and therefore students will be able to apply
successfully the laws of motion while playing the Newtonian
games, and yet retain the intuitive schema resulting from
sensorimotor experiences.

On the contrary, the provision of

sensorimotor activities into which ideas that can subsume
less inclusive concepts are embedded seems more promising.
In actual fact, this may be the best approach, and, at the
same time, a compromise to teach something that goes
contrary to common experience through common experience.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMED CONSENT FORM

The purpose of this study is to assess how university
physics students understand concepts of Newtonian mechanics,
that is, those of force and motion. The study is qualitative,
and therefore no mathematical formulae are involved.
There
are no right or wrong answers; instead, any ideas and beliefs
that you may have in your mind, both from instruction and
personal experiences with the world, are important.
Your participation in the study will involve an interview
approximately one hour in length.
Your participation is
voluntary, there are no risks or discomforts involved, and you
may terminate it at any time during the study.
It is hoped
that you will benefit from your participation, in the sense
that you will acquire a better grasp of the concepts of force
and motion. This study can be also seen as a complement to,
and extension of, the physics course you are taking from Dr.
Peter Hoekse and Dr. Roy Unruh.
Dr. Susann Doody (273-2719, EDC 159) can provide you with
additional information regarding the purpose of the study.
You are also encouraged to ask further questions about the
study after its completion.
If you have questions concerning your rights as a
participant of a research project you may wish to call the
office of the Human subjects Coordinator, University of
Northern Iowa, (319-273-2748).
I am fully aware of the nature and extent of my
participation in this study as stated above, and
the possible risks arising from it.
I hereby agree
to participate in this study. I ackowledge that I
have received a copy of this consent statement.

Signature of Participant

Date

Printed name of Participant

Date

Signature of Investigator

Date
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APPENDIX B
APPROVAL SHEET
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October 15, 1993
Yannis Hadzigeorgiou
Curriculum & Instruction, SEC 618
University of Northern Iowa
Cedar Falls, IA 50614
Dear Yannis Hadzigeorgiou:
Your project, "Conceptual Representation of the Newtonian Model of Motion
in University Physics Students", which you submitted for human subjects
review on October 10, 1993 has been determined to be exempt from further
review under the guidelines stated in the UNI Human Subjects Handbook. You
may commence participation of human research subjects in your project.
Your project need not be submitted for continuing review unless you alter
it in a way that increases the risk to the participants. If you make any
such changes in your project, you should notify the Graduate College
Office.
If you decide to seek federal funds for this project, it would be wise not
to claim exemption from human subjects review on your application. Should
the agency to which you submit the application decide that your project is
not exempt from review, you might not be able to submit the project for
review by the UNI Institutional Review Board within the federal agency's
time limit (30 days· after application). As a precaution against
applicants' being caught in such a time bind, the Board will review any
projects for which federal funds are sought. If you do seek federal funds
for this project, please submit the project for human subjects review no
later than the time you submit your funding application.
If you have any further questions about the Human Subjects Review System,
please contact me. Best wishes for your project.

s~
Norris M. Durham ... P.h.D.
Chair, Institutional Review Board
cc:

Dr. David A. Walker, Associate Dean
Dr. Susann Doody
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APPENDIX C
INTERVIEW SCRIPT
Dear student (by name), first of all I would like to
thank you for participating in this study.
It is a study
that involves philosophy, psychology, and physics, and I am
doing it for my doctoral dissertation.
I am interested in
finding out about how people think about various familiar
situations. There are no right or wrong answers. Nor are
there any mathematical formulae involved. Therefore I would
appreciate it if you gave me whatever ideas you have in your
mind.
It would be also very useful if you thought aloud by
explaining the way, that is "how", you are thinking.
I will first start by asking you some general questions
about how objects move and then I will present you with some
specific problems. I am hoping that we will be through in
about an hour. We might, however, take five or ten minutes
longer. If, at any moment, you feel tired or have any
problems, please let me know. Stretch out, relax and
think.
QUESTIONS FOR ASSESSING PRIOR PROPOSITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
1.

How would you define motion?

2. How can you say whether or not a body is moving?
If, for example, we are sitting next to each other on an
airplane, and we are looking out through the window and see
an airplane, would you agree with me that the airplane is
not moving, since to me the airplane appears to be at rest?
3. In the case of two people, one aboard a moving a train,
and the other on the platform, who watch the same event
taking place inside the train, that is the flipping of a
coin, what can you say about the path, the time of flight,
and the velocity of the coin?
4.
In the case of a person standing still in the rain, the
rain drops appear to fall vertically, while to a person
running in the rain the drops appear to fall at an angle.
Who is right? What is the real direction of motion of the
rain drops?
5. Can a body move in the absence of forces?
some examples?

Can you give

6. A spaceship is at rest at a space-station, away from any
planetary forces.
Suddenly its engine is fired once. What
do you think will happen? (Further explanation: How far will
the spaceship travel?)
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7. Suppose you are inside a vehicle or room which have no
windows that allow you to look outside. How can you tell
whether or not you are moving?
This is fine.
I will now present you with specific problem
tasks.
I have categorized my problems into three
categories. Each category is about one or two general
problem situations.
CATEGORY 1 - MOTION OF BODIES IN MOVING FRAMES OF REFERENCE
This category is concerned with two problem situations.
The first one, as you can see here in the drawing, is about
two friends standing on either end of the roof of a car
compartment of a train, facing each other, and who throw the
ball they are holding in their hands to each other. The
effect of wind or air resistance is considered negligible.
Task 1: Suppose that the train is at rest. What do you
think will happen?
(Further explanation: will the two
friends catch the ball simultaneously?) What is you frame
of reference?
(Clarification: relative to what point do you
perceive motion?) What makes the balls travel the length of
the compartment? suppose now that the train is moving with
constant speed in straight line, and suddenly the two
friends are throwing the balls. What do you think will
happen now? What is you frame of reference? What now makes
the balls travel the length of the compartment?
Task 2: Now as you see in this drawing, the two friends are
doing the same activity, but this time inside the train.
What do think will happen now? What is your frame of
reference? What makes the ball travel the length of the
compartment?
Task 3: What do think would happen if the two friends
rolled the balls, as you can see it in the drawing, towards
each other?
Task 4: Now we come to the second problem situation. There
is a person, as you can see it in the drawing, sitting in
the car compartment of a train traveling with constant speed
in straight line. Suddenly the person throws the softball
he/she is holding a small way straight up in the air. Where
will the softball land? What is your frame of reference?
What path does the softball take? What makes the ball
travel along that path?
Task 5: Where
on the roof of
reference this
makes the ball

will the ball land if the person is standing
the same train? What is your frame of
time? What is the path of the ball? What
travel along that path?
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Task 6: Now look at this drawing. What you see is a person
running with constant speed in straight line. Suddenly the
person throws a baseball straight up in the air.
(Clarification: the person applies a vertical force by
moving his hand vertically relative to his/her body.) Where
will the baseball land?
CATEGORY 2 - MOTION OF BODIES ON THE INERTIAL FRAME OF
REFERENCE OF THE EARTH
We now come to the second category. This category is
concerned with three general problem situations. The first
situation is about an object (like a rock, rocket, or airballoon) that is thrown or projected straigth up from the
ground.
I would like you to think about where that object
will land. The second situation is about an iron ball that
is dropped from a height to the ground. Again, I would like
you to think about where the iron ball will land. The third
situation is about two airplanes and two boats that are
going around the earth.
Task 7: So I start with this drawing that shows a person
standing in a yard and throwing a rock straight up in the
air. The air resistance is not taken into account. Where
will it land? What is your frame of reference? What makes
the rock travel up and down?
Task 8: What do you think now about a cannon ball fired by
a cannon as shown in the drawing? Where will the cannon
ball land? The effect of the air is not taken into account.
What is your frame of reference? What makes the cannon ball
travel up and down? Do you think the place of landing would
change if we took into account the motion of the earth? We
assume that, for the time it takes for the cannon ball to go
up and down, the earth travels with a constant speed in
straight line.
Task 9: Where would a rocket land if it were fired
vertically from the ground? The rocket travels straight up
until all its fuel is used up and then starts falling
straight down. Now, as you can see in the drawing, we take
into account the motion of the earth. Again the effect of
the air resistance is negligible. What is your frame of
reference? What path does the rocket follow? What makes
the rocket travel along that path?
Task 10: Now we will take the case of an air-balloon rising
vertically above the ground. After it goes high up, it
stays there for some time, and then comes back down again.
Where will it touch down? The are no winds in the
atmosphere to disturb the motion of the air-balloon. What
is your frame of reference? What path will the balloon
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take?

What makes the balloon travel along that path?

Task 11: Let's now come to the second problem situation
about falling iron balls. As you can see in the drawing, an
iron ball is dropped from a point high above the ground by
an imaginary hand fixed in space. Where will the iron ball
land? The only force acting on the ball is its weight.
What is your frame of reference? What path will the iron
ball take? What makes the iron ball move along that path?
Task 12: Do you see any difference in your thinking if the
iron ball were dropped by an imaginary hand that was near
the top of very high building? What would be your frame of
reference? What path would the iron ball follow? What
would make the iron ball move along that path?
Task 13: Now the iron ball is dropped from a very tall
building. As you see in the drawing, the man dropping the
ball is standing at the top of the building. Where will it
land? The only force acting on the ball is its weight.
What is your frame of reference? What path does the iron
ball follow? What makes the iron ball move along that path?
Task 14: The third and final situation of this category
involves two objects going around the earth. As you see in
the drawing, two boats are setting sail from the same place
on the equator, and they are going to sail around the earth
and along the equator. The boats will sail in opposite
directions. Will the boats arrive at the place from which
they set sail at the same time? What is your frame of
reference?
Task 15: How would now think if two airplanes were to take
off from the same place on the equator, and fly around the
earth parallel to the equator but in opposite directions?
Do you see any difference between this and the previous
problem with boat? What is your frame of reference?
Do you see any differences between the problem with the boat
and the airplane going around the earth, and the problem
with the two friends on the train? (Effect of wind is
negligible.)
I think you have been an excellent participant. You
really thought aloud during the problem tasks.
If you think
you could devote ten or fifteen more minutes I would really
appreciate it. You don't have to stay because I have enough
information to do my study, and as I said this was supposed
to last approximately one hour. But there is an additional
point which I would like to clarify further.
So if you
think that you can stay and "squeeze" your mind for an other
ten minutes, that would be fine.
If you feel tired or if
you have other things to attend to, that is again fine, and
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I want to thank you for your time.
CATEGORY 3 - MOTION OF BODIES WITH CONSTANT VELOCITY
This category has different questions about the relationship
between motion and net force.
Task 16: Do think that there is a net force acting on a
spaceship traveling in outer space with constant velocity?
Task 17: How about a car traveling against a strong wind?
The driver, as you see in the drawing, manages to keep the
car in a straight line with constant speed.
Do you think
there is a net force on the car?
Task 18: Here you see three identical airplanes traveling
with constant speed in a straight line.
Is a net force
acting on the planes, and if yes, on which ones? If yes,
which net force is greater?
Task 19: There are three different vehicles: a bicycle, a
racing car, and a truck.
They are all traveling with
constant speed in straight line. What can you say about the
net force acting on them?
Task 20:
In the drawing you see a person pushing a heavy
box along the floor with constant speed in straight line.
What can you say about the net force acting on the box?
Task 21:
In the drawing you see three identical vans. As
you see there is a string hanging from the roof of each van.
There is also a bob attached to the end of the string.
Which case do you think better shows a van moving with
constant speed in straight line?

